Peterson v. Superior Court

• Citation: 899 P.2d 905,43 Cal.Rptr.2d 836,10 Cal.4th 1185
• Decision Date: 21 August 1995
• Docket Number: No. S029736,S029736
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Parties: , 899 P.2d 905, 64 USLW 2157, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,307, 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6620, 95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 11,267 Nadine L. PETERSON et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Riverside County, Respondent; Banque PARIBAS et al., Real Parties in Interest.

Page 836

43 Cal.Rptr.2d 836

10 Cal.4th 1185, 899 P.2d 905, 64 USLW 2157,

Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,307,

95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6620,

95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 11,267

Nadine L. PETERSON et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Riverside County, Respondent; Banque PARIBAS et al., Real Parties in Interest.

No. S029736.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

Aug. 21, 1995.

McKay, Byrne & Graham, Gail D. Solo, John P. McKay, Los Angeles, Esner, Marylander & Zakheim, Esner, Marylander, Zakheim & Higa, Billie Ann U. Higa and Stuart B. Esner, Los Angeles, for Petitioners.

Douglas Devries, Sacramento, Roland Wrinkle, Woodland Hills, Harvey R. Levine, San Diego, Robert Steinberg, Los Angeles, Thomas G. Stolpman, Long Beach, William D. Turley, San Diego, Mary E. Alexander, San Francisco, Bruce Broillet, Santa Monica, Wayne McClean, Woodland Hills, Leonard Sacks, Granada Hills, Tony Tanke, Belmont, Leonard Esquina, Sacramento, Steven J. Kleifield, David Rosen, Los Angeles, Evan D. Marshall and Ian Herzog, Santa Monica, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.

No appearance for Respondent.

Haight, Brown & Bonesteel, Roy G. Weatherup, William O. Martin, Jr., Maureen Haight Gee, Santa Monica, Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal, Paul E.B. Glad, Thomas Holden, Cheryl L. Dyer, San Francisco, and Michael A. Mathews, Los Angeles, for Real Parties in Interest.

Fred J. Hiestand, Sacramento, Lord Day & Lord, Barrett Smith, Banks Brown, New York City, Sullivan, Roche & Johnson, Robert M. Cassel, San Francisco, and James R. Englese, San Mateo, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Parties in Interest.

GEORGE, Justice.

In Becker v. IRM Corp. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 454, 213 Cal.Rptr. 213, 698 P.2d 116 (hereafter Becker ), this court concluded that under California's products liability doctrine (which provides generally that manufacturers, retailers, and others in the marketing chain of a product are strictly liable in tort for personal injuries caused by a defective product), a residential landlord may be held strictly liable for an injury to its tenant caused by a defect in a leased dwelling. We granted review in the present case to decide whether Becker was wrongly decided and should be overruled, or, if Becker is not overruled, whether the principles underlying that decision apply outside the landlord-tenant context and warrant the imposition of strict products liability upon the proprietor of a hotel for an injury to its guest caused by a defect in the hotel premises.

Upon reexamining the basis for Becker 's holding with regard to the proper reach of the products liability doctrine, we conclude that we erred in Becker in applying the doctrine of strict products liability to a residential landlord that is not a part of the manufacturing or marketing enterprise of the allegedly defective product that caused the injury in question. For similar reasons, we also conclude that it would be improper to impose strict liability under products liability principles upon a hotel proprietor for injuries caused by an alleged defect in the hotel premises that the hotel proprietor did not create or market. Accordingly, we overrule that portion of our decision in Becker imposing strict products liability, and hold that neither landlords nor hotel proprietors are strictly liable on a products liability theory for injuries to their respective tenants and guests caused by a defect in the premises. This conclusion, however, by no means absolves hotel proprietors or landlords of all potential responsibility for such injuries; on the contrary, hotel proprietors and landlords that breach the applicable standard of care still may be held liable under general tort principles for injuries resulting from defects in their premises. Additionally, the injured tenant or guest retains any strict products liability cause of action that may lie against the manufacturer, distributor, or retailer of a defective product that causes the injury.

I

In an amended complaint filed March 19, 1990 (the last amended complaint), plaintiff Nadine L. Peterson alleged that, while a guest at the Palm Springs Marquis Hotel, she slipped and fell in the bathtub while taking a shower, sustaining serious head injuries. ¹ Plaintiff alleged that the bottom surface of the bathtub was "extremely slick and slippery" and that the bathtub had no "safety measures" such as "anti-skid surfaces, grab rails, rubber mats, or the like." Plaintiff named as defendants, among others, the owners of the hotel, Banque Paribas and Palm Springs Marquis, Inc.; the operator of the hotel, Harbaugh Hotel Management Corporation; and the manufacturer of the bathtub, the Kohler Company. In addition to a cause of action for negligence, plaintiff brought a cause of action for "strict liability in tort," asserting the bathtub was a "defective product" because the bathtub "was so smooth, slippery, and slick as to have provided no friction or slip resistance whatsoever...."

