Hunt v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.

• Decision Date: 08 October 1942
• Docket Number: 2425.
• Citation: 10 So.2d 109
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US
• Parties: HUNT v. MAGNOLIA PETROLEUM CO. ET AL.

10 So.2d 109

HUNT v. MAGNOLIA PETROLEUM CO. ET AL.

No. 2425.

Court of Appeals of Louisiana, First Circuit

October 8, 1942

Writ of Error Refused Jan. 5, 1943.

Liskow &amp Lewis, of Lake Charles, for appellants.

Hawkins &amp Tritico, of Lake Charles, for appellee.

LeBLANC Judge.

The facts in this case are substantially as follows:

The plaintiff, Sullivan H. Hunt, a married man, residing with his wife at Westlake, Louisiana, was first employed by the defendant, Magnolia Petroleum Co., on August 2, 1937, and worked as an oil-field rough-neck in what is referred to as the Cameron Meadows District in Louisiana. At the time of this first employment he was examined by Dr. R. G. Holcomb, the defendant company's examining physician at Lake Charles Louisiana. He worked intermittently in Louisiana, but on one occasion was sent for a brief period to the Amelia oil-field in Texas, after which he again worked for the defendant in Louisiana.

On February 16, 1939, as had been the case before when work was slack, he was laid off; but on that occasion, he withdrew from a voluntary annuity and insurance plan carried by the Magnolia Petroleum Co. for its employees, and cashed the benefits he was entitled to receive thereunder.

Within a month from that date he was again contacted by an employee or representative of the defendant company out of its Lake Charles office and was advised that there was some work for him at Kermit, Texas. He reported at once to the Lake Charles office and was sent, or went himself, to the Iowa field office, at Iowa, Louisiana, where records of physical examinations in the Louisiana district were kept, but was unable to secure his record just then. He was instructed however to report to the "tool-pusher" at Kermit, Texas, which he did, but before being put to work, had to submit to another physical examination which he passed. His wife went with him to Kermit, Texas, but they did not move their furniture there. He started to work on March 14, 1939, and worked continuously until May 25, 1939, on which day he sustained a severe accidental injury to his right leg.

On the same day that plaintiff was injured his employer forwarded a report to the Industrial Accident Board of Texas on a standard form supplied by that Board. This form is styled "Employer's First Report on Injury". On June 9, 1939, the Safety Casualty Company, the employer's compensation insurance carrier for the State of Texas, reported their payment of compensation at the rate of $20 weekly.

On June 8, 1939, plaintiff also submitted two forms to the Industrial Accident Board, both of which had been supplied by the Board, one being styled "Claim for Compensation" and the other "Notice of Injury". These forms were filled out by plaintiff's wife but were signed by him. All matters relating to the filing of these forms by both the employer and employee appear to have been in conformity with the usual procedure under the Workmen's Compensation Law of Texas.

In the meantime, the Safety Casualty Company continued to pay plaintiff compensation at the rate of $20 per week and also furnished him medical services until October 23, 1940, when his compensation payments were reduced to $10 per week. On October 26, 1940, plaintiff consulted the present attorneys who are prosecuting this suit and they wrote the Safety Casualty Company demanding compensation for plaintiff at the rate of sixty-five per cent of his average weekly wages for four hundred weeks under the Workmen's Compensation Law of Louisiana. Act 20 of 1914 and its amendments. On receipt of this letter, the Safety Casualty Company sent plaintiff's attorneys a notice of suspension of payments in any amount whatsoever and the Industrial Accident Board of Texas was notified to that effect.

It appears that after plaintiff had been treated for his injury at Kermit, Texas for some weeks, it was suggested to him that he be removed to a hospital with better facilities at Big Springs, Texas, but he requested instead, that he be sent to Lake Charles to be treated by Dr. Holcomb. Some time during November, 1939, Dr. Holcomb performed an operation on his leg and he was kept in a cast for about six weeks. Several months later he was sent to San Antonio, Texas, to be examined by Dr. Amos Graves, and on October 16, 1940, he wrote a letter which he addressed to the "State Board of Compensation, Austin, Texas" in which he stated that Dr. Graves had advised him to undergo further operations on his leg and he would like to know what effect his refusal to submit to such operations would have on his compensation payments. He also made some inquiries regarding a reasonable settlement for his injury.

