Boston & M. R. Co. v. County Com'rs of York Co.

• Citation: 79 Me. 386,10 A. 113
• Parties: BOSTON & M. R. CO. and another v. COUNTY COM'RS OF YORK CO.
• Decision Date: 02 June 1887
• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (US)

10 A. 113

79 Me. 386

BOSTON & M. R. CO. and another

v. COUNTY COM'RS OF YORK CO.¹

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

June 2, 1887.

Appeal from award of damages by county commissioners.

On motion and exceptions by appellant from supreme judicial court, York county. The opinion states the material facts.

Geo. C. Yeaton, for appellants. R. P. Tapley, for appellees.

EMERY, J. The county commissioners of York county laid out and established a county road, crossing at grade the tracks of both the appellant railroad companies, and made an appraisal of the damages sustained by each company from the necessary appropriation of its land within the limits of its location. The railroad companies appealed, and the question of damages was tried before a jury in this court. The bill of exceptions presents practically only two questions,—one raised by the first three exceptions, and the other by the fourth exception. The solution of these two questions will dispose of all the exceptions.

The legislature had ordered, by Rev. St. c. 18, § 27, that in such cases the railroad company shall at its own expense build and maintain so much of said county road as is within the limits of the railroad. This court held in Portland & R. R. Co. v. Deering, 78 Me. 61, 2 Atl. Rep. 670, that this statute duty of the railroad company did not entitle it to any extra compensation for the taking of its land; that the expense thus put upon the railroad company was not to be considered in appraising their damages. The result, in the case cited, is decisive against the claim of the Orchard Beach Railroad Company on this point, as its charter is expressly subject to legislative control.

The Boston & Maine Railroad Company, however, claims that its charter is not subject to "amendment, alteration, or repeal," the state having therein stipulated against such action. We do not think it necessary to express any opinion on tins claim.

The company further claims that, by reason of such stipulation in its charter, the legislature cannot lawfully require this company to bear such burdens without providing pecuniary compensation, since such requirement would impair the obligation of the contract between the state and the company contained in the charter. We do not think such a result necessarily follows from the assumed premises. Perhaps the question of the legislative authority over the company in this particular cannot strictly arise until the company refuse to comply with the statute; but as the company intimate their wish to obey the statute, and only claim that the burden imposed by it is an important element in the appraisal of their damages, we may properly pass upon the question in this proceeding. We may properly do this, whatever be the result of the motion for a new trial, as upon another trial the same question will inevitably arise. The question can perhaps be more directly presented if stated in this way: Could the legislature lawfully impose this burden on this company in the case of a pre-existing county road? Could the legislature lawfully require this company to assume the care of county roads (within its location) existing and crossing its track before the enactment of the statute? If the legislature could impose this duty, as to pre-existing roads, without compensation, it certainly could do so as to future roads. There must be the same answer to either statement of the question. In determining whether a statute is within the powers of the legislature, or whether it "amends, alters, or repeals" a charter contrary to stipulation, it is important to ascertain the intent or purpose of the statute. The purpose of this statute was evidently to promote the safety of travelers, both upon the railroad and the county way. In view of the nature of the ordinary steam railroad, and the dangers necessarily attending its operation, the onerous liability of the railroad company to its patrons and the public, it is clear that the company should have the whole control of all things necessary to be done within its location, for any purpose, whether for the benefit of the company or that of the public. It must practically have the exclusive possession of the land within the line of its location. Hayden v. Shillings, 78 Me. 413,6 Atl. Rep. 830. An independent and possibly antagonistic interest or authority should not be admitted within those lines. Still that part of the county way within the lines of the railroad location must be kept safe and convenient for travelers upon it. It must also be so constructed and maintained as not to endanger safety in operating the railroad. The one need combines with the other. The county way is as necessary as the railroad. To insure such construction and maintenance, to insure such safety upon both roads at the point of intersection, to protect travelers upon both roads, to provide for the better security of persons and property, the legislature has put this whole matter of construction and maintenance of both roads within the railroad limits upon the railroad company. The company is required to do this for its own protection, and that of citizens generally. This power of the legislature to impose uncompensated duties, and even burdens, upon individuals and corporations, for the general safety, is fundamental. It is the "police power." Its proper exercise is the highest duty of government. The state may in some cases forego the right to taxation, but it can never relieve itself of the duty of providing for the safety of its citizens. This duty and consequent power override all statute or contract exemptions. The state cannot free any person or corporation from subjection to this power. All personal as well as property rights must be held subject to the police power of the state. Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25; Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814; Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., Ill U. S. 746, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 652.

This important power must be extensive enough to protect the most retiring citizen in the most obscure walks, and to control the greatest and wealthiest corporations. Its exercise must become wider, more varied, and frequent, with the progress of society. "This police power of the state extends to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and the protection of all property within the state." Thorpe v. Rutland R. Co., 27 Vt. 150. "It extends to the protection of the lives, health, and property of the citizens, and the preservation of good order and public morals." Beer Co.'s Case, 97 U. S. 33. Its wide extent can be illustrated by instances of its actual exercise...