Western Lunatic Asylum v. Miller

• Citation: 1 S.E. 740,29 W.Va. 326
• Parties: WESTERN LUNATIC ASYLUM v. MILLER and others.
• Decision Date: 05 February 1887
• Court: Supreme Court of West Virginia

1 S.E. 740

29 W.Va. 326

WESTERN LUNATIC ASYLUM v. MILLER and others.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

February 5, 1887

Submitted January 22, 1887.

Syllabus by the Court.

Public corporations, whether municipal or simple agencies of the state, when clothed with the capacity to sue and be sued, to have a common seal, to take and hold property, and to transact business, are governed by the same laws and rules and subject to the same regulations and limitations, that natural persons are, except so far as they may be exempted by positive law.

The statute of limitations runs against such corporations in the same manner as it does against private corporations.

The rights and immunities of a sovereign state belong to her within her own jurisdiction and territory; and, when she becomes a suitor in the courts of a foreign state, she is treated as a foreign private corporation.

A state suing upon a private claim in another state is not exempted from the operation of the statute of limitations of the lex fori.

When a cause of action accrues against the estate of a decedent at the time of his death, and not before, and no one qualifies as administrator until more than five years thereafter, the law conclusively presumes that an administrator qualified on the last day of said five years, and the statute of limitations begins to run in favor of the estate of the decedent from that time, whether or not there is in fact any administrator of the estate.

Where the plaintiff in a suit is not entitled to any relief, there can be no decree between co-defendants, nor any recovery by one defendant against another defendant.

Appeal and supersedeas from circuit court, Cabell county.

Jas. F Brown, for appellant.

Benj. Brown and J. H. Ferguson, for appellee W. C. Miller.

The Attorney General, for the State.

T. H Harvey and J. H. McCue, for Western Lunatic Asylum.

Z. T. Vinson, for Irby's Heirs.

SNYDER J.

In the year 1850, William Irby, a lunatic from Cabell county, was taken to the Western Lunatic Asylum at Staunton, Virginia, where he remained as a patient until his death, in the year 1863. Peter C. Buffington was appointed committee of the estate of Irby, and in 1854 brought suit in the circuit court of Cabell county for a sale of his ward's lands in that county, alleging in his bill that the lands were unproductive, and a sale and investment of the proceeds would be advantageous to the estate, and also that a portion of said proceeds were necessary to pay debts, and the expenses of his ward at the asylum. The presumptive heirs of Irby were made defendants to the bill. Under decrees in said suit the lands were sold, and the sales confirmed. A small part of the proceeds was applied to the payment of debts. Nine hundred and fifty dollars was paid to the asylum on account for the support of Irby; and the residue, nine hundred and five dollars, was placed in the hands of W. C. Miller, as the general receiver of the court, who was, by decree entered September 1, 1859, ordered to "continue to invest the same in some safe stock or loan until the further order of the court." In November, 1868, an order was entered directing deeds to be made to the purchasers of the lands, which concludes with the words, "and this cause is filed away." This is the last order or proceeding had in this cause, so far as the transcript before us discloses.

In July, 1878, the Western Lunatic Asylum, styling itself a corporation created and existing under the laws of Virginia, and doing business at Staunton, in that state, brought this suit in the circuit court of Cabell county against W. C. Miller, the general receiver of said court, and the administrator and heirs of Irby, to recover $2,383.45, balance alleged to be due to the plaintiff from the estate of Irby for his board, clothing, etc., furnished at the asylum from November, 1850, to March, 1863, and to obtain a decree against said Miller, as receiver, for the aforesaid $905, and the interest thereon. George F. Miller, the administrator of Irby, pleaded the statute of limitations, and filed an answer in the nature of a cross-bill, asking for a decree in his favor for said $905. W. C. Miller, the receiver, answered, alleging that he had paid over the $905, placed in his hands, to the heirs of Irby, and exhibited receipts showing that he had so paid over a part of said fund; and he also pleaded the statute of limitations and the lapse of time as a bar to any recovery against him. In March, 1884, the state of West Virginia filed her petition, claiming said fund as the assignee of Virginia, under the act of February 3, 1863, passed by the reorganized government of Virginia. Acts 1862-63, p. 58.

The cause was referred to a commissioner, who reported the balance in the bands of the general reviewer, after deducting the amounts paid by him to the heirs of Irby, to be $1,106.84 as of May 7, 1882. To this report there was no exception. The court, on August 19, 1884, entered a decree in favor of the administrator of Irby against W. C. Miller, the receiver, for the balance reported by the commissioner in his hands, and then decreed that said administrator, after paying the costs of this suit, should pay the residue of said fund to the plaintiff on its claim against the estate of Irby, which, with the interest thereon to the date of the decree, was ascertained and fixed at $5,023.41, and found to be the only indebtedness of said Irby's estate. From this decree, George F. Miller, administrator, obtained this appeal.

The first question presented is whether or not the plaintiff's demand is barred by the statute of limitations. The plaintiff is a Virginia corporation, with perpetual succession, capacity to sue and be sued, a common seal, and the power to take and hold real and personal property. Chapter 15, Acts 1841, p. 38; sections 1, 2, c 85, Code Va. 1849, p. 387. If this is simply a public charitable corporation, and not a part of the government itself, then the statute of limitations applies to it in the same manner that it does to natural persons. The maxim, Nullum tempus occurrit regi, applies to sovereignty alone. Wheeling v. Campbell, 12 W.Va. 36; Forsyth v. Wheeling, 19 W.Va. 318. Public corporations, whether they are municipal or mere agencies of the state, are all more or less branches of the government, and necessarily clothed with attributes and incidents of sovereignty; yet, when they are clothed with the capacity to sue and be sued, to have a common seal, to take and hold property, and transact business, they are governed by the same laws, rules, and regulations, and subject to the same limitations, that natural persons are, except so far as they may be exempted or relieved by positive law. Tompkins v. Kanawha Board, 19 W.Va. 257.

But conceding, as claimed by the plaintiff, that this corporation and the commonwealth of Virginia are one and the same, and that it must be treated here as possessing all the attributes and immunities which belong to the sovereign Commonwealth of Virginia, still, when Virginia seeks redress and becomes a suitor in the courts of this state, and beyond her territorial limits, she must lay aside her attributes and immunities of sovereignty, and assert her demands as private individuals or corporations assert theirs in those courts, subject to the same laws and limitations. Sovereignty, though supreme within its own jurisdiction and territory, does not extend beyond these; and, when a sovereign state enters the courts of a foreign state, she does so with no other rights and immunities than those which pertain to private corporations or individuals. Esley v. People, 23 Kan. 512. The lex fori governs in the limitation of actions. Johnson v. Anderson, 76 Va. 766.

But it is contended by the attorney general for this state that by the act of the general assembly of February 3, 1863, Virginia transferred her claim against the estate of Irby to this state. Acts Va. 1862-63, p. 58; Calwell v. Prindle, 19 W.Va. 604. It is not necessary to decide whether or not such...