Edwards v. State Law Enforcement Div.

• Decision Date: 28 December 2011
• Docket Number: No. 27082.,27082.
• Citation: 720 S.E.2d 462,395 S.C. 571
• Parties: In the Matter of Jeremy Lane EDWARDS, Respondent, v. STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT DIVISION, Appellant.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

395 S.C. 571

720 S.E.2d 462

In the Matter of Jeremy Lane EDWARDS, Respondent,

v.STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT DIVISION, Appellant.

No. 27082.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard Nov. 15, 2011.Decided Dec. 28, 2011.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant Attorney General David Spencer, and Assistant Attorney General Geoffrey K. Chambers, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Walker H. Willcox and Mark W. Buyck, both of Willcox, Buyck & Williams, of Florence, for Respondent.

Chief Justice TOAL.

State Law Enforcement Division (SLED) (Appellant), appeals the circuit court order relieving Jeremy Lane Edwards (Respondent) from the sex offender registration requirements of section 23–3–430 of the South Carolina Code. We affirm.

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 1998, Respondent pled guilty to two counts of “Peeping Tom,” pursuant to section 16–17–470 of the South Carolina Code.¹ Respondent served a probationary sentence including one hundred hours of community service. In 2004, Respondent received a pardon from the South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services (SCDPPPS). In 2009, Respondent filed petitions with the Horry, Greenville, and Florence County solicitors requesting that the circuit court issue an order mandating that he was no longer required to register as a sex offender. The Horry and Greenville County solicitors did not object to the petition. The Florence County solicitor could not respond to the petition, due to a conflict, and referred the case to the South Carolina Attorney General.

The Attorney General opposed the petition, and asserted that Respondent's pardon did not relieve him from the requirement that he register as a sex offender. The Attorney General argued that the amendments to section 23–3–430 were remedial and procedural in nature, and thus applied retroactively to Respondent's case. The circuit court disagreed, and ruled that the 2004 pardon relieved Respondent from the registration requirements of section 23–3–430, and that the 2005 and 2008 amendments did not apply retroactively.

ISSUES

The parties raise three issues on appeal:

I. Whether the 2004 pardon relieved Respondent of the registration requirements of section 23–3–430 of the South Carolina Code.

II. Whether the amendments to section 23–3–430 clarified rather than changed the law requiring pardoned sex offenders to comply with the statute's registration requirements.

III. Whether the amendments to section 23–3–430 are procedural or remedial in nature, and therefore, apply retroactively.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A declaratory judgment action is neither legal nor equitable, but instead its character is determined by the nature of the underlying issue. Felts v. Richland Cnty., 303 S.C. 354, 356, 400 S.E.2d 781, 782 (1991). The underlying issue in this case concerns interpretation of the state sex offender registration statute. Interpretation of a legislative enactment is a question of law. City of Rock Hill v. Harris, 391 S.C. 149, 152, 705 S.E.2d 53, 54 (2011); Charleston Cnty. Parks and Recreation Comm'n v. Somers, 319 S.C. 65, 67, 459 S.E.2d 841, 843 (1995). In a case raising a novel question of law, this Court is free to decide the question with no particular deference to the lower court. City of Rock Hill, 391 S.C. at 152, 705 S.E.2d at 54.

DISCUSSION

I. Whether the 2004 pardon relieved Respondent of his registration requirements.

Respondent argues that the 2004 pardon relieved him of the requirement to register as a sex offender. We agree.

Section 24–21–940(A) of the South Carolina Code defines “pardon” as the circumstance when “an individual is fully pardoned from all the legal consequences of his crime and of his conviction, direct and collateral, including the punishment, whether of imprisonment, pecuniary penalty or whatever else the law has provided.” S.C.Code Ann. § 24–21–940 (2007). When a statute's terms are clear and unambiguous on their face, there is no room for statutory construction and a court must apply the statute according to its literal meaning. Miller v. Aiken, 364 S.C. 303, 307, 613 S.E.2d 364, 366 (2005).

In State v. Baucom, 340 S.C. 339, 531 S.E.2d 922 (2000), this Court addressed the use of pardoned convictions as an enhancement device. In that case, SCDPPPS pardoned the defendant for ten offenses, including convictions for driving under the influence. Id. at 341, 531 S.E.2d at 922.

