Humphrey v. Williams, S14A0395.

CourtSupreme Court of Georgia
Citation295 Ga. 536,761 S.E.2d 297
Decision Date11 July 2014
Docket NumberNo. S14A0395.,S14A0395.
PartiesHUMPHREY, Warden v. WILLIAMS.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Samuel S. Olens, Atty. Gen., Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Dep. Atty. Gen., Paula Khristian Smith, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., Clint Christopher Malcolm, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.

Jimmie Ray Williams, Leesburg, for appellee.

NAHMIAS, Justice.

In 2002, a jury in Decatur County convicted Jimmie Ray Williams of sexually molesting his 13–year–old stepdaughter and her 14–year–old friend in 2000, after a trial at which his 20–year–old daughter was allowed to testify, as a similar transaction, that Williams touched her sexually four times in one night in 1993, when she was 11 years old and living with him in Florida. The trial court sentenced Williams to serve a total of 20 years in prison followed by 20 years on probation, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in Williams v. State, 263 Ga.App. 22, 587 S.E.2d 187 (2003).

In August 2004, Williams filed a pro se petition for habeas corpus alleging, among other claims, that Billy Grantham, his attorney at trial and on direct appeal, provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Williams claimed that Grantham conducted a deficient pretrial investigation by failing to obtain Florida court records showing that the alleged similar transaction never took place. Williams argued that if Grantham had conducted a competent investigation and found those records, his daughter's testimony would have been excluded before trial or successfully impeached at trial, creating a reasonable probability that the trial verdict would have been more favorable to Williams.

The habeas court initially denied Williams's petition in November 2006, but in January 2008 this Court granted his application to appeal and vacated that judgment because the habeas court had not allowed Williams a full and fair opportunity to present his claims. On remand, at a new evidentiary hearing in October 2008, Williams presented the Florida court records and showed that they were readily available to Grantham at the time of trial. On December 31, 2012, the habeas court entered a detailed order setting aside Williams's convictions. The court concluded that Grantham's investigation of the alleged similar transaction was professionally deficient and that, but for counsel's failure to obtain the Florida records, there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of Williams's trial would have been more favorable to him, because his daughter's testimony would have been either excluded or successfully impeached.

The Warden now appeals, arguing, among other things, that reversal is required because the Florida court records on which the habeas court based its finding of ineffective assistance of counsel were never admitted into evidence in the habeas proceedings; the court erred in finding deficient performance; the court erred in finding prejudice based on its erroneous determination that the Florida records amounted to acquittal evidence that collaterally estopped the admission of the similar transaction testimony under this Court's decision in Moore v. State, 254 Ga. 674, 333 S.E.2d 605 (1985); and the court erred in finding prejudice because of the “overwhelming evidence” of Williams's guilt, aside from the similar transaction testimony, that was presented at trial.

As we explain below, the record shows that the Florida court records were in fact admitted into evidence at the 2008 habeas hearing, and we agree with the habeas court that Grantham's investigation of the alleged similar transaction was professionally deficient. The Warden is right that the habeas court erred in treating the Florida records as acquittal evidence precluding the admission of the similar transaction testimony, but the Warden is wrong in his assertion that the evidence at Williams's trial, aside from the similar transaction evidence, was overwhelming. Instead, the habeas court correctly concluded that if Grantham had obtained and used the Florida court records, the similar transaction testimony would have been either excluded or convincingly refuted at trial, and there is therefore a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been more favorable to Williams. Accordingly, we affirm the habeas court's judgment.1

1. Our evaluation of the Warden's arguments requires a detailed review of what the record shows regarding how the 2002 case against Williams arose, the evidence that was presented at the similar transaction hearing and at trial, and the additional evidence that was presented during the habeas corpus proceedings.

(a) Background. In January 2000, Williams, who was then 38 years old, was living in a double-wide trailer in Decatur County with his then-wife, Jonell Williams (“Jonell”); their four-year-old son; and Jonell's two daughters from a prior relationship, a nine-year-old and a 13–year–old, whom we will refer to as Stephanie. While Jonell was out of town for a week on business, Stephanie invited her 14–year–old friend and classmate, whom we will call Amanda, to sleep over on the night of Monday, January 24, 2000. Joe, a 17–year–old family friend who lived a few lots up the road, walked over to the Williams residence just before dark that evening. Williams and Joe drank some whiskey together, and at some point, Amanda and Stephanie also drank whiskey, getting heavily intoxicated to the point that they vomited. Amanda and Stephanie were hung over the next day, and Williams allowed them to stay home from school. After she returned to town, Jonell reported that Stephanie and Amanda had gotten drunk and skipped school to the Department of Family and Children Services (DFACS), and DFACS conducted an investigation. In separate interviews at their school, Amanda and Stephanie said that they snuck into Williams's whiskey and got drunk while he was outside repairing his truck with a friend. There was no mention that Amanda had sex while at the Williams residence, or of any sexual behavior by Williams toward either girl at any time, and DFACS took no action against Williams.

Over two years later, in March 2002, Stephanie told her mother Jonell that she wanted to go live with her father and would run away from home if Jonell said no. Jonell questioned Stephanie over three to four days about her suddenly expressed desire to go live with her father, and Stephanie provided a number of different explanations. Finally, after an hour-long discussion about why she wanted to live with her father so much, Stephanie told Jonell that it was because Williams had been sexually inappropriate with her on several occasions in 2000. Jonell took no immediate action, but some time later, when Jonell and Williams were arguing,Jonell told him about Stephanie's claim and said that she wanted a divorce and that he needed to quit his job and move as far away from her as he could. Williams denied molesting Stephanie. Two days later, Jonell reported Stephanie's allegations to the Decatur County Sheriff's Office (DCSO), which removed Williams from the trailer the same day and arrested him.

A few days later, Jonell contacted DCSO Investigator Frank Green and told him that he needed to speak with Williams's adult daughter, Jessica, who lived in Florida. (Decatur County borders on Florida.) On Friday, March 29, 2002, Investigator Green conducted a telephone interview of Jessica while she was at Jonell's trailer visiting Jonell for the weekend. According to Green, Jessica said that one night when she was in elementary school and living in Florida, she was asleep in bed with her younger brother in their bedroom when Williams, who was drunk, came into the room and started rubbing her over her underwear “in the vagina area, on her buttocks”; he left the room when Jessica told him to stop but came back again three times that night and did the same thing; and that night was the only time that Williams touched her inappropriately. Jessica also told Green that the incident was reported to the Florida equivalent of DFACS, which conducted an investigation. Green later obtained a report of some kind from the Florida agency that placed the date of the incident around February 1993, when Jessica was 11 years old. In addition, in early April 2002, Jonell reported to the DCSO that Williams had admitted to her in a telephone conversation on April 2 that he had consensual sexual intercourse with Amanda during the January 2000 sleepover.

On May 7, 2002, Williams was indicted for statutory rape and child molestation for allegedly having sexual intercourse with Amanda on the night of January 24–25, 2000; three counts of child molestation for allegedly masturbating in front of Stephanie in February or March of 2000, exposing his penis to Stephanie and asking her to touch it sometime during the months of May through August 2000, and fondling Stephanie's vaginal area in December 2000; and contributing to the delinquency of a minor for allegedly furnishing alcohol to Amanda and Stephanie on the night of January 24–25, 2000. Billy Grantham, an experienced criminal defense lawyer, was appointed to represent Williams.

(b) The Similar Transaction Hearing. On July 30, 2002, the trial court held a pretrial evidentiary hearing to determine if similar transaction evidence relating to the alleged 1993 incident involving Jessica could be admitted at trial.2 Investigator Green testified and recounted the substance of his telephone interview with Jessica. Grantham cross-examined the officer perfunctorily, but he presented no witnesses for Williams and offered no exhibits for the trial court to consider. In arguing that the court should exclude the similar transaction evidence, Grantham asserted that the alleged prior incident was too remote in time and that the acts that Williams allegedly committed in 1993 and in 2000 were not sufficiently similar, because there was no allegation that the 1993 incident included furnishing alcohol to Jessica or having sex with her,...

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8 cases
  • Gibson v. State, S16A1507
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • 6 Febrero 2017
    ...is governed by OCGA § 24–4–404 (b). See Olds v. State , 299 Ga. 65, 69 (2), n. 5, 786 S.E.2d 633 (2016) ; Humphrey v. Williams , 295 Ga. 536, 539 (1) (b), n. 2, 761 S.E.2d 297 (2014).6 We note that this purpose has been "eliminated from the new Evidence Code." Brooks v. State , 298 Ga. 722,......
  • State v. Atkins
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • 10 Septiembre 2018
    ...good law given its apparent conflict with Dowling, because it was unnecessary to do so in that case. See Humphrey v. Williams, 295 Ga. 536, 555 (2) (d) n.8, 761 S.E.2d 297 (2014). This case requires us to confront Moore’s holding.9 A plurality of the Currier Court concluded that double jeop......
  • Olds v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • 23 Mayo 2016
    ...man who had assaulted her.5 The new Evidence Code applies in cases tried on or after January 1, 2013. See Humphrey v. Williams, 295 Ga. 536, 539(1)(b), n. 2, 761 S.E.2d 297 (2014). Olds was tried in June 2013, and so, the new Evidence Code applies in this case.6 The enumeration in Rule 404(......
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    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • 8 Julio 2016
    ...Code, the admission of “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts” is governed by OCGA § 24–4–404 (b). See Humphrey v. Williams, 295 Ga. 536, 539 n. 2, 761 S.E.2d 297 (2014).4 Under the old Evidence Code, when offering similar transaction evidence, the State had the burden to show that: (......
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