League of Women Voters of Chi. v. City of Chi.

• Decision Date: 09 July 2014
• Docket Number: No. 13–2977.,13–2977.
• Citation: 757 F.3d 722
• Parties: LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF CHICAGO, et al., Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

757 F.3d 722

LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF CHICAGO, et al., Plaintiffs–Appellants,

v.CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 13–2977.

United States Court of Appeals,Seventh Circuit.

Argued April 7, 2014.

Decided July 9, 2014.

Sean Morales–Doyle, Thomas H. Geoghegan, Michael P. Persoon, Despres, Schwartz & Geoghegan, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs–Appellants.

Kerrie Maloney Laytin, Office of the Corporation Counsel, Richard J. Prendergast, Richard J. Prendergast, Ltd., Benna Ruth Solomon, City of Chicago Law Department, Michael James Kasper, Fletcher Topol & O'Brien Chicago, IL, for Defendant–Appellee.

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and KANNE and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge.

In 2012, Chicago's City Council voted on and adopted a new ward map to take effect in 2015. The League of Women Voters of Chicago and fourteen Chicago citizens (collectively “the League”) filed this action challenging the redistricting. The League alleged that the 2015 map failed to adhere to equal-population principles established under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The League also asserted that the City prematurely implemented the 2015 boundaries, which infringed upon their right to vote under the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted the City's 12(b)(6) motion for failure of the League to state a claim. For the following reasons, we affirm.

I. Background

Following the 2010 census, and pursuant to state law, the City of Chicago sought to reapportion its fifty aldermanic wards. 65 ILCS 20/21–36. Beginning in 2011, the City Council conducted hearings to solicit the views of citizens regarding the redrawing of ward boundaries. Under state law, the Council was required to garner the approval of forty-one aldermen in order to prevent a referendum on the redistricting plan. 65 ILCS 20/21–39; 65 ILCS 20/21–40. On January 19, 2012, the Council approved the redistricting plan by a vote of forty-one to eight.

According to the 2010 census, the City's population was 2,695,598, which, if divided equally, would result in 53,912 people in each ward. The wards created by the 2015 map deviate from the average population per ward by a maximum of 8.7 percent.

The League filed this action challenging the redistricting ordinance. Only Counts I and III are at issue in this appeal.¹ In Count I, they alleged that the new ordinance was implemented prematurely and deprived constituents of their right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.

In Count III, the League claimed that the maximum deviations of 8.7 percent between the wards violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They alleged that the 2015 map was arbitrary, that it politically discriminated against “independent” aldermen, and that it departed from traditional redistricting criteria. The League also alleged that the Second and Thirty–Sixth Wards were redrawn to a greater degree than others in an attempt to oust the aldermen of these wards who demonstrated political independence from the City Council majority.

Following the City's 12(b)(6) motion, the district court dismissed both Counts I and III for failure to state a claim. As for Count I, the court held that the League had not alleged permanent disenfranchisement nor a change to election law; at most, the League had claimed temporary disenfranchisement, which does not give rise to equal protection concerns. Moreover, the court noted that reacting to the concerns of future constituents is simply part of the political process.

The court also dismissed the equal-population claim, finding that the League failed to meet its burden to show a prima facie case of unconstitutionality. The court, citing Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842, 103 S.Ct. 2690, 77 L.Ed.2d 214 (1983) noted that a maximum population deviation below 10 percent is considered minor and insufficient to establish a prima facie case that requires justification by the state. The court further found that the League's complaint did not allege that the map targeted an objectively defined group and preserved the voting rights of minorities. Finally, the court found that disfavoring certain aldermen over others is an inherent part of the political process and an inevitable result of redistricting.

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

We review a 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo and construe all allegations and any reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 507 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir.2007). And while a complaint does not need “detailed factual allegations” to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, it must allege sufficient facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).

B. One Person, One Vote

The Equal Protection Clause principle of “one person, one vote” requires that officials be elected from voting districts with substantially equal populations. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). Thus, “one man's vote in a[n] ... election is to be worth as much as another's.” Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8, 84 S.Ct. 526, 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964). To achieve this result, the government must “make an honest and good-faith effort to construct its districts as nearly of equal population as is practicable,” but mathematical precision is not required. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 743, 93 S.Ct. 2321, 37 L.Ed.2d 298 (1973) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Supreme Court has held that a maximum population deviation greater than ten percent “creates a prima facie case of discrimination and therefore must be justified by the state.” Brown, 462 U.S. at 842–43, 103 S.Ct. 2690. But when a maximum deviation is less than ten percent, the deviation is considered minor and the plaintiffs cannot “establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause from population variations alone.” White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 764, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973); see also Daly v. Hunt, 93 F.3d 1212, 1220 (4th Cir.1996). Thus, a plan with a minor maximum population deviation will be presumed to be constitutionally valid absent a showing of “arbitrariness or discrimination.” Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 710, 84 S.Ct. 1449, 12 L.Ed.2d 620 (1964). To overcome the presumption, the League makes three allegations of arbitrariness or discrimination.

1. Alderman O'Connor's Statement

First, the League points to a statement made by Alderman Patrick O'Connor who claimed that the map was created in order “to have the largest number of City Council members available so that we would not have a referendum.” The League argues that this statement, standing alone, demonstrates that the map was created arbitrarily. Yet this statement suggests nothing of the sort. Alderman O'Connor was simply stating a fact: in order to prevent a referendum from occurring, it was necessary to obtain the proper majority of votes. 65 ILCS 20/21–39; 65 ILCS 20/21–40. One alderman's statement can hardly be said to establish that the whole City Council acted arbitrarily in designing the map. At most, the statement reflects that Alderman O'Connor wanted this bill to pass into law, a proposition that required a substantial majority of votes.

2. “Independent” Aldermen

The League also claimed that the new map—designed by Democratic aldermen—targeted two other Democratic aldermen from the Second and Thirty–Sixth Wards who “have shown political independence from the City Council majority.” The League alleged that the City Council majority drew the 2015 map to “oust” these aldermen from their respective districts. Citing Justice Stevens' concurrence in the summary affirmance of Larios v. Cox, 300 F.Supp.2d 1320 (N.D.Ga.) (per curiam), summarily aff'd, 542 U.S. 947, 124 S.Ct. 2806, 159 L.Ed.2d 831 (2004), they argue that political discrimination alone can serve to rebut the presumption of constitutional validity for maps with deviations below ten percent.²

Larios involved redistricting that was tainted by two prohibited considerations: (1) the redistricting sought “to allow rural and inner-city Atlanta regions of the state to hold on to their legislative influence” at the expense of Republican-leaning areas; and (2) the deviations “were created to protect incumbents in a wholly inconsistent and discriminatory way.” Larios, 300 F.Supp.2d at 1342. But Larios is inapplicable.

The district court's concern in Larios was that the voters ' ability to elect their representatives was significantly diminished, not that individual Democratic or Republican representatives were immune from the political process. It noted that voters with particular ideologies were being disfavored: “Republican-leaning districts [were] vastly more overpopulated as a whole than Democratic-leaning districts.” Id. at 1331. Such is not the case here.

The Constitution “guarantees the opportunity for equal participation by all voters in the election of [their representatives].” Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 566, 84 S.Ct. 1362 (emphasis added). It is not meant to insulate individual politicians from the threat of political reprisal once redistricting occurs. The fact remains that the equal-population requirement is meant to protect “an individual's right to vote.” Id. at 568, 84 S.Ct. 1362 (emphasis added).

Redistricting is an inherently political process; indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that “[p]olitics and political considerations are inseparable from districting and apportionment.... The reality is that districting inevitably has and is intended to have substantial political consequences.” Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 753, 93 S.Ct. 2321; see also Larios, 300 F.Supp.2d at 1354 (“a redistricting process need not be free of politics in order to be constitutional.”). As in any election or redistricting scheme, there are bound to be winners and losers. Simply alleging that two aldermen—who were of the same party as those seeking...