Five years after the pardon, police charged Baucom with another DUI offense, and he argued that his pardoned offenses should not be used to enhance that charge. Id. at 341–42, 531 S.E.2d at 922–23. The trial court disagreed and sentenced Baucom under section 56–5–2940 of the South Carolina Code, which at the time provided:

Any conviction, entry of plea of guilty or of nolo contendere or forfeiture of bail, for the violation of any law or ordinance ... that prohibits a person from operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, drugs, or narcotics shall constitute a prior offense for the purpose of any prosecution for any subsequent violation hereof.

S.C.Code Ann. § 56–5–2940 (1991 & Supp.1999).

The court of appeals affirmed the sentence, and held that the phrase “any conviction” necessarily included pardoned convictions. Baucom, 340 S.C. at 344, 531 S.E.2d at 924. This Court disagreed, holding that punishment is only one of the consequences absolved by a pardon under South Carolina law. Id. (noting that the individual is absolved of all consequences of his crime and conviction and that all of his civil rights are restored).

In the instant case, SCDPPPS pardoned Respondent in 2004. Thus, in light of the command of section 24–21–940 of the South Carolina Code, the circuit court correctly held that the pardon relieved Respondent from all direct and collateral consequences of his pardoned crime, which would necessarily include placement on the sex offender registry and continuous compliance with its registration requirements.

II. Whether the amendments to section 23–3–430 clarified rather than changed the law requiring pardoned sex offenders to comply with the statute's registration requirements.

Appellant asserts that the General Assembly's amendments to section 23–3–430 of the South Carolina Code clarified already existing law on pardoned sex offenders rather than changing that law. We find this position without merit.

The General Assembly created the state's sex offender registry in 1994. However, at the time of its creation, the statute did not address what effect a pardon may have on a sex offender's registration requirement. In 2005, the General Assembly amended the statute to address this issue.

The newly amended statute provided:

(F) If an offender receives a pardon for the offense for which he was required to register, the offender may not be removed from the registry except:

(1) as provided by the provisions of subsection (E); or

(2) if the pardon is based on a finding of not guilty specifically stated in the pardon.

S.C.Code § 23–3–430(F) (2007).

In 2008, the General Assembly amended paragraph F to add “the offender must reregister as provided by Section 23–3–460....” S.C.Code § 23–3–430(F) (Supp.2010) (emphasis added). The statute currently provides in pertinent part, “[I]f an offender received a pardon for which he was required to register the offender must reregister as provided by Section 23–3–460 and may not be removed from the registry....” Id. (emphasis added).

These amendments to section 23–3–430 occurred subsequent to the General Assembly's creation of the state's pardon statute. That statute provides, “[A]n individual is fully pardoned from all the legal consequences of his crime and of his conviction, direct and collateral, including the punishment, whether of imprisonment, pecuniary penalty, or whatever else the law has provided.” S.C.Code Ann. § 24–21–940 (2007).

It is clear that the General Assembly's amendments to the sex offender registry statute changed rather than clarified the law. The statute was silent regarding pardons at its creation in 1994. In 2004, the General Assembly mandated, via section 24–21–940, that a pardon relieved an individual of all criminal and civil penalties accompanying her crime. In 2005 and 2008, the General Assembly ensured that the broad application of the pardon statute would not relieve sex offenders of their registration obligation.

The State relies on Stuckey v. State Budget and Control Bd., 339 S.C. 397, 529 S.E.2d 706 (2000), in support of its position that the General Assembly's amendments clarify the legislature's original intent that, with only limited exceptions, even those with pardons should be required to register. In Stuckey, Appellant began employment as a public school teacher in August 1972 and was enrolled in the state retirement plan until she terminated her employment in June 1973. Appellant attended law school full-time from August 1973 to May 1976, and in October 1976 she began employment with the State Department of Education. In May 1995, Appellant filed a request with the South Carolina Retirement Systems (Agency) for two years retroactive educational leave pursuant to section 9–1–1140 of the South Carolina Code, which at the time provided, “[A] member who leaves employment to attend graduate school and returns directly to employment may establish up to two years' retirement credit by paying the actuarial cost as determined by the [State Budget and Control] Board.” S.C.Code Ann. § 9–1–1140 (1986).

Agency denied Appellant's request because she had not returned directly to covered employment. Agency interpreted “directly” to mean “immediately” but allowed for a grace period of ninety days in order to accommodate teachers who had an annual three month lapse in employment. Stuckey, 339 S.C. at 400–01, 529 S.E.2d at 707. This Court found that the General Assembly's amendment to section 9–1–1140 shed light on the legislature's intent. Id. at 401, ...