McFaddin v. Lumpkin

Decision Date25 August 1919
Docket Number10257.
Citation100 S.E. 168,112 S.C. 431
PartiesMCFADDIN v. LUMPKIN ET AL.
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Richland County; R. W Memminger, Judge.

Action by Susan McFaddin against Charlie Lumpkin and others. Judgment for plaintiff, and certain defendants appeal. Reversed.

D. C Ray and A. W. Ray, both of Columbia, for appellants.

Green & Green, H. F. Jennings, De Pass & De Pass, Alfred Wallace Jr., and James H. Hammond, all of Columbia, for respondents.

WATTS J.

This action was heard by his honor, Judge Memminger, at the spring term of court, 1918, for Richland county, who filed his decree, from which appeal is taken. The action purports to be brought to marshal assets, adjust equities among the parties claiming portions of the land of Emanuel Holman, and to apply to the debts and expenses of this suit and of the estate the lands undisposed of, except in the residuary clause of the will, to the exoneration, as far as possible of the specific devises under the will, and to set apart the remaining portions of the land devised to the respective devisees.

The points made by the appeal are, first, what standing the infant defendants have in the court; the guardian ad litem not having excepted to the master's report. This is a matter of discretion with the court. It is the duty of the court to guard the rights of infants, whether exceptions have been filed to the master's report or not within the time fixed. The court can allow exceptions filed at any time, before or at hearing, by an infant. Mr. Justice Hydrick, in Barfield v. Barnes, 108 S.C. 12, 93 S.E. 428, says:

'However, the duty and responsibility of safeguarding the rights of infants rests primarily upon the judges of the circuit court."

It is their duty to safeguard an infant's rights in any case that comes before them, and to see to it that the interest of the infant is fully looked after, protected, and safeguarded.

The next point made by the exceptions is second, that the deed to Mary Holman conveyed to her in her own right a vested remainder in such lands as should be left after such conveyances as were made by direction of Emanuel, defeasible only by execution of a new will by Emanuel Holman, directing her to convey the property to some one else, and that, not having done so, Mary becomes the owner in fee simple upon the death of Emanuel. An inspection of the deed shows that it does...

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2 cases
  • Stone v. Fisher, 7070
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • July 1, 1943
    ... ... and by its terms, conveyed all the right, title, and interest ... in and to the real estate therein described, to appellant ... (McFaddin v. Lumpkin et al., 112 S.C. 431, 100 S.E ... 168.) The deed expresses unqualifiedly the intention of the ... grantor, and, as heretofore stated, ... ...
  • Pinson v. Pinson
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • May 9, 1929
    ... ... 9 Cyc. 828; Loring v. Cunningham, 9 Cush ... (Mass.) 87; Donohoo v. Lea, 1 Swan (Tenn.) 119, ... 55 Am. Dec. 725. See, also, McFaddin v. Lumpkin, 112 ... S.C. 431, 100 S.E. 168 ...          "It ... will be noted that the payments provided for in the contract ... for ... ...

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