Chouteau v. Rice

• Citation: 1 Minn. 24
• Parties: PIERRE CHOUTEAU, et al. vs. HENRY M. RICE, et al.
• Decision Date: 01 January 1852
• Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)

Page 24

1 Minn. 24

PIERRE CHOUTEAU, et al. vs. HENRY M. RICE, et al.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Appeal from decree of district court, Washington county.

An appeal from a decree of the district court of Washington county, allowing the plea filed by the appellees, and dissolving the injunction.

The appellees moved to dismiss the appeal. First, because the decrees appealed from are interlocutory, and not final. Second, because the dissolution of an injunction is a matter resting entirely in the discretion of the judge making the order, and, therefore, not properly the subject of appeal.

A. Wilkin and Hollinshead, for the appellees.

R. R. Nelson and Wilkinson, for appellants.

COOPER, J.

This cause came to this court on appeal from the district court of the second judicial district.

The appellees interpose a motion to dismiss this appeal for the reasons: That the decrees sought to be corrected are interlocutory, and not final decrees, and therefore not the subject of appeal. That the dissolution of an injunction is a matter resting entirely in the discretion of the judge making the order, and therefore not appealable.

In order to understand, and have a just and full appreciation of the questions arising out of this motion, it will be necessary to give a succinct history of this cause.

The cause was commenced by filing a bill of complaint, alleging the existence of a partnership between the complainants and defendants, stating that a sum of money was due from the defendants — charging that the defendants had in their possession a large amount of partnership effects, and that they were wrongfully appropriating them to their own use, and fraudulently refusing to account for them. The bill prayed that a decree might be made dissolving the partnership — another appointing a receiver — another granting an injunction to restrain defendants from disposing, either of their individual property, or that of the company — and another ordering a subpœna to issue; together with such other and further decrees as might be necessary in the cause. A receiver was appointed. He accepted, and gave bonds. The injunction was granted, the subpœna issued, and service was had upon the parties defendant. Subsequently, the parties came into court, and plead in bar an agreement executed by the parties to this suit, which purports to settle all matters of variance between them. The plea is allowed. This is the first error complained of. Upon the allowance of the plea, an order is made dissolving the injunction. This constitutes the second error; and from these two decrees this appeal is taken.

Are these interlocutory, or are they final decrees? What is an interlocutory, and what a final decree? An interlocutory order or decree, is one which is made pending the cause, and before a final hearing on the merits. A final decree is one which disposes of the cause, either sending it out of court before a hearing is had upon the merits, or after a hearing upon the merits, decreeing either in favor of, or against the prayer in the bill. Either of which puts an end to the cause. A final order may sometimes be made upon an interlocutory proceeding; but not the converse. There is much difficulty in defining, so clearly as we could wish, the exact line which is to distinguish interlocutory from final decrees; but I think that the rule first laid down is the proper one; and that no order or decree which does not preclude further proceedings in the case in the court below, should be considered final.

In the case before us, no obstacle has been presented to prevent a further and final hearing; and we therefore think that these orders are entirely and purely of an interlocutory character, and not the subject of appeal. There is no doubt of the propriety of a rigid adherence to this rule, where the statute does not alter or extend it. Does the statute alter or extend it? We think not. The legislature of this territory did nothing more than to describe the manner in which appeals should be taken, and evidently intended to carry out, by its provisions, the salutary rule indicated in the 9th sec. of the act organizing the territorial government.

That act provides, that "writs of error, bills of exceptions, and appeals in chancery causes, shall be allowed in all cases, from the final decisions of said district courts, to the supreme court, under such regulations as may be prescribed by law."

