Grimes v. State

• Citation: 296 Ga. 337,766 S.E.2d 72
• Decision Date: 17 November 2014
• Docket Number: S14A1516,Nos. S14A1162,S14A1533.,S14A1163,s. S14A1162
• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
• Parties: GRIMES v. The STATE. Reed v. The State. Willis v. The State. Brantley v. The State.

296 Ga. 337

766 S.E.2d 72

GRIMES

v.The STATE.

Reed

v.The State.

Willis

v.The State.

Brantley

v.The State.

Nos. S14A1162

S14A1163

S14A1516

S14A1533.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Nov. 17, 2014.

Reconsideration Denied Dec. 11, 2014.

Margaret Flynt, Atlanta, for appellant (case no. S14A1162).

Steven E. Phillips, for appellant (case no. S14A1163).

David D. Marshall, for appellant (case no. S14A1516).

Jeffrey W. Cofer, Gerald P. Privin, Jared S. Westbroek, for appellant (case no. S14A1533).

Robert D. James, Jr., Dist. Atty., Leonora Grant, Asst. Dist. Atty., Samuel S. Olens, Atty. Gen., Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Atty. Gen., Paula K. Smith, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., Andrew G. Sims, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Opinion

BENHAM, Justice.

Appellants Jaqwanta Grimes, Brandon Reed, Antoine Willis, and Kyree Brantley appeal their convictions stemming from the shooting death of Marcus Holloway and the aggravated assault of LaQuinton Forte. For reasons set forth herein, we affirm.¹ The evidence viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict shows that in January 2011, co-indictee Charles Slaton (a.k.a.“Fat”) had a dispute with Dwain O'Neal.² On the afternoon of the shooting, Slaton was visiting the apartment of a woman (hereinafter “G.S.”) when O'Neal stopped by G.S.'s apartment as well. G.S. testified Slaton hid from O'Neal inside her apartment. After seeing some items of clothing he recognized as belonging to Slaton inside the apartment, including a hat that said “Ho Hater,” O'Neal began looking for Slaton inside the apartment. When he could not find Slaton, O'Neal left the apartment, went to the parking lot and slashed the tires on the car which Slaton was seen driving. O'Neal then went back inside the apartment. Meanwhile, Slaton had called his friends to come get him.

According to co-indictee Lancelot Hicks (a.k.a. “Lil' Lance”), Grimes (a.k.a. “Qwan”), Brantley (a.k.a.“Corey”), Willis (a.k.a. “Nuk” or “Nook”), Reed (a.k.a. “White Boy Brandon”), and someone going by the name of “Yams” arrived at the apartment complex in two different vehicles.³ Hicks stayed in the car he was in, but said he saw Reed, Grimes, Willis and Slaton exiting an apartment. He said Reed, Grimes, and Willis were shooting while Slaton took cover behind them. Hicks said Brantley and Yams exited the car and also began shooting. According to G.S., when the shooting started, O'Neal ran out the back of her apartment and, shortly thereafter, Slaton went out the front door.⁴ O'Neal testified that after going out the back window of G.S.'s apartment, he fled to his grandmother's apartment which was in a different building of the complex.

During the shooting melee that transpired in the parking lot outside G.S.'s apartment, Holloway, who was with Forte and David Moore (who was inside a car), was struck in the head and died of his injuries.⁵ Hicks stated the shooters and Slaton entered their vehicles and fled. Authorities recovered twenty-three shell casings from the scene and a single bullet from the victim's body, indicating that at least four, and possibly five, different guns were used during the shooting.⁶ Authorities recovered a 9mm Ruger pistol from the apartment of Willis's girlfriend⁷ and recovered a .357 Glock pistol from the car Willis was riding in at the time of his arrest. The ballistics expert testified that three of the 9mm shell casings recovered from the scene were fired from the 9mm Ruger pistol and the seven .357 shell casings were fired from the Glock .357 pistol recovered during Willis's arrest. The evidence showed that neither O'Neal, Holloway, Forte, nor Moore was armed with guns.

Authorities arrested Slaton first. While in jail, Slaton related details about the shooting to his cell mate Anthony Johnson and, in turn, Johnson went to authorities with the information. Johnson told authorities that Slaton told him two of the shooters used 9mm pistols, one used a .380 gun, one had a .45, and one had a .357. Johnson also told police that Slaton said the names of some of the shooters were “Nook” or “Nuk,” “Corey,” and/or “Brandon.” Johnson told police he could get the other shooters' names. Brantley's ex-girlfriend testified that Brantley told her he was with Grimes, Willis, Slaton, and Hicks at the apartments when the shooting occurred. Hicks testified that Slaton, Grimes, Willis, and Brantley had the words “Ho Haters” tattooed on their bodies. Hicks also identified all appellants in open court as the persons he saw shooting on the day in question.

The allegations raised on appeal by each appellant are addressed below.

1. Appellant Grimes (S14A1162). (a) Grimes alleges the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to convict him because Hicks's testimony was uncorroborated. He argues the testimony of Brantley's ex-girlfriend merely placed him at the scene at the time of the shootings, but did not show he engaged in any criminal activity. Former OCGA § 24–4–8⁸ provided that in “felony cases where the only witness is an accomplice, the testimony of a single witness is not sufficient. Nevertheless, corroborating circumstances may dispense with the necessity for the testimony of a second witness....” This Court has held that “slight evidence from an extraneous source identifying the accused as a participant in the criminal act is sufficient corroboration of the accomplice to support a verdict.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Brown v. State, 291 Ga. 750(1), 733 S.E.2d 300 (2012). See also Young v. State, 291 Ga. 627(2), 732 S.E.2d 269 (2012). The corroborating evidence in itself need not be sufficient to support the conviction, but it must “be independent of the accomplice testimony and must directly connect the defendant with the crime, or lead to the inference that he is guilty.” (Citation omitted.) Threatt v. State, 293 Ga. 549(1), 748 S.E.2d 400 (2013).

Here, Grimes does not dispute that the testimony of Brantley's ex-girlfriend placed him at the scene of the shooting when it occurred.

The record shows the ex-girlfriend's testimony was independent of Hicks's testimony, yet consistent with and corroborative of Hicks's testimony that he saw Grimes at the scene shooting a gun and then fleeing with the others.⁹ Hicks's testimony was corroborated in other ways as well. For example, Hicks's testimony identifying five shooters was consistent with the physical evidence collected from the scene and from the victim's body, as well as consistent with the testimony of the ballistics expert who stated that there were at least four and possibly five shooters. Johnson also told police about five guns used during the incident, thereby indicating there were likely five shooters. In addition, O'Neal testified that inside G.C.'s apartment he saw an item of clothing with the words “Ho Hater” which he recognized as belonging to Slaton. This evidence was consistent with Hicks's testimony that Grimes and Slaton had the words “Ho Haters” tattooed on their bodies. The evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find Grimes guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ; Threatt v. State, supra, 293 Ga. at 551–552, 748 S.E.2d 400.

(b) Grimes contends the trial court erred when it charged the jury on the Black's Law Dictionary definition of “corroborating evidence” in response to the jury's question asking for a definition of the term “slight corroboration.” Rather than giving said definition, Grimes argues the trial court should have given a recharge on accomplice testimony. The record shows the trial court instructed the jury as follows on accomplice testimony:

The testimony of the accomplice alone is not sufficient to warrant a conviction.

The accomplice's testimony must be supported by other evidence of some type. And that evidence must be such as would lead to the inference of the guilt of the accused independent of the testimony of the accomplice.

It is not required that supporting evidence be sufficient to warrant a conviction or that the testimony of the accomplice be supported in every material particular.

The supporting evidence must be more than that a crime was actually committed by someone. It must be sufficient to connect the accused with the criminal act and must be more than sufficient to merely cast upon the accused a grave suspicion of guilt.

Slight evidence from another source that connects the accused with the commission of the alleged crime and tends to show participation in it may be sufficient supporting evidence of the testimony of an accomplice.

In order to convict, that evidence, when considered with all of the other evidence in the case, must be sufficient to satisfy you beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty.

Whether or not any witness in this case was an accomplice is a question for you to determine from the evidence in this case.

The testimony of one accomplice may be supported by the testimony of another accomplice. Whether or not the testimony of one accomplice does, in fact, support the testimony of another accomplice is a matter for you to determine.

The sufficiency of the supporting evidence of an accomplice is a matter solely for you to determine.

After deliberating for a time, the jury posed a question to the trial court asking for a definition of “slight corroboration.” The trial court proposed instructing the jury to use the everyday meaning of the word “slight” and then to give them the definition of “corroborate” and “corroborating evidence” from Black's Law Dictionary. The State asserted it would be fine with giving the Black's Law Dictionary definition of “corroborating evidence.” Counsel for Willis objected and asked that the trial court instruct the jury to use the everyday usage of “slight corroboration.” Counsel for Reed joined in Willis's objection. Counsel for Brantley asked that the trial court respond by recharging the jury on accomplice testimony. Counsel for Grimes joined both stated objections. After the...