Mancia v. State

Citation2015 Ark. 115,459 S.W.3d 259
Decision Date19 March 2015
Docket NumberNo. CR–11–556,CR–11–556
PartiesCristobal Antonio Mancia, Appellant v. State of Arkansas, Appellee
CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas

Dana A. Reece, Little Rock, for appellant.

Dustin McDaniel, Att'y Gen., by: David R. Raupp, Sr. Ass't Att'y Gen., and Brad Newman, Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellee.

Opinion

KAREN R. BAKER, Associate Justice

On March 7, 2008, appellant, Cristobal Antonio Mancia, pleaded guilty to rape and was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment. Pursuant to Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4–3(k) (2010), Mancia filed a brief on appeal asserting that there was no meritorious basis for his appeal. We agreed and affirmed Mancia's conviction and held:

Although counsel indicates in his brief that there was no applicable exception to the general rule that there is no right to appeal from a plea of guilty, an appeal may be taken after a guilty plea when it alleges evidentiary errors which arose after the plea and during the sentencing phase. Johnson v. State, 2010 Ark. 63 . In this case, the plea was entered without benefit of a plea agreement, and appellant was provided a hearing for sentencing purposes. Counsel asserts that there were no adverse rulings, however, and our review of the record confirms that there were no objections to the evidence presented to the court. See Ark. Sup.Ct. R. 4–3(i) (2009). Consequentially, there were no adverse rulings so as to merit an appeal.

Mancia v. State, 2010 Ark. 247, at 1, 2010 WL 2006586 (per curiam).

On July 19, 2010, pursuant to Rule 37.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure (2010), Mancia filed a petition for postconviction relief alleging eight grounds for relief. On February 7, 2011, without holding a hearing, the circuit court denied Mancia's petition.

On May 31, 2011, Mancia's attorney, Dana Reece, lodged an appeal from that decision on behalf of Mancia. Mancia v. State, 2014 Ark. 206, 2014 WL 1856744(per curiam). Mancia's brief, after a final extension, was due on August 25, 2011. Id. On October 5, 2011, the State filed a motion to dismiss because no brief had been filed. Id. This court granted the State's motion on October 27, 2011. Id. Upon receiving the order of dismissal, Mancia filed a motion to reconsider dismissal and reinstate appeal on November 4, 2011. Id. After finding that Reece was at fault for failing to file the brief, this court granted Mancia's motion. Mancia v. State, 2011 Ark. 507, 2011 WL 5995547 (per curiam). On December 1, 2011, Reece filed a brief on Mancia's behalf. Id. Thereafter, on April 24, 2012, the Arkansas Supreme Court Committee on Professional Conduct suspended Reece for thirty-six months from representing clients before the Arkansas Supreme Court and Arkansas Court of Appeals. Id.

On February 6, 2014, because of abstract deficiencies in the brief that had been filed by Reece, we ordered rebriefing in this appeal. Mancia v. State, 2014 Ark. 55, 2014 WL 495130 (per curiam). On February 6, 2014, we notified Mancia, at the Arkansas Department of Correction, of our per curiam, and provided him with a copy. On July 1, 2014, Mancia filed a substituted brief and on July 24, 2014, the State timely responded.

From the circuit court's February 7, 2011 order denying Mancia's Rule 37.1 petition, Mancia appeals and contends that the circuit court erred in denying his petition on the following grounds: (1) the circuit court erred in denying Mancia's Rule 37 petition because defense counsel was ineffective on eight separate grounds;1 (2) the circuit court erred because it did not hold an evidentiary hearing; (3) pursuant to Martinez v. Ryan, –––U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 182 L.Ed.2d 272 (2012) and Trevino v. Thaler, –––U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1911, 185 L.Ed.2d 1044 (2013), Mancia is entitled to a new Rule 37 proceeding and appointed counsel because his previous Rule 37 counsel was constitutionally ineffective.

In turning to the merits, the circuit court did not hold an evidentiary hearing. Rule 37.3 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that an evidentiary hearing should be held in a postconviction proceeding unless the files and record of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief. Wooten v. State, 338 Ark. 691, 1 S.W.3d 8 (1999) (citing Bohanan v. State, 327 Ark. 507, 939 S.W.2d 832 (1997) (per curiam)). If the files and the record show that the petitioner is not entitled to relief, the circuit court is required to make written findings to that effect. Ark. R.Crim. P. 37.3(a).

“On appeal from a trial court's ruling on a petitioner's request for Rule 37 relief, this court will not reverse the trial court's decision granting or denying postconviction relief unless it is clearly erroneous. Kemp v. State, 347 Ark. 52, 55, 60 S.W.3d 404, 406 (2001). A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the appellate court after reviewing the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Id. Prater v. State, 2012 Ark. 164, at 8, 402 S.W.3d 68, 74.

“The benchmark for judging a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be ‘whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.’ Strickland [ v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ].” Henington v. State, 2012 Ark. 181, at 3–4, 403 S.W.3d 55, 58. Pursuant to Strickland, we assess the effectiveness of counsel under a two-prong standard. First, a petitioner raising a claim of ineffective assistance must show that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the petitioner by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Williams v. State, 369 Ark. 104, 251 S.W.3d 290 (2007). A petitioner making an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim must show that his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Abernathy v. State, 2012 Ark. 59, 386 S.W.3d 477 (per curiam). A court must indulge in a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id.

Second, the petitioner must show that counsel's deficient performance so prejudiced petitioner's defense that he was deprived of a fair trial. Id. The petitioner must show there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the fact-finder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt, i.e., the decision reached would have been different absent the errors. Howard v. State, 367 Ark. 18, 238 S.W.3d 24 (2006). A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Id. Unless a petitioner makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction resulted from a breakdown in the adversarial process that renders the result unreliable. Id. Additionally, conclusory statements that counsel was ineffective cannot be the basis of postconviction relief. Anderson v. State, 2011 Ark. 488, at 5, 385 S.W.3d 783.

Finally, “the rule for evaluating ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims in cases involving guilty pleas appears in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). In that case, the Supreme Court held that the ‘cause and prejudice’ test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), applied to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court further held that in order to show prejudice in the context of a guilty plea, the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. 366.” Buchheit v. State, 339 Ark. 481, 484, 6 S.W.3d 109, 111 (1999) (per curiam).

I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

With this standard in mind, we now turn to the issues raised by Mancia. Mancia asserts that the circuit court erred with regard to eight separate grounds of relief on his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel argument.

A. Intoxication

First, Mancia asserts that the circuit court erred in denying his claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and his guilty plea is invalid because his defense counsel was intoxicated and suffered from alcoholism. Mancia contends in his Rule 37 petition that he made a specific factual allegation that his attorney was under the influence of alcohol during his representation “and even worse while in the courtroom ... during Mancia's proceedings” and witnesses would be called to substantiate his claims.

The circuit court denied Mancia's claim and explained:

Petitioner's allegation that his attorney appeared before the Court intoxicated and that he suffered from alcoholism is unsubstantiated and unsupported by the record. As such, it is a conclusory allegation. The Petitioner must do more than make a conclusory allegation unsupported by facts. Nance v. State, 339 Ark. 192, 4 S.W.3d 501 (1999) ; Bryant v. State, 323 Ark. 130, 913 S.W.2d 257 (1996). A claim that prejudice was suffered without any factual explanation about what form the prejudice took or how serious it was is not enough to prove ineffective assistance of counsel. Spivey v. State, 299 Ark. 412, 773 S.W.2d 446 (1989). This allegation is denied and no hearing on it is required.

Mancia contends that the circuit court erred because he made factual allegations regarding his defense counsel's intoxication that would be substantiated if Mancia were afforded a hearing. Further, Mancia asserts that the circuit court's finding that Mancia's claim is “unsupported by the record” is the wrong standard to be applied, alleging that it was the circuit court's duty to hold an evidentiary hearing unless “the files and the record conclusively show that Mancia is not entitled to relief.”

The State responds that nothing in the record suggests that defense counsel was...

To continue reading

Request your trial
59 cases
  • Walden v. State
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Arkansas
    • September 15, 2016
    ...the argument that Martinez and other precedent mandates appointment of counsel for every Rule 37.1 hearing. Mancia v. State , 2015 Ark. 115, at 26, 459 S.W.3d 259, 275. Postconviction matters are considered civil in nature, and there is no absolute right to counsel. Stalnaker v. State , 201......
  • Sims v. State, CR–15–153
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Arkansas
    • October 8, 2015
    ...can be conclusively shown on the record, or the face of the petition itself, that the allegations have no merit." Mancia v. State, 2015 Ark. 115, at 25, 459 S.W.3d 259, 275 (quoting Bienemy v. State, 2011 Ark. 320, at 5, 2011 WL 3930364 ). As indicated by our discussions of the issues, the ......
  • Flemons v. State, CR–14–416
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Arkansas
    • December 15, 2016
    ...185 L.Ed.2d 1044 (2013). This court has rejected the argument that Martinez and Trevino require appointment of counsel. Mancia v. State , 2015 Ark. 115, 459 S.W.3d 259. The trial court has discretion to appoint counsel under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.3(b) (2015), and, in order ......
  • Bridgeman v. State, CR-16-971.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Arkansas
    • May 17, 2017
    ...proceedings is whether the plea was intelligently and voluntarily entered on advice from competent counsel. See Mancia v.State, 2015 Ark. 115, 459 S.W.3d 259. We must now turn our attention to the record of the proceedings before the trial court at the time Bridgeman entered his plea.6 Brid......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT