Worley v. Northwestern Masonic Aid Assn.

• Decision Date: 01 January 1882
• Citation: 10 F. 227
• Parties: WORLEY, Adm'r, etc., v. NORTHWESTERN MASONIC AID ASSOCIATION.
• Court: United States Circuit Court, District of Iowa

10 F. 227

WORLEY, Adm'r, etc., v. NORTHWESTERN MASONIC AID ASSOCIATION.

United States Circuit Court, D. Iowa.

1882

E. F Richman, for plaintiff.

Putnam & Rogers and W. J. Culver, for defendant.

The plaintiff, in his petition, states that Phillip H. Worley deceased, died on or about the twenty-second of October 1880, intestate, and that the plaintiff is the duly-appointed administrator of his estate; that the defendant is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of Illinois; that among the papers of decedent were two policies or certificates issued by the defendant, whereby the defendant agreed and contracted to pay to the devisees of said decedent, within 30 days after receiving evidence of said Worley's death, certain sums of money, to be arrived at and computed from the number of members in the division of which the decedent was constituted a member of said association by such certificate, at a sum certain for each member of the respective class in such division.

The plaintiff avers that he fully performed all covenants and conditions on his part; that satisfactory proofs were made to the company of the death of Phillip H. Worley; that the amount due in the aggregate upon the two certificates is the sum of $6,299.55; and that the defendant refuses to pay the plaintiff the amount due upon said policies or contracts.

The defendant, for answer, states that it is not a life insurance company, nor a corporation for pecuniary profit; that it is organized for benevolent purposes, solely under the provisions of the statute of Illinois, approved April 18 1872, as amended by an act approved March 28, 1874, and providing for the organization of corporations, not for pecuniary profit, by three or more persons making, signing or acknowledging, and filing in the office of the secretary of state, a certificate stating the name and the title by which said corporation or society or association shall be known in law, the particular business and objects for which it is formed, etc.; that the defendant has no capital stock, and that its sole object and purpose, as declared in the certificate, is to procure pecuniary aid to the widows, orphans, heirs, and devisees of the deceased members of said association; that by said act under which the defendant was organized it is provided that 'associations and societies which are intended to benefit the widows, orphans, heirs, and devisees of deceased members thereof, and where no annual dues and premiums are required, and where the members shall receive no money as profit or otherwise, shall not be deemed insurance companies,' the business of insurance not being one for the carrying on of which corporations can, by the terms of said act, be organized; that the defendant is an association such as is described in the act of March 28, 1874, no annual dues or premiums being paid or required to be paid by its members, and no money or profits paid or contemplated to be paid to them; that the benefits arising from membership in said association accrue solely to the widows, orphans, heirs, or devisees directly for their own sole benefit, and are not part of the estate of such deceased member, or payable to his administrator; that the benefits arising from the membership of said Phillip H. Worley in said association, as shown by the certificate set forth in the petition, are payable to his devisees and not to other persons; and that said plaintiff, as administrator of the estate of said Phillip H. Worley, is not entitled to receive the same. Defendant avers that it has no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief whether said Phillip H. Worley died intestate, and submits that the grant of letters of administration on his estate to the plaintiff would not bind the devisees or legatees of the last will of said deceased, if such will should be proved to exist, nor would a payment to plaintiff, as administrator, protect the defendant from liability to such devisees or legatees, if any such should prove to be.

The plaintiff demurs to the defendant's answer, and the case is before us upon the demurrer.

LOVE, D.J.

This action, in both form and substance, proceeds upon a breach of contract. The contract is contained in the certificates copies of which are exhibited with the petition. The certificates provide that, for certain considerations therein mentioned flowing from Phillip H. Worley, deceased, the association promises and agrees to pay to the devisees of said decedent certain sums of money therein specified. In order to maintain the action the plaintiff must allege and show a breach of the contract. What breach has the plaintiff assigned? What breach can he assign? He has not alleged that the defendant association has failed, neglected, or refused to pay to the devisees of the decedent the sums of money in question. This could not be alleged or shown, because the plaintiff has himself stated that there are no devisees in existence. The breach upon which the plaintiff must rely is the non-payment of the money to him as administrator of the decedent's estate. But is this a breach of the stipulations of the contract? The contract is not that the defendant company shall pay to the decedent in his life-time, or to the administrator of his estate at his death. The contract could not have made such a provision, since it would have been utterly repugnant to the whole purpose, scope, and design of the association, as provided in the very law of its...