Fields v. Henry Cnty., Tenn.
Citation | 701 F.3d 180 |
Decision Date | 10 December 2012 |
Docket Number | No. 11–6352.,11–6352. |
Parties | Gary FIELDS, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. HENRY COUNTY, TENNESSEE, Defendant–Appellee. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit) |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
ARGUED:Jerry A. Gonzalez, Jerry Gonzalez PLC, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, for Appellant. Jon A. York, Pentecost & Glenn, PLLC, Jackson, Tennessee, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:Jerry A. Gonzalez, Jerry Gonzalez PLC, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, Irwin Venick, Dobbins, Venick, Kuhn & Byassee, PLLC, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellant. Jon A. York, Brandon O. Gibson, Pentecost & Glenn, PLLC, Jackson, Tennessee, for Appellee.
Before: COLE and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges; THAPAR, District Judge. *
The question presented in this case is whether Henry County's policies of automatically detaining domestic-assault defendants for 12 hours and using a bond schedule to determine their bail violate the United States Constitution. The district court held they do not. We agree and affirm.
On December 11, 2008, Gary Fields's wife contacted the Sheriff's office in Henry County, Tennessee. She alleged that Fields hit and choked her. When police arrived to investigate, they found Mrs. Fields with a bloody lip, abrasions, and bruises. The next day, Officer Michelle Brewer obtained a warrant for Fields's arrest for misdemeanor domestic assault. When Officer Brewer prepared the warrant, she wrote “W/O” on the affidavit, indicating Fields's arrest would be without bond.
Three days later, Fields learned about the warrant and turned himself in to the Henry County Sherriff's Office. He was taken to the jail and booked. During booking, Fields requested that he be allowed to post bail. After being told that he could not do so until the next day, Fields demanded to speak to a judge or magistrate.
The officers in the booking room took Fields to see the Sheriff instead. Fields told the Sheriff that he had researched the issue and was allowed to post bail instead of being jailed. Fields was incorrect: There is no right under Tennessee law to immediate release or to post bail immediately after arrest.1
The Sheriff responded that Fields had to be detained for 12 hours because he was charged with domestic assault. He was also mistaken. Under Tennessee law, domestic-violence defendants must be held for a 12–hour period, but only if the official authorized to release the arrestee “finds that the offender is a threat to the alleged victim.” T.C.A. § 40–11–150(h)(1). And the official may still release the offender earlier if he “determines that sufficient time has or will have elapsed for the victim to be protected.” Id. Neither finding was made for Fields. His experience was not unique: Henry County admits that it had a policy of placing a 12–hour hold on all persons arrested for domestic violence regardless of the individual circumstances.2
The next morning, Fields appeared before a Henry County judge. The judge set bail at $5,000, imposed several conditions on Fields's release, and ordered him to attend 28 weeks of domestic-abuse counseling. Ten months later, prosecutors dropped the domestic-assault charge.
Fields then filed this § 1983 suit in federal court claiming that Henry County had violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from excessive bail and his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process. The district court granted Henry County's motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed.
We review the district court's summary-judgment decision de novo. Union Planters Bank, N.A. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 478 F.3d 759, 763 (6th Cir.2007).
To establish that a local government is liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that (1) the local government had an official policy, custom, or practice that (2) deprived the plaintiff of his federal rights. See Bruederle v. Louisville Metro Gov't, 687 F.3d 771, 777 (6th Cir.2012). Henry County does not dispute that Fields's detention resulted from a policy of automatically detaining domestic-assault defendants for a 12–hour period. Nor does it dispute that its policy was to set bail using a bond schedule. 3 Thus, the only issue before us is whether those policies violated the plaintiff's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Fields advances two theories under the Eighth Amendment: (1) Henry County's use of a bond schedule to set his bail violated his right to be free from excessive bail, and (2) Henry County's denial of bond for 12 hours violated his right to bail. He is wrong on both counts.
The Eighth Amendment provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required.” 4 Importantly, the Eighth Amendment does not mandate bail in all cases. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 753–54, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) (citing Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545–46, 72 S.Ct. 525, 96 L.Ed. 547 (1952)). Rather, the Eighth Amendment mandates that when bail is granted, it may not be unreasonably high in light of the government's purpose for imposing bail. See id. at 754, 107 S.Ct. 2095. In applying the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause, the Supreme Court has held that the term “excessive” means “grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant's offense.” United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334, 118 S.Ct. 2028, 141 L.Ed.2d 314 (1998) ( the Excessive Fines Clause).
The Bond Schedule. Fields argues that Henry County's use of a bond schedule violates his Eighth Amendment right to be free from excessive bail. But there is nothing inherently wrong with bond schedules. See Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1057 (5th Cir.1978) (en banc) (); cf. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6, 72 S.Ct. 1, 96 L.Ed. 3 (1951) . Indeed, bond schedules are aimed at making sure that defendants who are accused of similar crimes receive similar bonds. See, e.g., Stack, 342 U.S. at 5, 72 S.Ct. 1 ( ). The bond schedule represents an assessment of what bail amount would ensure the appearance of the average defendant facing such a charge. The schedules are therefore aimed at assuring the presence of a defendant. See id. . Thus, the mere use of a schedule does not itself pose a constitutional problem under the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Glenn v. City of Columbus, 75 Fed.Appx. 983 (5th Cir.2003) (citing Pugh, 572 F.2d at 1057);see also Terrell v. City of El Paso, 481 F.Supp.2d 757, 766 (W.D.Tex.2007) ( ).
That is not to say that using a bond schedule can never violate the Excessive Bail Clause. If, for example, the bond schedule set bail for domestic assault at an amount “grossly disproportional to the gravity of” that offense, then using the schedule could violate the Eighth Amendment. See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334, 118 S.Ct. 2028. But Fields does not make that argument.
In fact, Fields fails to point to any inherent problem with the dollar amount set in his case. He does not claim it was excessive either relative to the crime he was charged with or based on the particular facts of his case. See, e.g., Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 213 (1st Cir.1987) ( ); cf. United States v. Beaman, 631 F.2d 85, 86–87 (6th Cir.1980) ( ). He does not argue that the evidence produced at his hearing was too weak to justify the amount. See, e.g., United States v. Leisure, 710 F.2d 422, 428 (8th Cir.1983) ( ). And he does not claim that his bail was much higher than normal for such charges or that the judge relied upon impermissible factors. See, e.g., Stack, 342 U.S. at 5, 72 S.Ct. 1 (); Wagenmann, 829 F.2d at 213 ( ).
Instead, Fields faults Henry County for setting his bail at the same amount as other defendants facing domestic-assault charges. He argues that he was entitled to a “particularized examination” before having his bond set. Appellant's Br. at 13, 55. But nothing in the Eighth Amendment requires a particular type of “process” or examination. See Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 662 (9th Cir.2007) (); United States v. Giangrosso, 763 F.2d 849, 851 (7th Cir.1985) (...
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