Rodick v. City of Schenectady
| Decision Date | 23 August 1993 |
| Docket Number | 1641,Nos. 1452-1454,D,s. 1452-1454 |
| Citation | 1 F.3d 1341 |
| Parties | John C. RODICK, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant, v. The CITY OF SCHENECTADY; Kevin Coker; Brian Carroll; Robert McHugh; Eric Yager; John Falvo, Jr., individually and as agents, servants and or employees and police officers of the City of Schenectady and the City of Schenectady Police Department, Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Appellees, Jane K. Finin, Esq., Appellant. ockets 93-7010, 93-7012, 93-7020, 93-7156. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Jane K. Finin, Schenectady, NY (Grasso & Grasso, of counsel), pro se, and for defendants-appellants-cross-appellees, Kevin Coker, Brian Carroll, Robert P. McHugh, Eric Yager, and John Falvo, Jr.
Melissa J. Smallacombe, Albany, NY (Roemer and Featherstonhaugh, P.C., of counsel), for defendant-appellant-cross-appellee City of Schenectady.
Kevin A. Luibrand, Albany, NY (John T. Mitchell, Raul N. Tabora, Tobin and Dempf, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee-cross-appellant.
Before MINER, McLAUGHLIN and FRIEDMAN, * Circuit Judges.
Appellants are the City of Schenectady (the "City"), five of its police officers (the "officers") and the officers' attorney; they appeal from a judgment entered after a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Thomas J. McAvoy, Judge ). The City assails a jury award of damages against it and the individual defendants for malicious prosecution. The officers contend that their representation by the same lawyer who represented the City was an improper conflict of interest. The lawyer appeals from Rule 11 sanctions imposed on her as a result of a post-trial motion advancing the conflict of interest argument. Plaintiff cross-appeals, arguing that certain post-trial motions granted by the district court were untimely. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and vacate and remand in part for a new trial on the issue of damages for malicious prosecution.
On February 27, 1989, Schenectady Police Officer Robert McHugh was investigating a hit-and-run accident. An eyewitness gave him a license plate number and this led him ultimately to Plaintiff Rodick's house. There, he met with officers Coker, Carroll and Falvo, who had arrived at the house as back-ups. A radio dispatch indicated that there was an outstanding warrant in Florida for Rodick, including a request for extradition. As a result of that dispatch, patrol supervisor Yager was called to the scene. Failing in their attempts to speak with Rodick from the outside, they entered and found Rodick naked in bed. There is some dispute as to what ensued, but it is clear that Rodick was beaten repeatedly and tumbled down a flight of stairs. He was then handcuffed and, still naked, was removed from the apartment, placed in a patrol car and taken to the police station, where he spent the night without clothes or medical attention. Rodick was arraigned the next morning and was charged with resisting arrest, leaving the scene of an accident, and was also held as a fugitive from justice on the Florida warrant.
On May 26, 1989, Rodick filed a Notice of Claim against the City citing the mistreatment he had suffered at the hands of the Schenectady constabulary. The resisting arrest charge was dismissed on July 10, 1989, by the local police court for insufficient evidence, but was re-filed in August 1989. The On August 27, 1990, Rodick filed a complaint in the Northern District of New York under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, arguing that all the defendants had violated his rights under the First, Fourth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; he also appended a state law claim for malicious prosecution of the resisting arrest charge. At trial, both the City and the officers were represented by the same attorney, the City's Assistant Corporation Counsel. At the close of Plaintiff's case, the district court granted the City's motion for judgment as a matter of law dismissing the Sec. 1983 claims against it because of Rodick's failure to establish a municipal policy or procedure under which the officers were acting.
leaving-the-scene charge was dropped by the prosecutor. The fugitive-from-justice charge was referred to the Governor's office, but apparently was never acted upon. A seven-day trial on the resisting arrest charge began on March 27, 1990, and all the officers except Coker testified. At the close of the prosecution's case, Rodick's motion to dismiss the charge was granted, and the case was dismissed.
At the close of all the evidence, the district court submitted the case to the jury, instructing it to complete a special verdict form. The jury returned a verdict against all five officers on the Sec. 1983 claim, concluding that: (1) each officer had either used, or had failed to intervene while others were using, excessive force; (2) they had falsely arrested Rodick for resisting arrest, although they did have probable cause to arrest Rodick on other grounds; and (3) they had been indifferent to Rodick's medical needs. The jury determined that all five officers were liable for $440,000 in damages on the Sec. 1983 claim, as follows: (1) $150,000 in compensatory damages and $20,000 in punitive damages for excessive force; (2) $60,000 in compensatory damages and $30,000 in punitive damages for false arrest; and (3) $150,000 in compensatory damages and $30,000 in punitive damages for indifference to medical needs.
With respect to the state law malicious prosecution claim, the jury concluded that four officers, but not Coker, were liable. Filling in the amounts on the verdict form provided by the court, the jury assessed compensatory damages on that claim as follows:
5. What amount of damages, if any, do you find the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendant under consideration which was directly sustained as a result of the criminal prosecution?
The jury further awarded punitive damages on the claim in the amount of $10,000 each against Carroll, McHugh, Yager, and Falvo.
After this Delphic, if not bizarre, verdict was delivered, the jury was discharged and the following colloquy immediately ensued:
(emphasis added). On April 13, 1992, four days after this colloquy, the district court entered judgment on the jury's verdict. Based on the jury's response in the special verdict form, the court concluded that the jury had "awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $770,000" against the defendants on the malicious prosecution claim. The total judgment was $1,250,000.
On April 27, 1992, the officers, having now retained new counsel, moved, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59 and 60(b), to set aside the judgment and for a new trial solely because of a conflict of interest allegedly caused by the joint representation of the City and the officers by one lawyer. On May 20, 1992, the officers' new counsel requested an extension of time to make a motion under Rule 50(b). On June 2, 1992, while that request was still pending, the officers' counsel mailed a letter to the court asking it to "accept this as the on record request by the individual defendants to" make a Rule 50(b) motion. The district court agreed to treat that letter as the Rule 50(b) motion, and granted the individual officers an extension until August 30, 1992 to file papers in support of the motion. On June 19, 1992, 67 days after the entry of judgment, the City submitted papers moving for judgment as a matter of law under Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b), a new trial under Rule 59, or remittitur of the damage verdict, and also challenging the finding of malicious prosecution against three of the officers.
By order dated August 18, 1992, the district court rejected the officers' argument that the joint representation of them and the City constituted an improper conflict of interest. In addition, the court, finding that the motion had "no basis in law or fact," imposed sanctions of $9,668.88 under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 against the officers' new attorney. On September 2, 1992, that same attorney filed papers on the Rule 50(b) motion for which she had been granted an extension until August 30. In the motion, the officers sought judgment as a matter of law, contending that the jury's findings of false arrest, indifference to medical needs and malicious prosecution were not supported by the evidence.
On December 5, 1992, the district court entered an order addressing all the remaining post-trial...
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