United States v. Sayles

• Decision Date: 06 June 2014
• Docket Number: Nos. 13–1834,13–1874.,s. 13–1834
• Citation: 754 F.3d 564
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee v. Maurice Suton Anton SAYLES, Defendant–Appellant United States of America, Plaintiff–Appellee v. Martinus Antuan Sayles, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

754 F.3d 564

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee

v.Maurice Suton Anton SAYLES, Defendant–Appellant

United States of America, Plaintiff–Appellee

v.Martinus Antuan Sayles, Defendant–Appellant.

Nos. 13–1834, 13–1874.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: Feb. 14, 2014.

Filed: June 6, 2014.

Ruth B. Sanders, Kansas City, MO, argued, for appellant Maurice Sayles.

Ian A. Lewis, Asst. Fed. Public Defender, Springfield, MO, argued (Raymond C. Conrad, Jr., Fed. Public Defender, Kansas City, MO, on the brief), for appellant Martinus Sayles.

Randall D. Eggert, Asst. U.S. Atty., Springfield, MO, argued (Tammy Dickinson, U.S. Atty., Kansas City, MO, on the brief), for appellee.

Before RILEY, Chief Judge, LOKEN and BYE, Circuit Judges.

BYE, Circuit Judge.

Martinus Antuan Sayles (“Martinus”) and Maurice Suton Anton Sayles (“Maurice”) each pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud and the district court ¹ sentenced each to eighty-five months of imprisonment. Martinus and Maurice now appeal the sentences. We affirm each sentence.

I

Twin brothers Martinus and Maurice engaged in a scheme whereby they would steal checks, forge checks, purchase merchandise, then return the merchandise for cash. The loss attributable to the scheme was $5,990. On April 4, 2012, an indictment was filed in the Western District of Missouri, charging Martinus and Maurice with conspiracy to commit wire fraud. Maurice was also charged with three counts of wire fraud.

Martinus pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud without a written plea agreement. At sentencing, pursuant to the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“U.S.S.G.”), the district court determined Martinus had an offense level of 7, a criminal history category of VI, and a guidelines range of 15–21 months. The government sought a sentence at the high end of the guidelines range and the district court varied upward because of the serious nature of the crime, Martinus's criminal history, the need to deter Martinus from future crimes, and a need to protect the public. The district court sentenced Martinus to eighty-five months of imprisonment.

Maurice pleaded guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement to conspiracy to commit wire fraud. The plea agreement prevented the government from seeking a sentence higher than the guidelines range as calculated by the district court. Maurice was sentenced by the district court after Martinus, but on the same day. The district court applied a three-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b) for Maurice's role as a manager or supervisor and subsequently calculated Maurice had an offense level of 13, a criminal history category of VI, and a guidelines range of 33–41 months. The government breached the plea agreement and asked for a sentence of at least eighty-five months, arguing Maurice was the primary motivator of the conspiracy and had a criminal history category similar to Martinus, thus making a sentence of less than eighty-five months of imprisonment disproportionate to the sentence imposed on Martinus. The district court varied upward because of Maurice's criminal history and his role as the leader of the conspiracy and sentenced Maurice to eighty-five months of imprisonment.

II

We review the substantive unreasonableness of sentences “under a standard akin to an abuse-of-discretion standard, cognizant that it will be the unusual case when we reverse a district court sentence—whether within, above, or below the applicable Guidelines range—as substantively unreasonable.” United States v. VandeBrake, 679 F.3d 1030, 1037 (8th Cir.2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). When arguments were not raised below, they are reviewed for plain error. United States v. Smith, 573 F.3d 639, 659 (8th Cir.2009). Under plain error review, it is the defendant's burden to prove (1) there was error, (2) that was plain, and (3) affected substantial rights. United States v. Burnette, 518 F.3d 942, 947 (8th Cir.2008) (citing Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466–67, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997); Fed. R.Crim. Pro. 52(b)).

A

Martinus contends his sentence of eighty-five months is substantively unreasonable. A sentence may be unreasonable if the district court fails to consider a relevant factor which should have received significant weight; gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or considers the appropriate factors but commits a clear error of judgment. United States v. Haack, 403 F.3d 997, 1004 (8th Cir.2005). A district court is required to impose a sentence which is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to satisfy the statutory goals of sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). A district court must consider the guidelines range, but may vary from the range to “tailor the sentence in light of the other statutory concerns” of § 3553(a). United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245–46, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). If a district court varies from the advisory guidelines range, the sentence can be reasonable so long as the district court offers appropriate justification under the factors of § 3553(a). United States v. Plaza, 471 F.3d 876, 879 (8th Cir.2006). “The greater the variance from the advisory guidelines range, the greater the justification must be for that variance.” Id.

The district court gave four reasons for varying upward from the guidelines range: (1) the serious nature of the crime, (2) Martinus's criminal history, (3) the need to deter Martinus from future crimes, and (4) a need to protect the public. All were permissible reasons for varying from the guidelines. See18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The primary justification behind the upward variance was Martinus's significant criminal history of fraud. The district court noted Martinus had twenty-eight criminal history points, but the guidelines stops counting criminal history points at thirteen, thus a significant portion of Martinus's criminal history was not taken into account in the guidelines calculation. We find no basis for concluding the sentence is unreasonable. The district court considered appropriate factors in varying from the guidelines and adequately explained its sentence. See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 552 F.3d 686, 690–92 (8th Cir.2009) (affirming an above-guidelines sentence where the district court adequately explained its sentence, noting the sentencing judge is in a “superior position” to evaluate the facts of any given case and judge their significance against the § 3553(a) factors).²

B

Maurice argues the plea agreement should be unenforceable because the government breached the agreement, the district court committed procedural error by improperly calculating Maurice's guidelines range, and the district court imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence.

Maurice argues the plea agreement should be deemed unenforceable because the government breached the plea agreement. Maurice waived his right to appeal as part of his plea agreement; however, because the government breached the plea agreement, the appeals waiver is unenforceable. United States v. Lovelace, 565 F.3d 1080, 1084 (8th Cir.2009). When a defendant seeks to avoid an appeal waiver contained in a plea agreement by arguing, for the...