During discovery proceedings, the Kohler Company entered into a settlement with plaintiff for the sum of $600,000. The superior court found that this settlement was entered into in good faith.

Prior to trial, defendants Banque Paribas and Harbaugh Hotel Management Corporation (hereinafter defendants) filed a motion in limine to preclude plaintiff "from introducing any evidence or making any reference that strict liability applies to this case" on the ground that the "Becker v. IRM, (1985) 38 Cal.3d 454 [213 Cal.Rptr. 213, 698 P.2d 116], rationale does not apply to the present case...." The parties did not submit evidence in support of--or in opposition to--this motion, and no evidentiary hearing was held. The trial court granted the motion, ruling as a matter of law that the decision in Becker did not apply to the owners and operators of a hotel. A jury trial commenced that day but, on August 17, 1992, a mistrial was declared when the trial court excluded the testimony of plaintiff's expert witnesses for reasons unrelated to the issue before us.

Following a hearing, the trial court on October 3, 1992, issued an order that (among other things) confirmed that, upon retrial, the court would abide by its earlier ruling that "[s]trict liability as set forth in Becker v. IRM, 38 Cal.3d 454 [213 Cal.Rptr. 213, 698 P.2d 116], is not applicable to these proceedings." Plaintiff filed a petition for writ of mandate and/or prohibition in the Court of Appeal challenging the trial court's order, including the lower court's ruling precluding plaintiff from pursuing her strict products liability claim. The Court of Appeal summarily denied the petition for extraordinary writ. Plaintiff filed a petition for review in this court, which we granted, and we transferred the case to the Court of Appeal with directions to vacate its earlier order and issue an alternative writ.

After further proceedings, the Court of Appeal issued an opinion holding that a peremptory writ of mandate should issue directing the trial court, among other things, to permit plaintiff to proceed on her strict liability theory, and concluding that Becker applied to hotel proprietors. Upon petition by defendants, we again granted review to decide whether Becker should be overruled and, alternatively, whether under that decision the proprietor of a hotel is strictly liable in tort for injuries to guests caused by defects in the premises. ²

II

The sole issue in the case before us is whether the trial court erred in granting defendants' in limine motion to preclude plaintiff from arguing that, pursuant to our decision in Becker, the proprietor of a hotel is strictly liable under the doctrine of products liability for injuries to hotel guests caused by defects in the premises. For the reasons that follow, we conclude, upon reconsideration, that the decision in Becker constitutes an unwarranted extension of the doctrine of products liability and should be overruled. As we explain, the circumstance that landlords and hotel proprietors lease residential dwellings and rent hotel rooms to the public does not bring them within the class of persons who properly may be held strictly liable under the doctrine of products liability.

The plaintiff in Becker was injured when he fell against a shower door in the apartment he rented from the defendant. The door, which was made of untempered glass, broke and severely lacerated the plaintiff's arm. The only visible difference between shower doors with tempered glass and those with untempered glass in the apartment complex in question was a " 'very small mark in the corner of each piece of glass.' " (Becker, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 458, 213 Cal.Rptr. 213, 698 P.2d 116.) The apartment was part of a 36-unit complex built more than 10 years before it was acquired by the defendant.

Relying upon the rule announced in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 and its progeny, which imposed strict liability for personal injury caused by a defective product placed into the stream of commerce, this court observed that "a lease for a dwelling contains an implied warranty of habitability" and concluded that, in renting a dwelling, a landlord makes an "implied assurance of safety." (Becker, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 462, 465, 213 Cal.Rptr. 213, 698 P.2d 116.) Accordingly, this court held "that a landlord engaged in the business of leasing dwellings is strictly liable in tort for injuries resulting from a latent defect in the premises when the defect existed at the time the premises were let to the tenant. [Fn. omitted.]" (Id. at p. 464, 213 Cal.Rptr. 213, 698 P.2d 116.)

The defendant in Becker argued that a landlord that purchases an existing building is not part of the manufacturing and marketing enterprise and, therefore, should not be held strictly liable in tort for injuries caused by defects in the premises. The defendant in that case argued that the reasons enumerated in Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co. (1964) 61...