Sears v. Humphrey

Citation294 Ga. 117,751 S.E.2d 365
Decision Date18 November 2013
Docket NumberNo. S13A0670.,S13A0670.
PartiesSEARS v. HUMPHREY.
CourtSupreme Court of Georgia

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Robert P. Edwards, Jr., Jarrod F. Loadholt, Katheryn E. Klimko, Troutman Sanders LLP, Atlanta, for appellant.

Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Atty. Gen., Samuel S. Olens, Atty. Gen., Sabrina D. Graham, Mitchell P. Watkins, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee.

THOMPSON, Chief Justice.

In 1993, Demarcus Sears was convicted of kidnapping with bodily injury and armed robbery in connection with the death of Gloria Wilbur, who was kidnapped and robbed of her automobile in Georgia, raped in Tennessee, and murdered in Kentucky. The jury recommended a death sentence for the kidnapping with bodily injury after finding multiple statutory aggravating circumstances, including that the kidnapping with bodily injury was committed while Sears was engaged in the commission of the capital felony of murder. 1 The trial court sentenced Sears to death for the kidnapping with bodily injury in accordance with the jury's recommendation, see OCGA § 17–10–31(a), and to a life sentence for the armed robbery. After affirming each of his convictions and the life sentence for the armed robbery, this Court remanded the case for further proceedings related to Sears' claim of jury misconduct at the sentencing phase. See Sears v. State, 268 Ga. 759, 493 S.E.2d 180 (1997). This Court subsequently affirmed Sears' death sentence. See Sears v. State, 270 Ga. 834, 514 S.E.2d 426 (1999).

In 2000, Sears filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging among other claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, and an evidentiary hearing was held in 2006. In an order filed on January 9, 2008 (2008 Order”), the habeas court denied Sears' petition, and this Court denied Sears' application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal upon concluding that it lacked “arguable merit.” Supreme Court Rule 36. However, in a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court of the United States granted Sears' petition for a writ of certiorari and held that, with regard to Sears' ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, the habeas court failed to conduct a proper prejudice analysis under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694(III)(B), 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). See Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945, 130 S.Ct. 3259, 3267(III), 177 L.Ed.2d 1025 (2010). The Supreme Court then vacated this Court's order denying Sears' application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal and remanded the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with its opinion. Id. Pursuant to the Supreme Court's mandate, this Court vacated the habeas court's judgment and remanded the case to the habeas court for further proceedings not inconsistent with the Supreme Court's mandate.

After a new habeas judge was assigned to the case and after a hearing was subsequently conducted on June 3, 2011, the habeas court entered a new order on August 16, 2011 (2011 Order”), which adopted the 2008 Order with regard to all of Sears' claims except for his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, thereby once again denying him relief on those claims. With regard to Sears' ineffective assistance claim, the habeas court concluded that, even if he could prove that trial counsel rendered deficient performance, Sears had failed to prove that he was constitutionally prejudiced as a result. Accordingly, the habeas court denied Sears relief on his ineffective assistance claim. See Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440(3), 435 S.E.2d 600 (1993) (stating that a court need not address counsel's performance if an ineffective assistance claim can be rejected based on a lack of prejudice). This Court granted Sears' application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal from the 2011 Order. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the habeas court's denial of Sears' habeas petition.

I. Brief Factual Background

The evidence at trial showed that Demarcus Sears and Phillip Williams were stranded in Atlanta on the afternoon of October 7, 1990, because their automobile had broken down. Wishing to return to the Cincinnati area where they lived, they walked to a Waffle House in Smyrna, where Sears unsuccessfully tried to sell to patrons in the restaurant certain items that he was carrying with him in a black briefcase, including knives, brass knuckles, and a set of handcuffs that had no key. After leaving the Waffle House, Sears and Williams walked to a Kroger grocery store, where they decided to steal an automobile to drive home. They chose Gloria Wilbur as their victim when she parked her automobile and entered the Kroger store. Around 8:00 p.m., when Wilbur returned to her automobile, Sears struck her with brass knuckles and forced her inside the vehicle. Williams got behind the wheel, and they drove north on Interstate 75. While they were driving through Tennessee, Sears raped Wilbur. Shortly after entering Kentucky around 1:00 a.m., they stopped the automobile, and Sears took Wilbur into the bushes along Interstate 75 and stabbed her to death. Her abandoned automobile was discovered in a Cincinnati suburb later on October 8, and her body was found almost a week later. Bloodstains in the automobile matched Wilbur, and pubic hair taken from the back seat matched Sears.

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim

Sears contends that the habeas court erred for various reasons in again denying his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Specifically, Sears asserts that the habeas court violated the Supreme Court's mandate in multiple ways,2 unreasonably discounted much of the evidence that he submitted regarding his background and mental impairments,3 and erred in finding that he was not prejudiced by trial counsel's deficiencies.4

A. Applicable Law

Under the governing principles of Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687(III)(A), 104 S.Ct. 2052, a petitioner must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense in order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Smith v. Francis, 253 Ga. 782, 783–784(1), 325 S.E.2d 362 (1985). The inquiry with regard to Strickland's first prong is highly deferential toward counsel's judgment, and “every effort [must] be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689(III)(A), 104 S.Ct. 2052. A petitioner must overcome “the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” (Punctuation and citation omitted.) Id.

