Sandpiper Mobile Village v. City of Carpinteria, B058435

Citation12 Cal.Rptr.2d 623,10 Cal.App.4th 542
Decision Date15 October 1992
Docket NumberNo. B058435,B058435
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals
PartiesSANDPIPER MOBILE VILLAGE, etc., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF CARPINTERIA, etc., Defendant and Respondent.

Robert J. Jagiello, Law Offices of Jagiello & Pech and Robert J. Jagiello and Debra K. Butler, Lake Arrowhead, for plaintiff and appellant.

Endeman, Lincoln, Turek & Heater and Donald R. Lincoln and Linda Reich Duncan, San Diego, Hatch & Parent and Stanley C. Hatch and Thomas D. Wise, Santa Barbara, for defendant and respondent.

GILBERT, Associate Justice.

Here we uphold the rent control ordinance of the City of Carpinteria because: (1) it does not exact a compensable physical taking of the property of appellant, Sandpiper Mobile Village (Yee v. Escondido (1992) 503 U.S. 519, 112 S.Ct. 1522, 118 L.Ed.2d 153), (2) it is rational and serves a legitimate public purpose and therefore does not violate substantive due process, and (3) on We do not consider its validity as applied because Sandpiper did not allege requisite facts in its complaint to raise this issue.

its face it validly regulates mobilehome rent. 1

BACKGROUND AND CONTENTIONS

Sandpiper owns and operates a mobilehome park in Carpinteria. By judgment on the pleadings, the trial court denied Sandpiper's challenge to the constitutionality of Carpinteria's mobilehome park rent stabilization ordinance. We affirm.

We review this judgment by the same standards we use to review a judgment entered after the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend. (See 6 Witkin, Cal.Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Proceedings Without Trial, § 263, pp. 564-565.)

We deem true all material and properly pleaded facts. We may not consider opinions, contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged. (Casella v. City of Morgan Hill (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 43, 48, 280 Cal.Rptr. 876, cert. den. 503 U.S. 983, 112 S.Ct. 1665, 118 L.Ed.2d 387; Agins v. Tiburon (1980) 447 U.S. 255, 259, fn. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 2141, fn. 6, 65 L.Ed.2d 106.)

The maximum site rent allowed under the ordinance is the sum of the rent in effect on July 1, 1979, increased by 75 percent of the ratio of change in the Consumer Price Index. The ordinance permits a park owner to apply for additional rent increases to ensure a just and reasonable return on investment. No provision in the ordinance permits park owners to immediately increase rent charged to incoming residents.

Sandpiper alleges that the ordinance unconstitutionally "prevents plaintiff from raising rents to market levels upon sale or other transfer of a unit ...." Sandpiper states: "The application of the Rent Control Ordinance to plaintiff results in enabling the tenants to monetize the rent savings upon the sale of their mobile homes to third parties," which "constitutes an impermissible transfer of wealth by the defendant to the departing tenants in violation of California Constitution, Article I, § 19." 2

Sandpiper also asserts the ordinance is irrational and serves no legitimate governmental purpose to preserve low or affordable housing because it enables departing tenants to sell their mobilehomes for a premium.

Sandpiper alleges that Carpinteria's ordinance "has had the effect of depriving the plaintiff of all use and occupancy of its real property in the spaces occupied by tenants, except a greatly reduced income stream, and granting to the tenants ... the right to physically permanently occupy and use the real property of plaintiff at reduced rentals." Sandpiper cites Hall v. City of Santa Barbara (9th Cir.1986) 833 F.2d 1270, to support its position that the ordinance exacts a physical taking of its property.

Sandpiper states that "[t]he tenants ... have used [their] power and ability on many occasions, to sell the rights of use and occupancy of plaintiff's real property at reduced rentals, which have been transferred to ... tenants by operation and enforcement of the Rent Control Law...."

DISCUSSION
Physical Taking

Sandpiper argues that enforcement of this ordinance constitutes a physical taking of its property because it transfers the right to market rents from the park owner to the tenants who obtain a premium for the sale of their coaches in the rent controlled park. (Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, supra, 833 F.2d 1270; accord Pinewood Estates v. Barnegat Tp. Leveling Bd. (3d Cir.1990) 898 F.2d 347.) Carpinteria contends that its rent control ordinance is a constitutional economic regulation which does not exact a per se physical taking. (Yee v. City of Escondido (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1349, 274 Cal.Rptr. 551, affd. Yee v. Escondido, supra, 503 U.S. 519, 112 S.Ct. 1522, 118 L.Ed.2d 153; Casella v. City of Morgan Hill, supra, 230 Cal.App.3d 43, 280 Cal.Rptr. 876.)

During the pendency of this appeal the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Yee, supra, a case very similar to this one. The Supreme Court held that "[o]n their face, the state and local laws at issue here merely regulate petitioners' use of their land...." (Yee v. Escondido, supra, 503 U.S. at p. ----, 112 S.Ct. at p. 1529, 118 L.Ed.2d at p. 166.) The High Court stated that "no government has required any physical invasion" of a park owner's property. (Id., at p. ----, 112 S.Ct. at p. 1528, at p. 165.) The Supreme Court stated that "[t]he government effects a physical taking only where it requires the landowner to submit to the physical occupation of his land." (Ibid., emphasis in text.) On their face, these laws do not compel a park owner to continue renting his or her property to tenants, therefore they do not require compensation, per se. (Ibid.)

The Yee court also rejected the contention that because the ordinance transfers wealth from park owners to incumbent tenants a physical invasion occurs. (Yee v. Escondido, supra, 503 U.S. at p. ----, 112 S.Ct. at p. 1529, 118 L.Ed.2d at p. 167.) The High Court explained that no physical taking occurs regardless of "[w]hether the ordinance benefits only current mobile home owners or all mobile home owners...." (Ibid.)

