Rodriguez v. State

• Decision Date: 30 June 2014
• Docket Number: No. S13G1167.,S13G1167.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court
• Parties: RODRIGUEZ v. The STATE.

295 Ga. 362
761 S.E.2d 19

RODRIGUEZ
v.
The STATE.

No. S13G1167.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

June 30, 2014.

[761 S.E.2d 21]

Eric Charles Crawford, Crawford & Boyle, LLC, Monroe, for appellant.

Ayanna Kalisha Sterling–Jones, Asst. Dist. Atty., Daniel J. Porter, Dist. Atty., Franklin Pearson Clark, Gwinnett County District Attorney's Office, Lawrenceville, for appellee.

BLACKWELL, Justice.

In August 2010, a City of Norcross police officer stopped Sonia Rodriguez, and in the course of that traffic stop, the officer found more than four ounces of marijuana in her car. Rodriguez was indicted for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and she moved to suppress the discovery of the marijuana, conceding that it was reasonable for the officer to stop and detain her for a brief investigation, but contending that the marijuana was discovered only after her detention was unreasonably prolonged. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied her motion, but it certified its decision for immediate review, and the Court of Appeals allowed an interlocutory appeal.¹ The appeal eventually was heard by all twelve judges of the Court of Appeals, and although the Court of Appeals entered a judgment affirming the denial of the motion to suppress, only six judges concurred in that judgment. See Rodriguez v. State, 321 Ga.App. 619, 746 S.E.2d 366 (2013).

Upon the petition of Rodriguez, we issued a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, and we directed the parties to address two questions in their briefs:

1. Was the Court of Appeals equally divided in this case, and therefore, should it have transferred the case to this Court? See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. V, Par. V.

2. If so, did the trial court err when it denied the motion to suppress?

We now conclude that the Court of Appeals never should have rendered any decision in this case and instead should have transferred the appeal to this Court. About the merits of the appeal, we see no error in the denial of the motion to suppress. Accordingly, we vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals, we affirm the judgment of the trial court,

[761 S.E.2d 22]

and we remand for the Court of Appeals to transmit a remittitur to the trial court consistent with this opinion.

1. We begin with the proceedings in the Court of Appeals, where the appeal was docketed in the September 2012 term. At first, the appeal was assigned to a panel of three judges, and on February 19, 2013, the panel issued a unanimous decision, affirming the denial of the motion to suppress.² Eight days later, Rodriguez filed a motion for reconsideration. That motion was granted, the panel decision was vacated, and the case was referred to the full bench of twelve judges. See OCGA § 15–3–1(c). On April 12, 2013, the Court of Appeals entered the decision of the full bench, again affirming the denial of the motion to suppress. That decision was announced in a per curiam opinion, which was joined in full by Presiding Judges Andrews and Barnes, in part and in judgment by Judges Boggs and Branch, and in judgment only by Judges Ray and McMillian. See Rodriguez, 321 Ga.App. at 623, 746 S.E.2d 366. Presiding Judge Doyle wrote a dissenting opinion, in which she proposed to reverse the denial of the motion to suppress, and her dissent was joined by then-Chief Judge Ellington, then-Presiding Judge Phipps, and Judge McFadden. See id. at 623–626, 746 S.E.2d 366 (Doyle, P.J., dissenting). Judge Dillard wrote his own dissenting opinion, in which he proposed to vacate the denial of the motion to suppress and remand for the trial court to reconsider the motion. See id. at 627, 746 S.E.2d 366 (Dillard, J., dissenting). Then–Presiding Judge Miller dissented separately, but without any opinion indicating whether she would have reversed or only vacated the denial of the motion to suppress. ³

Our Constitution provides that, “[i]n the event of an equal division of the Judges [of the Court of Appeals] when sitting as a body, the case shall be immediately transmitted to the Supreme Court.” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. V, Par. V. We have addressed the meaning of the Equal Division clause before, and under our precedents, when the full bench of the Court of Appeals has considered every claim of error that might cause the judgment of the trial court to be set aside, and when the full bench is equally divided about whether that judgment must be set aside, there is an “equal division,” ⁴ and the case must be transferred to this Court. See Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Godard, 211 Ga. 41, 42, 83 S.E.2d 591 (1954) (Equal Division clause “contemplates the transfer by the Court of Appeals to this court of cases where the Judges of the Court

[761 S.E.2d 23]

of Appeals are equally divided on all questions in the case which would require an affirmance or reversal of the judgment of the trial court”). See also Ford v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 270 Ga. 730, 731, n. 4, 514 S.E.2d 201 (1999) (noting that there was no equal division in Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Ford, 218 Ga.App. 248, 461 S.E.2d 877 (1995), where a majority of judges were of the opinion that the judgment of the trial court must be reversed upon some ground, notwithstanding that the judges were equally split as to whether it had to be reversed on one particular ground); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Clinard, 211 Ga. 340, 342–343, 86 S.E.2d 1 (1955) (citing Godard and returning case to Court of Appeals where judges were equally divided upon one claim of error, but had not considered other claims of error that might equally require reversal of the judgment below).

In this case, six judges of the Court of Appeals were of the opinion that the denial of the motion to suppress should be affirmed, and six were of the opinion that it should not. To be sure, of the latter six judges, four were of the opinion that the denial should be reversed entirely, Rodriguez, 321 Ga.App. at 623–626, 746 S.E.2d 366 (Doyle, P.J., dissenting), one was of the opinion that it should be vacated and remanded for further proceedings on the motion, id. at 627, 746 S.E.2d 366 (Dillard, J., dissenting), and one did not say whether she would reverse or vacate, nor did she say what should happen next in the trial court, only that she dissented from the decision to affirm. But for purposes of the Equal Division clause, differences of opinion in this case about whether the judgment of the trial court should be set aside as “reversed” or instead as “vacated” are not dispositive. See Newman, “Last Words of an Appellate Opinion,” 70 Brooklyn L.Rev. 727, 728 (2005) ( “If a judgment is to be undone, at least in some respect, there is a difference of opinion among judges as to the circumstances in which ‘vacated’ or ‘reversed’ should be used in decretal language.”). See also Holton v. Lankford, 189 Ga. 506, 512–513(1), 6 S.E.2d 304 (1939) (“The judgment of reversal, without more, operated only to vacate the orders and decree as therein stated....”). Nor are differences of opinion in this case among the six dissenting judges about what ought to happen next in the trial court dispositive. See Parfait v. Transocean Offshore, Inc., 980 So.2d 634, 635–637 (La.2008) (12–member court of appeals was equally divided where six judges would affirm award of damages, two would reduce the award by an amount certain, one would reduce the award by another amount certain, and three would reverse award entirely). Six judges would have let the judgment of the trial court stand, and six would not. There was an equal division in this case, the Court of Appeals ought not have rendered any decision, and it instead should have immediately transferred the case to this Court.⁵ Accordingly, we vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals.

2. We now consider whether the trial court erred when it denied the motion to suppress.⁶ Viewed in the light most favorable to the findings of the trial court, the evidence shows that Rodriguez was driving

[761 S.E.2d 24]

along Mitchell Road in the City of Norcross late in the afternoon of August 18, 2010. She was accompanied by a female passenger, Ereka Taszeika Williams. Rodriguez and Williams passed by a Norcross police officer, whose patrol car was equipped with an automatic license plate recognition system. ⁷ The system alerted the officer that Rodriguez was driving a vehicle that was known to have been driven by Enrique Sanchez, who was wanted on an outstanding warrant. Based upon this alert, the officer stopped Rodriguez and Williams. After he stopped them, but before he exited his patrol car and approached their vehicle, the officer checked the registration of their vehicle and learned that it was registered to Rodriguez.

When the officer approached the vehicle, he asked Rodriguez and Williams for identification. Rodriguez produced her driver's license, and Williams produced no identification card, but she gave her name and date of birth to the officer. At that point, the officer explained the reason for the stop, and Rodriguez responded that Sanchez is her son and that he was in prison. The officer noticed that Rodriguez did not look at him as they spoke, and he asked whether there were any weapons or contraband in the car, to which the women quickly and simultaneously responded “no.” Both women appeared nervous when they responded to the question about weapons or contraband. The officer also observed an “unusually strong” odor of air freshener from the passenger compartment of the car, which he knew to be frequently associated with attempts to mask the odor of narcotics.

The officer then returned to his patrol car to verify the identities of Rodriguez and Williams and to ascertain whether either had outstanding warrants, and in the course of that verification, the officer determined—approximately four minutes after he had initiated the stop—that Williams was the subject of an outstanding arrest warrant in Florida. By that time, a second officer had arrived at the...