Henry & Coatsworth Co. v. Evans

• Decision Date: 18 February 1889
• Citation: 10 S.W. 868,97 Mo. 47
• Parties: HENRY & COATSWORTH CO. v. EVANS et al.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

10 S.W. 868

97 Mo. 47

HENRY & COATSWORTH CO. v. EVANS et al.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

February 18, 1889.

1. MECHANICS' LIENS — RIGHTS OF SUBCONTRACTORS — EXTENT OF LIENS.

Rev. St. Mo. 1879, § 3172, provides that "every mechanic or other person, who shall * * * perform any * * * labor upon, or furnish any materials * * * for, any buildings * * * or improvements upon land," under any contract with the owner or his contractor, "upon complying with the provisions of this article, shall have for his * * * labor done, or materials furnished, a lien upon such building * * * or improvements, and upon the land belonging to such owner, * * * on which the same are situated, * * * to secure the payment for" such labor or materials. Held, that such lien exists in favor of subcontractors and others, notwithstanding prior payment of the full contract price, in good faith, by the owner to his contractor; also that such liens are not limited to the amount agreed to be paid by the owner to his contractor.

2. SAME — CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

Such construction of the statute does not give it an unconstitutional force and effect, as depriving the owner of property "without due process of law."

3. SAME.

Nor does it conflict with section 4 of the Missouri bill of rights, securing to all "the enjoyment of the gains of their own industry."

Appeal from circuit court, Jackson county; TURNER A. GILL, Judge.

Action by Henry & Coatsworth Company against D. W. Evans, contractor, and C. W. Dickinson, owner, to enforce a mechanic's lien. Plaintiff appeals from a judgment denying its lien.

Traber & Gibson, R. J. Ingraham, Jas. F. Mister, and C. O. Tichenor, for appellant. Botsford & Williams, B. F. Deatherage, and R. B. Middlebrook, for respondents.

BARCLAY, J.

In this action plaintiff, a subcontractor, seeks to establish, as a lien, a demand for materials furnished towards the erection of a building on land of defendant Dickinson. The exact controversy presented for decision arises from the following undisputed facts: Evans was the original contractor with Dickinson for the erection of certain buildings on land of the latter. Plaintiff, under a contract with Evans, supplied materials used in their construction. Plaintiff's account therefor was not paid. Notice of the demand was served on the owner, and the account filed in due time as a lien on the property, in accordance with the lien law.

No defect in the formal steps taken by plaintiff is suggested, but it appears that the owner had paid the original contractor the full amount of the agreed price for the buildings before notice or knowledge of plaintiff's demand, and that the contractor had applied that amount to discharge other valid claims against the property for labor and materials furnished, reserving nothing for himself. The circuit court rendered a personal judgment for the amount of plaintiff's demand against the contractor Evans, but denied the claim for a lien against the property. After the usual steps for a review of that ruling, plaintiff has brought the case here.

It is necessary to determine in this case whether payment of the full contract price, in good faith, by the owner to the contractor, in the circumstances above described, prevents the establishment of a lien against the property by a subcontractor who has furnished materials for the erection of a building, and otherwise complied with the statute.

The law of this state concerning these liens is the product of a gradual development. Its foundations were laid in our early jurisprudence, (Laws Mo. 1804-1824, p. 803, c. 346,) and improvements were made thereon from time to time until its present form was reached, (Rev. St. 1879, c. 47.) It is unnecessary to give the details of its history, further than to remark that its framers embodied in it some materials acquired from the statutes of other states, and some of the products of their own labor, forming thus a composite structure in many respects unlike the laws elsewhere on the subject. The points of dissimilarity must be clearly borne in mind to avoid the error of applying, to the interpretation of our own statute, decisions of courts in other states construing language quite different. Liens of the kind mentioned in our statute did not exist under the common law of England. They are founded on principles of natural justice which the civil law recognized, more than a thousand years ago, by giving workmen and material-men a similar right of compensation (called a "privilege," which took precedence even over prior mortgages) against property they had improved.

