U.S. v. Rowland

Decision Date03 September 2003
Docket NumberNo. 02-4108.,02-4108.
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Billy Ray ROWLAND, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

B. John Burns, argued, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Des Moines, IA, for appellant.

Shannon L. Olson, argued, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Des Moines, IA (Robert C. Dopf, Asst. U.S. Attorney, Des Moines, IA, on the brief), for appellee.

Before BOWMAN, HEANEY, and BYE, Circuit Judges.

BYE, Circuit Judge.

Billy Ray Rowland pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He did so after his motion to suppress was denied by the district court,1 but in his plea agreement he reserved the right to appeal that denial. On appeal, he argues the firearm was discovered during an unlawful inventory search of his vehicle. We agree but still affirm the district court's denial because the search falls within another exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.

I

On December 19, 2001, at approximately 11:30 a.m., the Story County Sheriff's Department received a report that a dark-colored, older-model Chevrolet was driving onto the shoulder of northbound Interstate 35 with sheets or papers flapping in the windows on both sides of the vehicle. The caller did not know whether there was a passenger in the vehicle and described the driver as a male in his 40's.

At 11:44 a.m., Story County Sheriff's Deputy Scott Madison observed a gray 1980's Oldsmobile driving northbound on Interstate 35. Deputy Madison observed the vehicle weaving back and forth in its lane, occasionally crossing the center line and once crossing the fog line. Sheets or papers were flapping in the window. Deputy Madison activated his cruiser's emergency lights. A passenger in the front passenger seat of the suspect vehicle sat up, and the driver pulled the vehicle to the shoulder and a stop.

Deputy Madison approached the vehicle and asked the driver to step out. The driver complied with his request, and identified herself as Cynthia Roger. Subsequently, she was positively identified as Christeena Janell Barker. She was unable to produce identification, however, and told Deputy Madison her purse had been stolen. When asked about a driver's license, the driver responded she had never obtained a driver's license.

Deputy Madison then approached the male passenger, who correctly identified himself as Billy Ray Rowland. When asked for identification, Rowland produced an Indian tribal identification card and his Social Security card but not a driver's license. Deputy Madison requested his dispatcher run a records check on both individuals. Deputy Madison was subsequently informed the computer search did not locate a valid driver's license for either individual and, in fact, revealed Rowland's driver's license had been suspended by the State of California. The dispatcher also informed Deputy Madison an arrest warrant was outstanding for Rowland in Oklahoma.

A records search of the vehicle's license plate number revealed title to the vehicle was in the name of Roger Cook who, after repeated attempts by the dispatcher, could not be reached. Rowland told the Deputy he was in the process of buying the vehicle from the titleholder but could not produce any documentation to support this assertion.

Because Deputy Madison and the other officers who soon joined him at the scene suspected Rowland's possession of the vehicle was unlawful, the decision was made to impound the vehicle, and law enforcement immediately began a road-side inventory search. During their initial search of the vehicle, officers found a syringe in the glove compartment and rolling papers and razor blades elsewhere in the passenger compartment. In the trunk a small wooden box was also discovered, which Deputy Madison testified during the suppression hearing was consistent with drug use. Because the vehicle was full of a variety of items including trash, and because of the amount of freeway traffic, the vehicle was towed to an impound-garage where a subsequent, more thorough search was conducted. Officers then discovered, among other things, a loaded .38 caliber handgun and ammunition under the driver's seat.

After unsuccessfully moving to suppress the firearm, Rowland pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He reserved the right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress; he now exercises that right.

II

"In reviewing the grant or denial of a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, we are bound by the district court's findings of fact regarding the circumstances of the search unless we believe on the basis of the record as a whole that the district court clearly erred." United States v. Marshall, 986 F.2d 1171, 1173 (8th Cir. 1993). We may reverse the district court's ultimate ruling on the suppression motion, however, if the ruling reflects an erroneous view of the applicable law. Id.

Rowland first argues the vehicle should never have been impounded. We disagree.

The Story County Sheriff's Department impoundment policy provides for immediate impoundment of vehicles "which a deputy has reason to believe are wrongfully possessed by the person then having control of such vehicles." Rowland argues there was no such belief. To support this assertion, Rowland points to his "candid" response that the vehicle was owned by a third party not at the scene, but he (Rowland) was in the process of purchasing the vehicle. Also, Rowland points out law enforcement had not received a report of a stolen vehicle resembling his.

