Judd v. Anderson
| Decision Date | 09 June 1879 |
| Citation | 1 N.W. 677,51 Iowa 345 |
| Parties | JUDD v. ANDERSON. GOE v. HETHERINGTON ET AL |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Mahaska District Court.
THE above cases are submitted together upon the same abstract. The plaintiff, M. A. Judd, claims of the defendant, Ira W Anderson, seven hundred dollars on account of an alleged breach of warranty in the sale to the plaintiff of certain land described in the petition. The plaintiff, Bateman H Goe, claims of the defendant J. E. Hetherington one hundred and fifty dollars and interest on account of certain damages paid by the C., R. I. & P. R. Co. to said Hetherington, for right of way over certain premises described by plaintiff in his petition, and which he claims to own. The defendants Ira W. Anderson and John F. Lacey were substituted in place of James E. Hetherington as defendants. They claim that they are the owners of the land upon which the damages in question were assessed, and that they were such owners at the time of the assessment; that said damages were paid over to them at the time of the assessment, and that plaintiff has no right thereto. All the land in controversy, in both actions, was originally owned by Bateman H. Goe or H. Bateman Goe, which names, it is conceded, refer to the same person. The defendant Ira W. Anderson claims that he acquired title to said land in virtue of a tax sale and deed for the delinquent taxes of 1869 and 1870. The defendant Ira W. Anderson conveyed a part of said land to the plaintiff M. A. Judd, and an undivided one-half to the defendant John F. Lacey.
The real and only question in the two cases is as to the validity of the defendant Anderson's tax title. The court below held that the tax title was invalid, and rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff Judd against the defendant Anderson for five hundred and forty dollars and costs, and in favor of the plaintiff Goe against the defendant Hetherington for one hundred and sixty dollars. The defendants appeal. The facts are stated in the opinion.
REVERSED.
John F Lacey and Wm. Kennedy, for appellants.
M. E. Cutts, for appellees.
DAY, J. SEEVERS, J., took no part in the decision of this case.
At the time of the assessment and sale for delinquent taxes in controversy Bateman H. Goe owned a tract of land described as follows: Commencing at the S. E. corner of the N. E. 1/4 of section 19, 75, 15; running thence west fourteen and sixty one-hundredths chains; thence north, fifteen degrees east, five and ninety one-hundredths chains; thence east thirteen and ten one-hundredths chains; thence south five and seventy-three one-hundredths chains to place of beginning, containing seven and nine hundred and thirty-six one-thousandths acres. It is plain from the foregoing description that the land owned by Goe is, in form, a trapezoid. It is situated in the south-east corner of the forty in question. It is twenty-two and ninety-two one-hundredths rods wide from north to south, fifty-two and four-tenths rods long on the shorter side, and fifty-eight and four-tenths rods long on the longer side. Goe owned no other land in the county.
In 1869 an assessment of real estate was made as follows: "Bateman H. Goe, E. 2/3 S. 1/2 S. 1/2 N. E. N.W. 19, 75, 15, seven and one-half acres; value per acre, forty dollars; value of land, three hundred dollars." This description, it will be observed, also covers land situated in the south-east corner of the tract in question. If we discard from it the description as to the number of acres, it covers a tract twenty rods wide from north to south, and fifty-three and one-third rods long, almost identical with the land owned by Goe, and almost entirely included within it, containing six and two-thirds acres, or a little less than one and one-third acres less than the tract in fact owned by Goe. This assessment clearly authorized the sale of a tract of land in the S. E. corner of the N. E. 1/4 of N.W. 1/4 of section 19, 75, 15, twenty rods wide and fifty-three and one-third rods long, containing six and two-thirds acres.
In the certificate of purchase the land is described as follows: This description is equivalent to saying the seven and one-half acres owned by B. H. Goe, in the S. E. part of the N. E. 1/4 of the N.W. 1/4 of section 19, township 75, range 15. As it is admitted that B. H. Goe owned but one tract of land in the county, and that it was situated in the south-east part of the forty in question, the certificate of purchase contains the data for applying the description to the land in fact owned by B. H. Goe, and it covers so much of it as is embraced in the assessment.
Parol evidence is admissible, not for the purpose of adding to or varying the description contained in the certificate of purchase, but of applying that description to its subject-matter, and when it is shown that B. H. Goe owned one tract of land, and but one, in the N. E. 1/4 N.W. 1/4 19, 75, 15, the description, the tract of land owned by B. H. Goe, in the S. E. part of the N. E. 1/4 of the N.W. 1/4 19, 75, 15, is just as definite and certain as if the description in full had been written out in the certificate.
The doctrine that parol evidence is admissible for the purpose above indicated is recognized, at least impliedly, in Immegart v. Gorgas, 41 Iowa 439, and ...
To continue reading
Request your trial