Furthermore, a park owner is not entitled to compensation for a physical taking because of the inability to choose incoming tenants. (Yee v. Escondido, supra, at p. ----, 112 S.Ct. at p. 1529, 118 L.Ed.2d at p. 167.) The landowner still retains a number of choices. As in Yee, Sandpiper voluntarily rents its land to tenants. (Ibid.) Under the State Mobilehome Residency Law, a park owner is entitled to change the use of his land by evicting his tenants with six or twelve months' notice. (Id., at p. ----, 112 S.Ct. at p. 1528, 118 L.Ed.2d at p. 165; Civ.Code, § 798.56, subd. (g).)

Sandpiper, like Yee, fails to establish a physical taking "because there has simply been no compelled physical occupation giving rise to a right to compensation...." (Yee v. Escondido, supra, at p. ----, 112 S.Ct. at pp. 1530-1531, 118 L.Ed.2d at p. 168; FCC v. Florida Power Corp. (1987) 480 U.S. 245, 107 S.Ct. 1107, 94 L.Ed.2d 282.)

Substantive Due Process

Sandpiper alleges that "the Ordinance is irrational and ... does not serve a legitimate governmental purpose of preserving low or affordable housing," because it enables tenants to sell their mobilehomes at premiums thereby "burdening the space with the need to pay the additional premium."

California courts have previously upheld such rent control provisions as legitimate, rational exercises of the police power because they are " 'reasonably calculated to eliminate excessive rents and at the same time provide landlords with a just and reasonable return on their property.' [Citation.]" (Casella v. City of Morgan Hill, supra, 230 Cal.App.3d at p. 56, 280 Cal.Rptr. 876.)

In readopting its 1980 rent stabilization ordinance, the extending ordinance stated that "said Chapter ... has proven to be an effective and beneficial program for the people of Carpinteria...." (City of Carpinteria Ord. No. 371.) It is not our role to second-guess this legislative determination. (Casella v. City of Morgan Hill, supra, 230 Cal.App.3d at p. 52, 280 Cal.Rptr. 876, and see pp. 51-54, 56-57, 280 Cal.Rptr. 876.)

Sandpiper argues that the premium received by tenants upon the sale of their mobilehomes "is one that otherwise could be sold by the park owner plaintiffs, in the process of negotiating a long-term lease with a new tenant...." It further argues that although this premium is exempt from rent control, it provides the tenant with long-term security and usually a reduced rent. California property law, however, "considers leasehold value the property of the tenant, not the landlord. [Citations.]" (Casella v. City of Morgan Hill, supra, 230 Cal.App.3d at p. 55, 280 Cal.Rptr. 876.)

The regulation of rent in a scarce housing market is a public policy matter to be determined by the Legislature. (Casella v. City of Morgan Hill, supra, 230 Cal.App.3d at p. 57, 280 Cal.Rptr. 876; see also Carson Mobilehome Park Owners' Assn. v. City of Carson (1983) 35 Cal.3d 184, 189, fn. 4, 197 Cal.Rptr. 284, 672 P.2d 1297.) The ordinance here is constitutional.

Regulatory Taking
As Applied

"On their face, the state and local laws at issue here merely regulate petitioners' use of their land by regulating the relationship between landlord and tenant." (Yee v. Escondido, supra, 503 U.S. at p. ----, 112 S.Ct. at p. 1529, 118 L.Ed.2d at p. 166, emphasis in text.) The Supreme Court has admonished that " 'the constitutionality of statutes ought not be decided except in an actual factual setting that makes such a decision necessary.' " (Pennell v. San Jose (1988) 485 U.S. 1, 10, 108 S.Ct. 849, 856, 99 L.Ed.2d 1; and see Williamson Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank (1985) 473 U.S. 172, 190, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 3118, 87 L.Ed.2d 126, referring to Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. & Recl. Assn. (1981) 452 U.S. 264, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 69 L.Ed.2d 1, Agins v. Tiburon, supra, 447 U.S....

To continue reading

Request your trial
14 cases
  • People v. Beaumont Inv., Ltd.
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • 11 de agosto de 2003
    ...v. City of Montclair, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 795, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 598. See also, e.g., Sandpiper Mobile Village v. City of Carpinteria (1992) 10 Cal. App.4th 542, 550, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 623 [California courts have upheld vacancy control as legitimate economic regulation].) As a procedural ......
  • Los Altos El Granada Investors v. Capitola
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • 17 de maio de 2006
    ...City of Montclair (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 784, 791, fn. 2, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 598, (Montclair); Sandpiper Mobile Village v. City of Carpinteria (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 542, 549, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 623 (Sandpiper).) It is clear they were invoking the concept of "finality" which requires that an administ......
  • Santa Monica Beach, Ltd. v. Superior Court
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (California)
    • 4 de janeiro de 1999
    ...Law is actually a facial challenge, and therefore barred by the statute of limitations. (See Sandpiper Mobile Village v. City of Carpinteria (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 542, 549, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d 623 [holding there is a five-year statute of limitation for real property takings challenges].) SMB con......
  • Travis v. County of Santa Cruz
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • 25 de julho de 2002
    ...Fambrough (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 324, 327-328, 53 Cal.Rptr. 862, which also relied on Frustuck; Sandpiper Mobile Village v. City of Carpinteria (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 542, 549, 12 Cal. Rptr.2d 623, which relied on Garden But there are at least two reasons not to follow those precedents here. ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT