Humphrey v. Walker

• Decision Date: 28 March 2014
• Docket Number: S13X1473.,Nos. S13A1472,s. S13A1472
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court
• Parties: HUMPHREY v. WALKER. Walker v. Humphrey.

294 Ga. 855
757 S.E.2d 68

HUMPHREY
v.
WALKER.
Walker
v.
Humphrey.

Nos. S13A1472, S13X1473.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

March 28, 2014.

[757 S.E.2d 71]

Samuel S. Olens, Atty. Gen., Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Atty. Gen., Sabrina Dawn Graham, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dana Elizabeth Weinberger, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.

Brian Kammer, Atlanta, for appellee.

BLACKWELL, Justice.

In 2002, Artemus Rick Walker was tried by jury and convicted of the murder of Lynwood Ray Gresham, as well as several related crimes. For the murder, he was sentenced to death, and for the other crimes, he was sentenced to terms of imprisonment. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed his convictions and sentences. See Walker v. State, 282 Ga. 774, 653 S.E.2d 439 (2007). Then, in 2009, Walker filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Following an evidentiary hearing, the habeas court granted the writ. Although it found that some claims asserted by Walker were procedurally barred, not cognizable in habeas proceedings, or otherwise without merit, the habeas court concluded that several of his claims had merit. In particular, the habeas court concluded that Walker was denied due process by having been tried while incompetent, and it concluded as well that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel, not only with respect to his competence, but also with respect to the presentation of certain defenses and mitigating evidence involving his mental health. Based on these conclusions, the habeas court granted the writ and vacated both the convictions and sentences. In Case No. S13A1472, the Warden appeals from the grant of the writ, and in Case No. S13X1473, Walker cross-appeals. In light of the deference that we owe to the factual findings of the habeas court, we affirm the grant of the writ in the appeal by the Warden. By our affirming the grant of the writ, the cross-appeal is moot, and we dismiss it.

I. The Factual Circumstances of the Crimes

On direct appeal, we summarized the factual circumstances of the crimes of which Walker was convicted as follows:

[Walker] devised a plan to rob Lynwood Ray Gresham, who was the vice president of the bank that was next door to the service station Walker owned. Walker hired Gary Lee Griffin several days before the crimes to work at his service station and asked Griffin if he would help “rob and kill” a “rich” man. On May 12, 1999, Walker borrowed an automobile that belonged to another of his employees and drove with Griffin to the hotel where Griffin was staying. They picked up Griffin's bicycle at the hotel and then traveled in the automobile to Walker's apartment. Walker gave Griffin black pants to change into and gave him a knife and a stun gun. Walker also changed into black clothing. They also loaded Walker's bicycle into the automobile.

Walker drove the pair with their bicycles to a place near Gresham's house and parked, and they rode the bicycles to Gresham's house. Griffin waited at the side of the house as Walker went to the door and engaged Gresham in a conversation in the front yard. Walker and Gresham began struggling. Walker told Griffin to use the stun gun on Gresham, but Griffin refused. Griffin also refused when Walker told him to stab Gresham with the knife. Griffin gave Walker the knife, and Walker stabbed Gresham 12 times in the chest and back. Walker told Griffin to pick up things that had fallen during the struggle, which included Gresham's keys and wallet. Walker dragged Gresham, who was still alive, to the side of the house and hid him in some bushes, where he was later found dead. Walker then told Griffin that he had “one more to kill” and asked Griffin for Gresham's keys. Walker tried to open the door to Gresham's house, but Gresham's wife, Roberta Gresham, locked a chain lock and a foot lock from inside. Roberta Gresham called the police, and she observed Walker, with whom she was familiar, through a window with “something on his hip that looked like a gun.” Roberta Gresham's daughter, Allison, yelled to Walker that she had a gun. Walker and Griffin then rode away on their bicycles. Griffin was arrested nearby after he crashed his bicycle. The victim's

[757 S.E.2d 72]

wallet was found in Griffin's pocket, and a broken stun gun was found on Griffin's belt. Walker was arrested a few hours later after he was discovered in the woods nearby. The victim's blood was on Walker's clothes, and he had the victim's keys. The knife used to kill Gresham and a pistol were discovered near the site of Walker's arrest.

