In re Carry

• Decision Date: 30 December 2013
• Parties: In the Matter of Application of Jonathan R. WHEELER for a Retired Officer Permit to Carry a Firearm Openly and/or Concealed. In the Matter of Application of George A. Daudelin for a Retired Officer Permit to Carry a Firearm Openly and/or Concealed.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court

433 N.J.Super. 560
81 A.3d 728

In the Matter of Application of Jonathan R. WHEELER for a Retired Officer Permit to Carry a Firearm Openly and/or Concealed.
In the Matter of Application of George A. Daudelin for a Retired Officer Permit to Carry a Firearm Openly and/or Concealed.

Superior Court of New Jersey,
Appellate Division.

Argued March 6, 2013.
Decided Dec. 30, 2013.

[81 A.3d 733]

J. Sheldon Cohen, Teaneck, argued the cause for appellants Wheeler and Daudelin (DeCotiis, FitzPatrick & Cole, LLP, attorneys; Steven C. Mannion, Newark, on the brief).

Maria I. Guerrero, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent State of New Jersey (Carolyn A. Murray, Acting Essex County Prosecutor, attorney; Ms. Guerrero, of counsel and on the brief).

Before Judges GRALL, KOBLITZ and ACCURSO.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

GRALL, J.A.D.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	Introduction	734
II.	Facts	735
III.	The Firearms Law	736

A.
The Purpose, Requirements, Narrow Scope and Role of the Carry Permit Law
736

1.	The Purpose and Requirements	736
2.	The Narrow Scope	737
3.	The Similar Roles of Employment–Based Exemptions from the Carry Permit Law and the “Justifiable Need” Standard	739
4.	The Role of Special Permits for Retired Police Officers	740
5.	The Legislature's “Justifiable Need” Requirement is Consistent with the Lawful Defensive Use of Firearms	742

B.	The History of the Carry Permit Law	742
C.	The Factual Justifications for the Carry Permit Law	743
D.	Summary	745

IV. The Second Amendment
745

A.	The Claim Presented	745
B.	The Right	746

1.	The Narrow Holdings in Heller and McDonald	747
2.	The Broad Reasoning Supporting the Narrow Holdings in Heller and McDonald	747
3.	The Threshold Question Raised by the Court's Narrow Holdings and Broader Reasoning	748
4.	Limitations on the Right	749
5.	The Standard of Scrutiny	753
6.	“Justifiable Need” Passes Muster	757

V.	Equal Protection	762
VI.	Privileges and Immunities	764
VII.	Preemption	765

[81 A.3d 734]

I. Introduction

Jonathan R. Wheeler and George A. Daudelin retired from the Arson Investigation Unit (AIU) of Newark's Fire Department and later applied to the Division of State Police (Division) for a special permit authorizing certain retired law enforcement officers to carry handguns. N.J.S.A. 2C:39–6l (1)-(4).¹ These special carry permits may be issued to retirees who either served in an enumerated law enforcement agency or served with an agency in another state and are “qualified retired law enforcement officer[s], as [that term is] used in the federal ‘Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act of 2004’ [ (LEOSA) ], Pub.L. No. 108–277, domiciled in this State.” N.J.S.A. 2C:39–6l; In re Casaleggio, 420 N.J.Super. 121, 128–29, 18 A.3d 1082 (App.Div.2011) (so interpreting subsection l 's reference to LEOSA, 18 U.S.C.S. § 926C).

Another type of carry permit is available to any qualified person who can demonstrate a “justifiable need” for carrying a handgun. N.J.S.A. 2C:58–4d. To acquire one, an applicant must show “ ‘an urgent necessity ... for self-protection’ ” based on “specific threats or previous attacks demonstrating a special danger to the applicant's life that cannot be avoided by other means.” In re Preis, 118 N.J. 564, 571, 573 A.2d 148 (1990) (quoting Siccardi v. State, 59 N.J. 545, 557, 284 A.2d 533 (1971)). Neither Wheeler nor Daudelin applied for that type of carry permit, because they concluded they could not show “justifiable need.”

The Division denied Wheeler's and Daudelin's application. Challenging the constitutionality of the carry permit laws, both requested a hearing in the Law Division. N.J.S.A. 2C:39–6l (5). After consolidating the cases and taking testimony, the judge affirmed the denials.

On appeal, the applicants acknowledge their ineligibility for either type of carry

[81 A.3d 735]

permit and renew and expand their constitutional challenges. The questions presented are: 1) whether the “justifiable need” requirement of N.J.S.A. 2C:58–4d violates the Second Amendment; 2) whether subsection l of N.J.S.A. 2C:39–6 arbitrarily distinguishes between eligible retired officers and others; 3) whether distinctions between retired officers domiciled in New Jersey and elsewhere violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2—an issue not raised in the trial court; and 4) whether LEOSA would preempt these applicants' prosecution for possessing a handgun without a permit in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39–5b—an issue not properly raised in the Law Division.