All of this seems to have prompted the Industrial Accident Board to have a hearing of his case and accordingly on November 3, 1940, plaintiff was notified that a hearing would be held on November 19, 1940. At the same time he was furnished with a form calling for an affidavit and statements in support of his claim. He did not file the form and on November 23, 1940, was requested by letter to do so. On December 5, 1940, his attorneys wrote the Board advising that the matter of his claim had been turned over to them for attention and asked for a short delay in order that they might consult a Texas attorney with regard to the matter. The Board had, however, on December 3, 1940, rendered a decision in the case awarding compensation at the rate of $11.97 per week and its reply to the letter of the plaintiff's attorneys was to notify them to that effect. A copy of the award as made was also sent them. Neither plaintiff nor his attorneys had any further communication with the Board and it is shown that unless an appeal was taken within twenty days from the date of the award, the matter became final. Plaintiff however consistently refused to accept payments made under the award and on December 18, 1940, his attorneys filed the present proceeding in the district court of Calcasieu Parish claiming that he is entitled to recover compensation at the rate of sixty-five per cent of his average weekly wages, or $20 per week, for four hundred weeks, on the ground that the contract of employment under which he was engaged and worked at the time of his injury, was entered into in the State of Louisiana and that his rights to compensation thereunder are therefore governed by the Workmen's Compensation Law of this state. Payments amounting to $1,470 are acknowledged in the petition and judgment is asked for in the sum of $8,000 payable in four hundred weekly installments of $20 each, subject to credit for the full amount heretofore paid. It was shown that the Safety Casualty Company does not carry the Magnolia Petroleum Company's compensation insurance for the State of Louisiana and therefore judgment is sought against the latter company alone.

The defendant first filed exceptions to the jurisdiction of the district court of Calcasieu Parish, ratione materiae, of no right or cause of action and also a plea of estoppel. These were all filed on the same day. Several days afterwards defendant filed another exception of no right of action and an amended exception of res adjudicata. All of these exceptions and pleas were tried and submitted together in the lower court and were all overruled. The defendant applied to the Supreme Court for writs of certiorari and prohibition but these were refused on the ground that the remedy was by appeal from final judgment in the event the case was decided adversely to the defendant.

Under reservation of its various pleas and exceptions the defendant then filed its answer in which it admitted the accident and plaintiff's resulting injury and that he was paid compensation in the amount of $1,470. Most of the issues raised under the former pleas were again presented and in addition plaintiff's present disability was denied. Pleading in the alternative, defendant alleged that at plaintiff's direction, and with his consent, it had incurred necessary medical, surgical and hospital expenses in his behalf in the sum of $1,095.62 and that in the event there should be judgment rendered in his favor, it is entitled to an offset in the sum of $845.62 which is the amount it has paid in excess of the maximum of $250 required to be paid for such services under the Workmen's Compensation Law of Louisiana.

After trial on the merits in the lower court there was judgment in favor of the plaintiff awarding him compensation at the rate of $20 per week beginning May 25, 1939, for a period not to exceed four hundred weeks, subject to a credit of $1,470 for compensation already paid. The defendant's alternative plea for an offset of $845.62 was rejected. From that judgment the defendant is prosecuting the present appeal in which it re-urges all of its former pleas and exceptions as well as those issues presented on the merits.

The most important plea, we think, and apparently the one most seriously urged by the defendant, is that of res adjudicata. In it may be said to be involved the plea to the jurisdiction of the court ratione materiae and the exception of no cause or right of action as well, as one of the questions raised under it, is whether or not the contract of employment between the plaintiff and the defendant is a Louisiana contract and as such governed by the Workmen's Compensation Law of Louisiana, which is a dominant and controlling issue under all the other pleas mentioned. If the contract is a Louisiana contract then of course plaintiff has a cause of action in a Louisiana court and such court has jurisdiction of the case but under the pleas of res adjudicata it is further contended that the plaintiff having gone before the Industrial Accident Board of Texas to have his claim adjudicated and the award of that Board...