People v. Richardson
| Decision Date | 25 March 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 1–11–3075.,1–11–3075. |
| Citation | 30 N.E.3d 336 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Andre RICHARDSON, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Michael J. Pelletier, Alan D. Goldberg, and S. Amanda Ingram, all of State Appellate Defender's Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Anita M. Alvarez, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Jon Waters, and Nancy Colletti, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
¶ 1 Defendant Andre Richardson appeals from the summary dismissal of his pro se petition for relief under the Post–Conviction Hearing Act (Act) ( 725 ILCS 5/122–1 et seq.
(West 2010)). On appeal, Richardson contends that his petition sufficiently alleged an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on trial counsel's failure to acquire and produce evidence of his mental impairment to demonstrate his inability to waive his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). We affirm.
¶ 3 On February 9, 2001, Richardson, who was 16 years old, was arrested at 4837 South St. Lawrence Avenue in Chicago in connection with the murder of his 11–month–old daughter, Diamond Clark. At the police station, Richardson gave a videotaped statement in which he made inculpatory remarks, including that he bit his daughter, struck her numerous times with a coat hanger and belt, struck her face with his hands, struck her in the ribs, and shook her.
¶ 4 Prior to trial, the defense filed a motion to suppress Richardson's videotaped statement as involuntary. In the motion, Richardson alleged, in part, that he was incapable of understanding the full meaning of his Miranda rights and that the statements sought to be suppressed were obtained as a result of physical coercion illegally directed against him by police. After a hearing, at which the evidence showed that Richardson received an injury to his left eye at the police station lockup, the trial court denied the motion to suppress. The court found that although Richardson was injured at the police station, the detectives and assistant State's Attorney who questioned him were not involved in the altercation. Furthermore, Richardson was advised of his rights, did not complain of any pain or request medical assistance, and appeared calm in the videotape. The trial court thus concluded that the totality of the circumstances showed that the confession was voluntary.
¶ 5 At Richardson's 2005 jury trial, the trial court admitted into evidence his videotaped inculpatory statement and forensic evidence. The State's evidence at trial also included the testimony of Cyntoria Clark, the baby's mother; James Franklin, an eyewitness to part of the beating; Monica Smith, the neighbor who called “911”; Michael Hayes, the arresting officer; and Assistant State's Attorney (ASA) John Heil. Richardson, the sole witness for the defense, testified that his videotaped statement was true, except for hitting his daughter with a belt, which he did not do. At the close of the evidence, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of first degree murder.
¶ 6 At sentencing, the presentence investigation report (PSI) revealed that Richardson had been a learning-disabled student throughout his life and that, when he was transferred to jail at age 17, he could not read. The fitness evaluation presented at sentencing concluded that Richardson was fit for sentencing. It also indicated that he achieved a full-scale IQ score of 61, which falls within the extremely low range of intellectual functioning and ranked him at the 0.5 percentile when compared to his same-aged peers. The evaluation also stated that Richardson “appears to fall in the upper echelon of mild mental retardation
.” Following a sentencing hearing, the court sentenced Richardson to 40 years' imprisonment.
¶ 7 On appeal, this court reversed Richardson's conviction on the basis that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress where the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that his eye injury was not inflicted in order to obtain a confession. People v. Richardson, 376 Ill.App.3d 537, 314 Ill.Dec. 915, 875 N.E.2d 1202 (2007)
. The State was granted leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court. People v. Richardson, 226 Ill.2d 627, 317 Ill.Dec. 507, 882 N.E.2d 81 (2008). Before our supreme court, the State argued that Richardson's inculpatory statement was voluntary and not coerced. The supreme court agreed and reversed this court's decision, instructing this court to consider Richardson's remaining contentions. People v. Richardson, 234 Ill.2d 233, 334 Ill.Dec. 675, 917 N.E.2d 501 (2009)
.
¶ 8 On remand, this court considered Richardson's remaining contentions, and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. People v. Richardson, 401 Ill.App.3d 45, 340 Ill.Dec. 740, 929 N.E.2d 44 (2010)
. In relevant part, this court rejected Richardson's claim that he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel based on counsel's failure to offer expert testimony concerning his mental impairment during the motion to suppress hearing. Id. at 46, 340 Ill.Dec. 740, 929 N.E.2d 44. We acknowledged that Richardson's mental capacity was raised during sentencing but observed that the information in the PSI did not deal with Richardson's ability to waive his Miranda rights. Id. at 48, 340 Ill.Dec. 740, 929 N.E.2d 44.