The Missouri statute undertakes to define the facts which shall create such a lien, and to provide a remedy for its enforcement. It should receive a liberal and reasonable construction to effectuate the purposes disclosed by its terms. De Witt v. Smith, 63 Mo. 263. To arrive at a sound interpretation, we must consider the law in all its parts, and ascertain, as best we may, and give expression to, the true intent of the legislature. It is our duty to give full effect to that intention when discovered, without attempting to enlarge or to restrict the legislative meaning to harmonize with any views of our own concerning its wisdom or expediency.

The first section of the law in question is as follows, (omitting the parts immaterial to this case:) "Every mechanic or other person, who shall * * * perform any * * * labor upon, or furnish any materials * * * for, any buildings * * * or improvements upon land, * * * under * * * any contract with the owner * * * or his * * * contractor, * * * upon complying with the provisions of this article, shall have for his * * * labor done, or materials * * * furnished, a lien upon such building * * * or improvements, and upon the land belonging to such owner * * * on which the same are situated, * * * to secure the payment for such * * * labor done, or materials * * * furnished." Rev. St. 1879, § 3172.

It has been already decided that in no event can a subcontractor assert a lien against the property for a greater amount than the reasonable market value of the labor or materials he furnished towards the erection of the building or improvement. Deardorff v. Everhartt, 74 Mo. 37; Schulenberg v. Prairie Home, 65 Mo. 295.

But there is nothing in this or in any other section expressly limiting the aggregate liens to the amount which the owner agreed to pay the original contractor for the completed work; yet such limitation, in definite terms, appears to have been thought necessary by the legislature of other states desiring to express that purpose in their laws. We shall mention some of those statutes to indicate the differences between them and our own in this particular.

The limitation now referred to has usually assumed one of two forms. In some states the clause conferring the lien is of nearly as broad a scope as our own, but the limitation is supplied by another section, to the effect that the lien notice by the subcontractor to the owner shall give the former a claim against and right to any sum "due, or to become due, under the contract," by the owner to the contractor. Such was the law of Colorado when the decision in Jensen v. Brown, (1875,) 2 Colo. 697, was announced. Sess. Laws Colo. 1872, p. 150, § 6.

The law of Iowa was somewhat similar when Stewart v. Wright, (1879,) 52 Iowa, 335, 3 N. W. Rep. 144, was decided; the language defining the status of a subcontractor there being as follows: "And, from and after the service of such notice, his lien therefor shall have the same force and effect," etc., "as a lien by the contractor, but shall be enforced against the property only to the extent of the balance due to the contractor at the time of the service of such notice upon the owner, his agent or trustee." Code Iowa 1873, p. 386, § 2133.

In other states this limitation has been expressed as a proviso in the section defining the right of lien, or as a distinct part of the statute. Thus the law of 1851, applicable to New York city, contained the following as a part of the sentence creating the lien: "But such owner shall not be obliged to pay for or on account of such house, other building, or appurtenances, in consideration of all the liens authorized by this act to be created, any greater sum or amount than the price stipulated and agreed to be paid therefor in and by such contract," (i. e., the contract between the owner and original contractor.) Laws N. Y. 1851, pp. 953, 954, § 1.

In Illinois, it was provided that no claim of any subcontractor, etc., should be a lien, "except so far as the owner may be indebted to the contractor at the time of giving such notice * * * of such claim, or may become indebted afterwards to him as such contractor." Rev. St. Ill. 1874, c. 82, § 33.

Kansas laws added this condition to the right of lien: "Provided, that the owner shall not be liable to such subcontractor for any greater amount than he contracted to pay the original contractor." Laws Kan. 1872, p. 295, § 2.

In Connecticut it was declared that "no such lien shall attach to any building or its appurtenances, or to the land on which the same may stand, in favor of any person, to a greater amount in the whole than the price which the owner agreed to pay for such building and its appurtenances." Gen. St. Conn. 1875, p. 360, § 12.

Such limitations, in one or another form, have been in force at different times in many states. Some of them have been changed by later laws. They are mentioned here as types of the forms that have been thought effective to limit the subcontractor's lien to the amount due under the owner's original contract, when the law-makers so intended.

The case at bar turns, of course, on the proper construction of our own law. The latter contains no such language as has been quoted from other states, nor anything substantially similar. The question then arises whether our legislature intended a like limitation to be supplied...