(1) Tre Wright v. (1) James Rasmussen
| Decision Date | 04 October 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 17-CV-159-JHP |
| Parties | (1) TRE WRIGHT, Plaintiff, v. (1) JAMES RASMUSSEN, SHERIFF OF OKFUSKEE COUNTY, in his official capacity, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Oklahoma |
Before the Court is Defendant James Rasmussen's ("Defendant"), in his official capacity at Sheriff of Okfuskee County, Motion for Summary Judgment filed June 25, 2018 [Dkt. 28]. The Court, being fully advised in the premises, finds that Defendant's Motion should be, and is hereby, granted.
Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Summary judgment is not a disfavored procedural shortcut, but an integral part of the federal rules as a whole. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986), the Supreme Court held that "there is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." The Court further held that "if the evidence is merely colorable, or not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Id. In addition, the Anderson Court stated that "the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of a plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which a jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Id. A movant's summary judgment burden may properly be met by reference to the lack of evidence in support of plaintiff's position. See Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 671 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325).
Furthermore, as described by the court in Cone v. Longmont United Hosp. Ass'n., 14 F.3d 526 (10th Cir. 1994), "Even though all doubts must be resolved in (the nonmovant's) favor, allegations alone will not defeat summary judgment." Cone at 530 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). See also Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1111 (10th Cir. 1991); Roemer v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 911 F. Supp. 464, 469 (D. Colo. 1996). Moreover, "(i)n response to a motion for summary judgment, a party cannot rely on ignorance of facts, on speculation, or on suspicion, and may not escape summary judgment in the mere hope that something will turn up at trial." Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 794 (10th Cir. 1988).
Reviewing the evidentiary material submitted by the parties, the Court finds that there are no material disputes as to the following facts:
On September 25, 2015, Tre Wright ("Plaintiff"), who was incarcerated in the Okfuskee County Jail ("the jail"), became involved in a physical altercation with his cell mate, and hit him in the mouth. (Dkt. 28-1, 12:24-13:20). When Plaintiff hit him, the cell mate's tooth cut Plaintiff's index finger. (Dkt. 28-1, 13:19-23). Plaintiff reported the cut to a jailer, who gave him a bandage to cover the wound. (Dkt. 28-1, 14:17-9, 15:15-17). Believing that his right hand or finger was broken from the fight, Plaintiff filled out a Sick Call Request form the day of the fight asking to the see the jail nurse. (Dkt. 28-1, 15:15-25; Dkt. 28-5). The sick call request completed on September 25 did not mention the cut on Plaintiff's finger. (Dkt. 28-1, 16:17-22; Dkt. 28-5). During the following two days, Plaintiff continued to receive bandages from jail staff, but did not fill out any sick call request forms on September 26 or September 27 about the cut, or anyother medical complaint. (Dkt. 28-1, 16:25-17:14, 38:19-24). Plaintiff did fill out two sick call request forms on September 28, 2015. (Dkt. 28-1, 17:19-18:4, 18:11-21; Dkt. 28-6; Dkt. 28-7). On one of those forms he sought medical care for the cut on his finger for the first time. (Dkt. 28-1, 18:11-21; Dkt. 28-7).
The same day Plaintiff submitted the sick call request form regarding the cut on his finger, he was seen by a nurse employed by Turn Key Health. (Dkt. 28-1, 43:15-18; Dkt. 28-8; Dkt. 28-9). She cleaned and dressed the wound, gave Plaintiff an ice pack and ibuprofen, and called the doctor for further instructions. (Dkt. 28-1, 43:15-18; Dkt. 28-8; Dkt. 28-9). Plaintiff was then taken to the Creek Nation Hospital Emergency Room the following day, September 29. (Dkt. 28-1, 19:6-15, 41:3-22; Dkt. 28-10). Hospital physicians x-rayed his hand and determined it was not broken, but that the cut on his finger was infected. Plaintiff was prescribed antibiotics and ibuprofen for the infection, and discharged from the hospital back to the jail with instructions to return for a check-up the following day. (Dkt. 28-10). He was then taken back to the Creek Nation hospital on September 30 and immediately transported to Oklahoma State University Medical Center in Tulsa, where he was treated by specialists. (Dkt. 28-1, 22:24-23:7, 23:6-20; Dkt. 28-12). The infection in Plaintiff's hand worsened over the next several weeks, and eventually, a portion of his right index finger was amputated. (Dkt. 28-1, 23:15-25:14).
During the time Plaintiff was incarcerated at the jail, the jail contracted with healthcare provider Turn Key Health Clinics to provide healthcare and medical services to inmates. (Dkt. 28-13; Dkt. 28-14). The jail had a policy in place to provide inmates with both emergency and non-emergency medical care, comparable to that which is received by citizens in the surrounding community. (Dkt. 28-13; Dkt. 28-15). Jail policy further stated that an inmate's request for medical services will be denied. (Dkt. 28-15). The medical policy required inmates to fill out sick call request forms for non-emergency care, and required that medication be given to inmatesper physician's orders. (Dkt. 28-13; Dkt. 28-15). The policy also specifically addressed treating cuts. (Dkt. 28-15). Additionally, it was Defendant's policy to rely on and defer to the decisions of medical providers regarding the treatment inmates receives. (Dkt. 28-13).
Plaintiff asserts a claim against Defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that his rights under the Eighth Amendment were violated by healthcare being denied or delayed while he was incarcerated in the Okfuskee County Jail.
Section 1983 creates no substantive civil rights, but rather only provides a procedural mechanism for enforcing rights established elsewhere. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994); Gallegos v. City and County of Denver, 984 F. 2d 358, 362 (10th Cir. 1993). See also Miller v. Hawver, 474 F. Supp. 441, 442 n.1 (D. Colo. 1979) (). To sustain a § 1983 claim, Plaintiff must present "specific allegations of fact indicating a deprivation of rights, instead of a litany of general conclusions that shock but have no meaning." Barr v. Abrams, 810 F. 2d 358, 363 (2nd Cir. 1987).
First and foremost, Plaintiff must show an underlying violation of his constitutional rights by some employee of Defendant before municipal liability can be imposed against him in his official capacity as Sheriff of Okfuskee County. Official capacity suits "generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent." Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). In Hinton v. City of Elwood, 997 F.2d 774, 782 (10th Cir. 1993), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that "[a] municipality may not be held liable where there was no underlying constitutional violation by any of its officers." (Citations omitted.) This is so"regardless of whether the municipality's policies might have 'authorized' such harm." Id. (citing City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799, 106 S.Ct. 1571, 89 L.Ed.2d 806 (1986)); see also Walker v. City of Orem, 451 F.3d 1139, 1152 (10th Cir. 2006) (); Livsey v. Salt Lake County, 275 F.3d 952, 958 (10th Cir. 2001) (). Here, Plaintiff failed to demonstrate any underlying violation of his constitutional rights.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant or his employees were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs during his incarceration at the jail, particularly with regard to the cut on his index finger. The U.S. Supreme Court held in Estellev. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), that deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, and that such a constitutional violation is actionable under § 1983. Estelle at 104. That ruling thereby established the "deliberate indifference" test against which all § 1983 inmate denial and delay of medical care claims are judged. Estate of Hocker v. Walsh, 22 F.3d 995, 998 (10th Cir. 1994). A plaintiff must satisfy both the objective and subjective elements of the deliberate indifference test to demonstrate that his constitutional rights regarding medical care were violated. Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 752-753 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834-37, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). Because Defendant acknowledged the amputation of Plaintiff's finger was sufficiently serious, Plaintiff satisfied the objective portion of the test and only needed to prove the subjective element.
Plaintiff, however, did not prove the subjective element. To do so, he must show Defendant or his employees acted with a "sufficiently culpable state of mind," so egregious it amounts to "deliberate indifference" to a...
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