Because the facts are not in dispute and the questions turn on interpretation of statutes and the Constitution, we owe no deference to the judge's determinations. Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 214 N.J. 384, 401–02, 70 A.3d 524 (2013); In re Liquidation of Integrity Ins. Co., 193 N.J. 86, 94, 935 A.2d 1184 (2007); Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378, 658 A.2d 1230 (1995).² For the reasons that follow, we conclude the applicants are not entitled to relief on any ground asserted.

II. Facts

Daudelin was assigned to Newark's AIU in 1984 and served in that unit for about sixteen years before retiring in 2000; he first applied for a special carry permit in April 2011. Wheeler was assigned to the AIU in 1997 and retired with no more than eleven years of service in 2008; he filed this application for a special permit in February 2011.³ Both held leadership positions and retired in good standing.

Acknowledging their ineligibility for special permits, they offered evidence to demonstrate that their exclusion from the list of eligible retirees is arbitrary. Active members of an AIU have powers equivalent to those of police officers only “while engaged in the actual performance of arson investigation duties,” N.J.S.A. 40A:14–7.1d, and may carry handguns only “while either engaged in the actual performance of arson investigation duties or while actually on call to perform arson investigation duties and when specifically authorized ... to carry weapons.” N.J.S.A. 2C:39–6a(8) (emphasis added). ⁴ But these applicants were on duty or on call except when on vacation, and they intervened whenever they observed crimes in progress, even crimes unrelated to their duties, and they worked with officers from the police department, county prosecutor's office

[81 A.3d 736]

and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms when investigating arsons related to other crimes.

They also presented evidence of inconsistent application of the special carry permit law. Some AIU retirees had been issued special carry permits based on subsection l 's reference to LEOSA, but they received those permits prior to this court's decision in Casaleggio.

Neither Wheeler nor Daudelin made any attempt to establish the “justifiable need” necessary to obtain an ordinary carry permit. Instead, they argued that if retired officers, who have no police powers, can obtain a carry permit without showing “justifiable need,” then no one should be required to make that showing.

III. The Firearms Law

Discussion of the constitutional challenges to the “justifiable need” component of the carry permit law requires an understanding of the role of “justifiable need” in the “ ‘careful grid’ of regulatory provisions” comprising our firearms law. Preis, supra, 118 N.J. at 568, 573 A.2d 148 (quoting State v. Ingram, 98 N.J. 489, 495 n. 1, 488 A.2d 545 (1985)). Accordingly, the importance of this component of that grid is best understood in context.

The carry permit law is distinct from laws that provide enhanced punishment for persons who commit crimes with guns or other deadly weapons, which are also part of the careful grid. Id. at 568–69, 573 A.2d 148. As the discussion that follows demonstrates, the carry permit law is one of the regulatory provisions of the firearms laws designed to protect the public before any harm is caused. The regulatory provisions address the danger of serious injury inherent in the ownership and carrying of firearms.

A. The Purpose, Requirements, Narrow Scope and Role of the Carry Permit Law1. The Purpose and Requirements

Some regulatory provisions of the firearms laws “keep firearms from all such persons whose possession would pose a threat to the public health, safety or welfare,” under any circumstance. Burton v. Sills, 53 N.J. 86, 93, 248 A.2d 521 (1968), appeal dismissed,394 U.S. 812, 89 S.Ct. 1486, 22 L.Ed.2d 748 (1969). In order to lawfully acquire a handgun, rifle or shotgun, one must demonstrate that he or she is not disqualified by reason of youth, criminal record history, domestic violence restraining order or disability affecting one's ability to carry a firearm. N.J.S.A. 2C:58–3a–c (requiring prior authorization—a permit to purchase a handgun or a purchaser identification card for rifles and shotguns—and enumerating the disqualifying conditions). ⁵

The carry permit law serves a different purpose—addressing the “serious dangers of misuse and accidental use” inherent even when the person carrying a handgun is law-abiding and responsible. Siccardi, supra, 59 N.J. at 558, 284 A.2d 533 (construing N.J.S.A. 2A:151–44 ( L. 1966, c. 60, § 35, p. 501)). An applicant for a carry permit must demonstrate more than absence of a disqualifying condition. The applicant must show that he or she is “thoroughly familiar with the safe handling and use of handguns” and that he or she has “a justifiable need to carry a handgun.” N.J.S.A. 2C:58–4d. These two additional

[81 A.3d 737]

requirements make the carry permit “the most closely-regulated aspect of [this State's] gun-control laws.” Preis, supra, 118 N.J. at 568–69, 573 A.2d 148.

The additional requirements minimize the danger the carry permit law is intended to address. The showing of proficiency reduces the risk of mishandling. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 941 (7th Cir.2012) (noting the obvious menace when the untrained carry guns in public), reh'g en banc denied,708 F.3d 901 (7th Cir.2013). And the demonstration of particularized need serves to limit ...