This provision needs no judicial construction. Its intention is manifest, and its language plain. But it is held that the statutes of Minnesota, regulating appeals from the courts of chancery, confer the right of appeal from any order or decree of such court. § 54 provides that "Any party may appeal from any order or decree, to the supreme court." This is a plain provision, and, if unqualified by the succeeding sections of that act, would undoubtedly give the right of appeal from interlocutory, as well as final decrees. But in the construction of statutes, we must look at the whole act relating to the particular subject under consideration, and not merely to detached sentences, taken from any particular section of such act. One of the subsequent sections provides, that upon the taking of an appeal, the appellant shall give such security as one of the judges shall direct, conditioned to abide the final decision or order of the supreme court, and to pay the costs of appeal, in case the final decree of the court below is affirmed. What meaning can be attached to this provision, other than that the appeal must be from a final order or decree? If appeals had been allowed from interlocutory orders or decrees, would the legislature have enacted that on such appeal, the party appellant should give security to pay all costs on an appeal from a final decree? Such a construction would be monstrous. Would they anticipate an order, and make one party liable for the acts of another? Never. But the act does not stop even here; it goes further, and provides: "That if the final decree of the court below be affirmed, the supreme court shall have power to award damages, not exceeding fifteen per cent. on the amount awarded by the decree below." Can this "amount awarded by the decree below" mean anything but a final decree? It cannot. Money or property is only awarded by final decrees, unless it is under the provision of statute. Here we have no such statutes, and if this act means anything by naming these orders or decrees, it means such orders and decrees as are allowed under the general rules regulating the practice in courts of chancery. A decree awarding money or property, in dispute, in the bill of complaint, and under the general pleadings, must be a final decree. And why? For the reason that it goes to the vitality of the issue — it touches the merits of the cause. From a thorough investigation of this question, we are entirely convinced, that the construction of the statutes given, is the proper and only one, and that appeals will only lie from final decrees. To adopt a different rule, where there is no statutory prohibition, would be almost equivalent to closing the doors of justice. This rule has been sanctioned by experience, and is one which commends itself to every rational mind. Manifest wrong, manifest delay, and manifest injustice, would most indubitably be the result of allowing appeals from every decree of a court of chancery. We must establish some rule and if not the one herein announced, where are we to stop? It is extremely dubious, if a contrary rule were adopted, whether there be a man amongst us, who would live to see the end of this, or any other cause, now pending in the courts of chancery of this territory. Nor can hardship or irreparable injury accrue to the party from the adoption of this rule. The courts of chancery are always open, and relief will be granted whenever, and wherever, the proper application is made, and a proper cause shown upon the merit of the application.

The appeal is dismissed with costs.

GOODRICH, C. J., dissenting.

It appears from the record in this cause, that complainants, P. Chouteau, Jr., and others, in the month of October, 1849, filed their original bill in the district court, at Stillwater, against Henry M. Rice and others, charging that said Rice and others, had entered into partnership with complainants for the purpose of trading with certain Indian tribes in Minnesota. That complainants furnished a large amount of goods, money, &c. for such trade, a portion of which was still in the possession of Rice. That Chouteau resided in the city of St. Louis, Mo. That Rice assumed the management of the business at St. Paul, and was charged with its conduct in accordance with certain articles of partnership, which are made a part of complainant's bill. That Rice, departing from, and disregarding said articles of partnership, fraudulently diverted the capital so furnished by complainants, from its legitimate object — embarked in wild and visionary speculations in land, town lots, buildings, &c. &c. — that by this conduct on the part of Rice, complainants had sustained a loss of $30,000.

They pray that Rice and others, with whom they allege he has combined and confederated for the purpose of defrauding them, be made parties defendant to this bill — that Rice be enjoined from the further management of the affairs of the firm — that he and his confederates be restrained from conveying or disposing of such property of the firm as he may have in his possession, or that held in his own right — that an account be taken, and the partnership dissolved — upon which an injunction issued. The bill was subsequently taken pro confesso; after which, and at the October Term, 1850, Rice and others pleaded a settlement and release of all matters in controversy, of a date subsequent to the filing of complainant's bill — and, by counsel, moved the court that the injunction be dissolved and the bill dismissed. The cause was continued for...