The district court, on the other hand, found the officers at the scene were reasonable in believing the vehicle was wrongfully possessed. United States v. Rowland, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12941, at *11 (S.D.Iowa May 30, 2002). In reaching this conclusion the district court reasoned: "Although Mr. Rowland told Deputy Madison he was in the process of purchasing the vehicle from the titleholder, he had no proof of his purchase. Furthermore, Mr. Rowland's trustworthiness was greatly diminished due to his outstanding arrest warrant and suspended driver's license." Id.

We are similarly compelled by these facts. Moreover, though the district court did not consider it, the impoundment policy also allows for the immediate impoundment of a "[v]ehicle positioned upon a public highway in such a location as to indicate that it constitutes a hazard to traffic." The very fact the vehicle's two occupants were both without a driver's license (Baker's was suspended, and Rowland never obtained one), and thus unable to move the vehicle off the Interstate, and because it was winter in Iowa, justified impounding the vehicle. Cf. United States v. Bridges, 245 F.Supp.2d 1034, 1037 (S.D.Iowa 2003) (finding an impoundment and the resulting inventory search violated the Fourth Amendment because police department impoundment guidelines did not cover the circumstances of the case; defendant was free to secure the vehicle, and it was parked in a store's parking lot and did not pose a safety hazard).

III

Rowland also asserts the search of his vehicle was not an inventory search. We agree.

Law enforcement may search a lawfully impounded vehicle to compile an inventory list of the vehicle's contents without violating the Fourth Amendment. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 376, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976). To do so, officers need neither search warrant nor probable cause, for they are not investigating a crime; instead, they are "performing an administrative or care-taking function." Marshall, 986 F.2d at 1174 (explaining Opperman). In performing this function, officers may legitimately be protecting the owner's property while it remains in custody. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369, 96 S.Ct. 3092. They may be protecting themselves from claims of lost or damaged property or from any potential danger posed by the unknown contents of the vehicle. Id. The only limit on such searches is they must be reasonable under the circumstances. Id. Inventory searches are reasonable if "conducted according to standardized police procedures, which vitiate concerns of an investigatory motive or excessive discretion." Id.

The Story County impoundment policy mandates within 24 hours of towing an impounded vehicle officers must "[c]omplete an inventory of all property in the vehicle and a notation of any parts of the vehicle which appear to be missing or damaged." The policy goes on to explain "The inventory is a record which is intended for use in ensuring safe return of the lawful possessor's property and resolving questions regarding the condition or contents of the vehicle."

It is uncontested law enforcement did not record all of the property in the vehicle. Rather, Deputy Madison testified, he only recorded items which might be used as possible evidence. Additionally, as the district court noted:

Both Deputy Madison and Sergeant [Barry Michael] Thomas testified during the hearing that although officers generally "look through" all items in an impounded vehicle, it is customary within the department to record only items they perceive to be particularly valuable. In this case, the items perceived to be "of value" were those items listed on Defendant's Exhibit A as items seized.

Rowland, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12941, at *12-13.

Accordingly, the government argues the written policy stating all property should be recorded in practice means all significant property should be recorded. The government further argues law enforcement complied with this unwritten policy, because there was nothing of value in the vehicle other than the evidence listed by...

To continue reading

Request your trial
88 cases
  • U.S. v. Keys
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of North Dakota
    • October 12, 2005
    ...impounded vehicle to compile an inventory list of the vehicle's contents without violating the Fourth Amendment." United States v. Rowland, 341 F.3d 774, 779 (8th Cir.2003) (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 376, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976)). These searches can be con......
  • U.S. v. Allison
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa
    • July 24, 2009
    ...for his arrest. Since a search incident to arrest may only be conducted after a suspect has been arrested, see United States v. Rowland, 341 F.3d 774, 783 (8th Cir. 2003) ("Because [the defendant] was not arrested, law enforcement could not have conducted a search incident to arrest pursuan......
  • U.S. v. May
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota
    • July 10, 2006
    ...Marshall, supra at 1175, nor is this a case where the officers did not adhere to the inventory search policy. See, United States v. Rowland, 341 F.3d 774, 782 (8th Cir.2003). We find that the officers properly conducted an inventory search of the vehicle, in accordance with a standardized p......
  • United States v. Johnson
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • May 14, 2018
    ...is in conflict with what the Court said in Brigham City . Three of the cases precede Brigham City by years. See United States v. Rowland , 341 F.3d 774 (8th Cir. 2003) ; United States v. Khoury , 901 F.2d 948 (11th Cir. 1990) ; United States v. Whitfield , 629 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1980). In ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT