Reilly Elec. Contractors, Inc. v. State Dep't of Labor & Training, 2010–266–M.P.

• Citation: 46 A.3d 840
• Decision Date: 06 July 2012
• Docket Number: No. 2010–266–M.P.,2010–266–M.P.
• Parties: REILLY ELECTRICAL CONTRACTORS, INC. d/b/a Relco, Inc. et al. v. STATE of Rhode Island DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND TRAINING, through its director Adelita S. OREFICE.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island

46 A.3d 840

REILLY ELECTRICAL CONTRACTORS, INC. d/b/a Relco, Inc. et al.

v.STATE of Rhode Island DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND TRAINING, through its director Adelita S. OREFICE.

No. 2010–266–M.P.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

July 6, 2012.

Gerard R. Visconti, Esq., for Plaintiff.

Tedford B. Radway, Esq., Cranston, for Defendant.

Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, and INDEGLIA, JJ.

OPINION

Justice INDEGLIA, for the Court.

The issue presented in this petition is whether G.L.1956 § 5–6–2 permits only a licensed electrician to install underground hollow polyvinyl chloride (PVC) material that is devoid of any electrical wiring or conductors. The Board of Examiners of Electricians (the board), the Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training (DLT), and the Superior Court all determined that § 5–6–2 required a licensed electrician to perform such work. The petitioners, Reilly Electrical Contractors, Inc. (Relco), Michael McSheffrey, Robert Rutledge, John Brewer, and Ray Bombardier,¹ disagreed and petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari. Having granted the petition, this matter came before the Supreme Court on March 28, 2012, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised should not be summarily decided. After hearing the arguments of counsel and reviewing the memoranda submitted on behalf of the parties, we are satisfied that cause has not been shown. Accordingly, we shall decide the case at this time without further briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

IFacts and Travel

Having been selected as a subcontractor for an outdoor lighting project taking place at Rhode Island College, Relco's employees were installing PVC material beneath a soccer field on October 27, 2005. Although the hollow PVC material did not contain any electrical wiring at that time, the future purpose of the tubing was to house and protect electrical conductors and wiring. On that day, Robert Raimbault, the chief electrical inspector for the state, observed four men holding the PVC material over their heads as they fed it into the excavated ground. After questioning the men, Mr. Raimbault discovered that only one of the four men had a current Rhode Island electrician's license.² Consequently, DLT issued cease-and-desist orders and fines against the three unlicensed men (Mr. Bombardier, Mr. Brewer, and Mr. Rutledge) for performing electrical work without a license in violation of § 5–6–2, as discussed infra. The DLT also issued cease-and-desist orders and fines against Relco and Mr. McSheffrey ³ for allowing employees to perform electrical work without a license and for engaging in electrical work without a state permit, in violation of § 5–6–25.⁴ Relco and its employees subsequently appealed these violations to the board.

On March 15, 2006, a hearing was held before the board (the first board hearing).⁵ At that hearing, Mr. McSheffrey testified that on the day before the inspection, Relco applied for an electrical permit from the City of Providence. Mr. McSheffrey asserted that although the work taking place on the day of the inspection was not “electrical work,” the material being handled was “a UL listed electrical product.” He also referred to the PVC material as “electrical conduit.”

Mr. Raimbault also acknowledged that the PVC material being handled by the Relco employees “was rated as electrical material[,]” and was “described in the electricalcode.” He also testified that although the PVC material did not contain any electrical conductors on the date of the inspection, the next step in the process would be to install electrical conductors within it. He further attested that the undertaking by Relco's employees was “standard electrical installation practice” and that the PVC material was not used to conduct air or water.

At the close of the first hearing, the board unanimously recommended that the director of DLT deny the appeal, which she did on April 20, 2006. Undeterred by the outcome of their administrative appeal, petitioners filed an appeal of DLT's decision in the Superior Court under G.L.1956 § 42–35–15.

After the filing of that appeal, however, DLT vacated the contested violations and fines based on due process concerns that the fines should not have been issued prior to a hearing. Thereafter, DLT reissued to Relco and its employees new notices of violation, based on the conduct of October 27, 2005, this time affording them the right to a hearing before any action took place. The petitioners again appealed the reissued notices to the board.

On February 20, 2008, a second hearing was held before the board (the second board hearing). The bulk of the evidence at this hearing was the record from the first board hearing, which the board reviewed. At the second board hearing, Mr. Raimbault confirmed that the PVC material in question was “consistent with the electrical conduit constructed of PVC material exclusively made for the electrical industry as listed and tested[.]” He further clarified that “it [was] electrical pipe constructed of PVC [that] is not the type used for plumbing[.]”

After the second hearing, the board again unanimously recommended that the director of DLT affirm the violations for the events of October 27, 2005, which she did on February 25, 2008. The petitioners filed a timely appeal of this decision with the Superior Court by amending the prior complaint that they had previously filed.

On May 13, 2010, a hearing before a justice of the Superior Court was held on the matter. In their appeal before the hearing justice, petitioners asserted that the board's decision violated § 42–35–15 because it was arbitrary, capricious, and clearly erroneous. Specifically, petitioners argued that what took place on October 27, 2005, was merely preparatory work involving PVC “pipe” that by itself could not in any way conduct electricity. The petitioners, in their argument before the hearing justice, averred that the word “conduit” was something that in and of itself conducts electricity—such as an insulated wire or cord. Thus, the petitioners explained, because the PVC material handled by the Relco employees could not conduct electricity, it was not conduit at all, but rather “a protection device” used to protect wires—or in their view, conduit—that are subsequently threaded through the pipe. ⁶ The petitioners did concede that an electrical permit is required to install electrical conductors within the PVC material.

In a written decision issued on July 20, 2010, the hearing justice denied petitioners' appeal by ruling that the PVC material was conduit pursuant to § 5–6–2 and therefore an electrician's license and state permit were required for its installation. Final judgment was entered on July 29, 2010. On May 19, 2011, we granted the petition for writ of certiorari.

IIStandard of Review

This Court has frequently stated that, when considering an administrative appeal, “the scope of our review, like that of the Superior Court, is an extension of the administrative process.” Auto Body Association of Rhode Island v. State Department of Business Regulation, 996 A.2d 91, 94 (R.I.2010) (quoting Rhode Island Public Telecommunications Authority v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board, 650 A.2d 479, 484 (R.I.1994)). “In conducting our review, ‘we are restricted to questions of law, which we review de novo.’ ” Id. at 95 (quoting Champlin's Realty Associates v. Tikoian, 989 A.2d 427, 437 (R.I.2010)). “Accordingly, we give deference to the factual findings of the administrative agency.” Id. (citing Champlin's Realty Associates, 989 A.2d at 437).

On certiorari, we do not weigh the evidence but rather, as an extension of the administrative process, we limit the scope of our review to the record as a whole “to determine whether [any] legally competent evidence exists” in it to support the trial court's decision. Champlin's Realty Associates, 989 A.2d at 437 (quoting Sartor v. Coastal Resources Management Council, 542 A.2d 1077, 1082–83 (R.I.1988)). “Legally competent evidence is defined as ‘such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, and means an amount more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.’ ” Foster–Glocester Regional School Committee v. Board of Review, 854 A.2d 1008, 1012 (R.I.2004) (quoting Rhode Island Temps, Inc. v. Department of Labor and Training, Board of Review, 749 A.2d 1121, 1125 (R.I.2000)). “However, this Court has also stated that ‘an administrative decision can be vacated if it is clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence contained in the whole record.’ ” Auto Body Association, 996 A.2d at 95 (quoting Costa v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 543 A.2d 1307, 1309 (R.I.1988)).

IIIDiscussion

We begin our analysis by citing the portion of the Rhode Island statute at issue in this petition. Section 5–6–2, entitled “Work for which license required[,]” provides in pertinent part:

“(a)(1) No person, firm, or corporation shall enter into, engage in, solicit, advertise, bid for, or work at the business of installing wires, conduits, apparatus, fixtures, electrical signs, lightning protection equipment * * * and other appliances for carrying or using or generating electricity for light * * * or power purposes * * * unless that person, firm, or corporation shall have received a license and a certificate for the business, issued by the state board of examiners of electricians of the division of professional regulation of the department of labor and training in accordance with the provisions set forth in this chapter.”

The single issue in this matter is whether the PVC material Relco and its employees handled was “conduit[ ] * * * for carrying * * * electricity” as described in § 5–6–2. If the PVC material was conduit to be used in that manner, as the board and the Superior Court...