With respect to Strickland's second prong, a petitioner must affirmatively prove prejudice by “show[ing] that there is a reasonable probability (i.e., a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome) that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Smith, 253 Ga. at 783(1), 325 S.E.2d 362 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694(III)(B), 104 S.Ct. 2052). In reviewing a habeas court's ruling on an ineffective assistance claim, [w]e accept the habeas court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous and independently apply the law to those facts.” Head v. Hill, 277 Ga. 255, 266(VI), 587 S.E.2d 613 (2003).

B. Whether the Habeas Court Violated the Supreme Court's Mandate

As an initial matter, we address Sears' claim that the habeas court violated the Supreme Court's mandate in several ways. First, Sears contends that the habeas court violated the mandate by addressing trial counsel's performance in its 2011 Order. The habeas court concluded in the 2008 Order that Sears had demonstrated that his counsel's sentencing phase investigation was constitutionally deficient based upon its finding that counsel's investigation into mitigation evidence [was] limited to one day or less, talking to witnesses selected by [Sears'] mother.” The habeas court concluded nevertheless that, [b]ecause counsel put forth a reasonable theory with supporting evidence,” Sears had failed to prove prejudice. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the habeas court erred in its “analysis regarding whether counsel's facially inadequate mitigation investigation prejudiced Sears,” Sears v. Upton, 130 S.Ct. at 3264(II), Sears claims that the habeas court violated the mandate issued by the Supreme Court by re-examining trial counsel's performance 5 when that issue was not before the habeas court on remand. See Briggs v. Penn. R. Co., 334 U.S. 304, 306, 68 S.Ct. 1039, 92 L.Ed. 1403 (1948) (holding that “an inferior court has no power or authority to deviate from the mandate issued by an appellate court); In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co., 160 U.S. 247, 255, 16 S.Ct. 291, 40 L.Ed. 414 (1895) (“When a case has been once decided by th[e Supreme C]ourt on appeal, and remanded to [a lower c]ourt, whatever was before th[e Supreme C]ourt, and disposed of by its decree, is considered as finally settled.”).

However, we do not read the language of Sears v. Upton as establishing that the Supreme Court “disposed of” either prong of Sears' ineffective assistance claim. See In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co., 160 U.S. at 256, 16 S.Ct. 291 (stating that [t]he opinion delivered by th[e Supreme C]ourt, at the time of rendering its decree, may be consulted to ascertain what was intended by its mandate”). Rather, we read the remanding opinion as showing that the Supreme Court only assumed for the purposes of its discussion the correctness of the 2008 Order's conclusion that trial counsel conducted a ‘constitutionally inadequate’ investigation. Sears v. Upton, 130 S.Ct. at 3261 (stating that the evidence that Sears presented in his habeas proceeding “was not brought to light” at the time of his trial “because— in the words of the state [habeas] court[Sears'] counsel conducted a penalty...

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12 cases
  • Ford v. Tate
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • 31 Octubre 2019
    ...the habeas court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous and independently apply the law to those facts." Sears v. Humphrey, 294 Ga. 117, 119 (II) (A), 751 S.E.2d 365 (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted). See Humphrey v. Morrow, 289 Ga. 864, 866 (II), 717 S.E.2d 168 (2011) (explain......
  • Hulett v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • 20 Octubre 2014
    ...in a different sentencing verdict for Hulett for the commission of the Phelps brothers' brutal murders. See Sears v. Humphrey, 294 Ga. 117, 131(II)(D), 751 S.E.2d 365 (2013) (explaining that, in determining Strickland prejudice in a case challenging a death sentence, “this Court must consid......
  • Hittson v. Warden
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
    • 9 Julio 2014
    ...criminal conviction will be issued where there is arguable merit.” Ga. Sup.Ct. R. 36 (emphasis added); see also Sears v. Humphrey, 294 Ga. 117, 117, 751 S.E.2d 365, 368 (2013) (explaining that a CPC denial rests on the Supreme Court's conclusion that a claim lacks “arguable merit”). “In ord......
  • Foster v. Chatman
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • 23 Mayo 2016
    ...(C.A.11 2014). If he can, then the court affords plenary review of the arguably meritorious claim. See, e.g., Sears v. Humphrey, 294 Ga. 117, 117–118, 751 S.E.2d 365, 368 (2013) ; Hillman v. Johnson, 297 Ga. 609, 611, 615, n. 5, 774 S.E.2d 615, 617, 620, n. 5 (2015). The most we can glean, ......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Death Penalty
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 66-1, September 2014
    • Invalid date
    ...Humphrey v. Nance, 293 Ga. 189, 191, 744 S.E.2d 706, 710 (2013). 3. See Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945, 946 (2010).4. Sears v. Humphrey, 294 Ga. 117, 117-18, 751 S.E.2d 365, 368 (2013).5. Upton, 561 U.S. at 946.6. 561 U.S. 945 (2010).7. Id. at 955.8. 294 Ga. 117, 751 S.E.2d 365 (2013).9. See,......

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