Taylor v. Cayce

• Decision Date: 04 February 1889
• Citation: 97 Mo. 242,10 S.W. 832
• Parties: TAYLOR v. CAYCE.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

10 S.W. 832

97 Mo. 242

TAYLOR v. CAYCE.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

February 4, 1889.

1. EQUITY — CANCELLATION OF DEED — MISTAKE.

Where plaintiff seeks to recover the proceeds of lands which he alleges he owned and quitclaimed, by mistake as to his ownership, to defendant, and which defendant afterwards sold, the value of plaintiff's title is immaterial, until the deed is disposed of. If the deed was fairly obtained without mistake or fraud, plaintiff cannot vacate it; especially where the parties cannot be restored to their former positions.

2. SAME — PRESUMPTIONS.

Plaintiff having alleged that he had owned the land for many years before making the deed, his knowledge of his rights in it will be inferred.

3. TRIAL — BY THE COURT — ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE.

The admission of merely irrelevant evidence on a trial by the court is not ground for reversal.

4. SAME — RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE — RULINGS ON TESTIMONY.

A bill of exceptions stating that the court heard all the foregoing evidence, both that objected to and that not objected to, postponing a final ruling until the conclusion

of the trial, does not show that the action of the court is prejudicial, where the bill also shows specific rulings on the admissibility of testimony objected to, and exceptions at the time.

5. SAME — DISCRETION OF COURT.

It is within the discretion of the court sitting without a jury to receive evidence objected to, and reserve its ruling on such objection. While a party has a right to an announcement of the ruling before finding on the whole case, he should make known his desire in that regard specifically, and an objection to the reception of evidence subject to objection is not sufficient.

6. SAME — RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE.

The circuit court in its discretion may allow defendant to give further testimony after the close of plaintiff's testimony in rebuttal.

7. APPEAL — REVIEW — WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE.

The finding of the circuit court in an equitable cause will not be set aside unless the supreme court is entirely satisfied that it is against the weight of evidence.

Appeal from circuit court, St. Francois county; JAMES D. FOX, Judge.

Hough, Overall & Judson and John F. Bush, for appellant. Smith, Silver & Brown and Carter & Clardy, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

By this proceeding appellant seeks to recover of respondent the proceeds of sale of certain lands. The appellant's petition asserts his former ownership of the lands, and that he made a quitclaim deed of them to respondent, who thereafter sold them, with other lands, to the Iron Mountain Company. Without reciting the allegations of the petition at length, it will be sufficient to note the facts on which appellant predicates his prayer for relief against the effect of his quitclaim so given. He charges that, "on the 27th day of June, A. D. 1882, the defendant made application to plaintiff for a quitclaim deed or conveyence of his (plaintiff's) aforesaid premises, for the purpose of enabling defendant to convey a good title to the whole tract or body of land which said premises of plaintiff and said premises of defendant together form and compose, and which defendant was then endeavoring to sell to said Iron Mountain Company. Defendant made such application, and spoke to plaintiff about and for such quitclaim deed or conveyance, about sunset on said day, telling plaintiff at the time that said company was willing to pay, and was going to pay, for said body of land, forty dollars per acre, which plaintiff avers was the reasonable value of his portion of said lands. From this application for said conveyance, and from the conversation and conduct of defendant in that behalf, did plaintiff first learn that the defendant was endeavoring to sell his (plaintiff's) said premises, and had on hand the foregoing scheme and negotiation. In a few minutes after such application for said conveyance, the same evening, defendant sent his son-in-law and agent or attorney, Kossuth W. Weber, with a quitclaim deed, already prepared without plaintiff's knowledge, for said premises, to plaintiff for his signature and acknowledgment; alleging, as an excuse for his haste in the transaction, that defendant was going to St. Louis that night to close and consummate said negotiation or treaty for the sale of the aforesaid body of land, and was desirous of taking such quitclaim deed from plaintiff along to show said company, as evidence of his authority and ability to convey a good title to said land and premises, and was under the necessity of so doing to succeed in said negotiation. At the time of such application, and of the presentation of said deed for his signature, plaintiff had had no occasion to investigate his title to said premises, or to examine the land records of said county of St. Francois for that purpose, and had in fact never made such investigation or examination; and so at such time plaintiff had no adequate, correct, or clear idea of the condition of his said title, or of the numbers, description, and extent of his said lands. Under these circumstances, plaintiff sought time to examine said land records, and investigate the condition of his said title, and of his said premises, the numbers, description, extent, and other incidents thereof, and also sought time to see the defendant in person, and secure an express and more definite understanding or agreement concerning the consideration which plaintiff was to receive for the making of said quitclaim deed or conveyance of said lands; alleging, also, and saying at the time to said Kossuth W. Weber, agent and attorney of defendant, that the deed of quitclaim which said attorney so brought, and was presenting to plaintiff for his signature and acknowledgment, contained or covered too much land, or too many pieces of land. To plaintiff's request for delay, and for time, and his objection concerning the quantity and description of the lands in said deed, defendant's said attorney made reply; at the time saying that the description of the lands in such quitclaim deed, so awaiting execution at the hands of plaintiff, was a true copy of the description of the sheriff's deed, — meaning a deed which Thomas S. McMullin, acting as sheriff of said county of St. Francois, made to the defendant on a sale under an execution and judgment which defendant held, by equitable assignment at the time, in favor of one Thomas P. Eaves and against David Lasseter, bearing date the 13th day of ...