282 Ga. at 774–775(1), 653 S.E.2d 439.¹

II. Competence at the Time of Trial

We begin with the claim that Walker was denied due process because he was incompetent at the time of his trial, one of the claims upon which the habeas court granted the writ.² It long has been settled that the constitutional guarantee of due process forbids the conviction of one who is incompetent. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378(I), 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966). An accused is incompetent to stand trial if he is without the “ability to understand the nature and object of the proceedings going on against [him], to comprehend [his] own condition in reference to such proceedings, and to render [his] attorneys such assistance as a proper defense to the indictment preferred against [him] demanded.” Norris v. State, 250 Ga. 38, 42(3), 295 S.E.2d 321 (1982). See also Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993) (“The standard for competence to stand trial is whether the defendant has ‘sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding’ and has ‘a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’ ” (Citation omitted)). And as we have explained,

the constitutional requirement of trial competence is rudimentary, for upon it depends the main part of those rights deemed essential to a fair trial, including the right to effective assistance of counsel, the rights to summon, to confront, and to cross-examine witnesses, and the right to testify on one's own behalf or to remain silent without penalty for doing so.
Sims v. State, 279 Ga. 389, 390(1), 614 S.E.2d 73 (2005) (citations and punctuation omitted). A claim that an accused is not competent, however, must be asserted in the court of conviction and on direct appeal, and if such a claim is not so asserted, it ordinarily is barred by procedural default and cannot, therefore, be later asserted in habeas proceedings. Perkins v. Hall, 288 Ga. 810, 820(III)(B)(1), 708 S.E.2d 335 (2011). See also Head v. Thomason, 276 Ga. 434, 441, 578 S.E.2d 426 (2003). But “[a] claim that is subject to procedural default may nevertheless be considered in habeas corpus proceedings if the petitioner can satisfy the cause and prejudice test.” Perkins, 288 Ga. at 822(III)(C), 708 S.E.2d 335. The habeas court acknowledged that Walker never asserted in the court of conviction that he was incompetent to stand trial, but it found adequate cause and prejudice to overcome the procedural default.

A. Cause and Prejudice

“A common method of satisfying the cause and prejudice test is to show that trial and direct appeal counsel rendered ineffective assistance,” ³Perkins, 288 Ga. at 822(III)(C), 708 S.E.2d 335 (citation omitted), and that is the ground upon which the habeas court here found sufficient cause and prejudice to overcome the bar of procedural default. With

[757 S.E.2d 73]

respect to cause and prejudice, the habeas court reasoned as follows:

While it is true that [Walker]'s due process claims are procedurally defaulted, as [Walker] failed to raise these claims in a motion for new trial or in his direct appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court, the Court finds that [Walker] has shown it was caused by his trial and appellate counsel's ineffectiveness for failing to pursue a mental health investigation. [Walker] was prejudiced by this failure in that his competency to stand trial was never evaluated or litigated....
The Warden contends that the record does not sustain this finding of cause and prejudice, and as we consider this contention, we look first to the familiar and settled principles that govern claims of ineffective assistance.

To show a denial of effective assistance, Walker had to prove both that the performance of his lawyers was deficient and that he was prejudiced by this deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687(III), 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). To prove that the performance of his lawyers was deficient, Walker was required to show that the lawyers performed their duties in an objectively unreasonable way, considering all the circumstances, and in the light of prevailing professional norms. Id. at 687–688(III)(A), 104 S.Ct. 2052. See also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381(II)(C), 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986). This is no easy showing. As the United States Supreme Court has explained:

Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.... There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689–690(III)(A), 104 S.Ct. 2052 (citations omitted). See also Humphrey v. Nance, 293 Ga. 189, 191(II)(A), 744 S.E.2d 706 (2013). To these ends, the law recognizes a “strong presumption” that counsel performed reasonably, Strickland,...