¶ 9 On June 15, 2011, Richardson filed a pro se postconviction petition alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence of his limited mental capacity at the hearing on his motion to suppress statements. Richardson asserted that this evidence would have shown that he could not have knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights prior to providing his inculpatory statements to the State. Richardson specifically alleged in his petition:
“Trial counsel's failure to marshall [sic ] evidence on [defendant's] diminished mental capacity at the motion to suppress, and her failure to argue such evidence coupled with [defendant's] youth weighed in favor of suppression, was objectively unreasonable because such evidence was highly relevant in determining the validity of the Miranda waiver and the voluntariness of [defendant's] statement.”
Richardson did not sign his petition or attach a verification affidavit. However, he did attach transcripts from three pretrial court dates in which defense counsel represented to the court that she had hired an expert to examine Richardson regarding his ability to waive his Miranda rights and that she was in the process of having the examination conducted. Richardson also attached to his petition transcripts showing that he was unable to spell “Cyntoria,” the name of his baby's mother. Richardson's allegation is premised on the information included in the PSI.
¶ 10 On September 13, 2011, the circuit court issued a written order dismissing the petition as frivolous and patently without merit. In doing so, the circuit court held that it would follow this court's 2010 decision on appeal, which determined that Richardson could not establish that he was provided ineffective assistance of counsel, declined to assume that the result of the evaluation was favorable and not used or that counsel failed to conduct an evaluation, and found that Richardson was fit for sentencing. Richardson now appeals the propriety of that dismissal.
¶ 12 We initially reject the State's contention that Richardson's petition was properly dismissed at the first stage of proceedings solely on the basis that his petition lacked both a verification affidavit and his signature on the petition.
¶ 13 A postconviction proceeding “shall be commenced by filing with the clerk of the court in which the conviction took place a petition (together with a copy thereof) verified by affidavit.” 725 ILCS 5/122–1(b)
(West 2010). After the briefs were filed in this case, our supreme court explained that, “at the first stage of proceedings, the court considers the petition's substantive virtue rather than its procedural compliance.” People v. Hommerson, 2014 IL 115638, ¶ 11, 378 Ill.Dec. 459, 4 N.E.3d 58
. Specifically, with respect to a lack of an affidavit, our supreme court held that “the circuit court may not dismiss a petition at the first stage proceedings solely on the basis that it lacked a verification affidavit,” and “[t]hat deficiency is properly the subject of a motion to dismiss at the second stage of proceedings.” Id. ¶¶ 11, 14. In following our supreme court's reasoning in Hommerson, we find that the lack of a verification affidavit and signature affixed to Richardson's petition is not dispositive at the first stage of proceedings. In so finding, we now turn to Richardson's substantive argument that he was denied effective assistance of counsel.
¶ 14 On appeal, Richardson contends that he raised an arguable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. He specifically maintains that his counsel was ineffective for failing to have him evaluated for his ability to understand Miranda where there was reason to believe he was mentally retarded. If he was of such limited functioning that he could not understand Miranda, then he asserts it was at least arguable that the court would have suppressed his confession following the hearing on his motion.
¶ 15 The Act provides a method by which persons under criminal sentences can assert that their convictions resulted from a substantial denial of their constitutional rights. 725 ILCS 5/122–1(a)(1)
(West 2010). At the first stage of postconviction proceedings, the trial court must independently review the petition, taking the allegations as true and determine whether the petition is “frivolous or patently without merit.” People v. Hodges, 234 Ill.2d 1, 10, 332 Ill.Dec. 318, 912 N.E.2d 1204 (2009) ; 725 ILCS 5/122–2.1(a)(2) (West 2010). A...
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... ... trial, arguing among other things that Richardson's ... “physical, mental, educational and/or psychological ... state, capacity and condition” prevented him from fully ... understanding his Miranda rights. People v ... Richardson , 917 N.E.2d 501, 505 (Ill. 2009) ... ( Richardson II ). His counsel requested several ... extensions to have Richardson's mental capacity evaluated ... and questioned his mother at the suppression hearing about ... the physical attack on Richardson ... ...