100 U.S. 213 (1880), Hough v. Texas & P.r. Co.
|Citation:||100 U.S. 213, 25 L.Ed. 612|
|Party Name:||HOUGH v. RAILWAY COMPANY.|
|Case Date:||January 12, 1880|
|Court:||United States Supreme Court|
Submitted on printed arguments by Mr. James Turner for the plaintiff in error, and by Mr. John C. Brown for the defendant in error.
ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Texas.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the court.
Plaintiffs in error, the widow and child of W. C. Hough, deceased, seek in this action to recover against the Texas and Pacific Railway Company damages, compensatory and exemplary, on account of his death, which occurred in 1874, while he was in its employment as an engineer.
In substance, the case is this:--
The evidence in behalf of the plaintiffs tended to show that the engine of which deceased had charge, coming in contract with an animal, was thrown from the track, over an embankment, whereby the whistle, fastened to the boiler, was blown or knocked out, and from the opening thus made hot water and steam issued, scalding the deceased to death; that the engine was thrown from the track because the cow-catcher or pilot was defective, and the whistle blown or knocked out because it was insecurely fastened to the boiler; that these defects were owing to the negligence of the company's master-mechanic, and of the foreman of the round-house at Marshall; that to the former was committed the exclusive management of the motive-power of defendant's line, with full control over all engineers, and with unrestricted power to employ, direct, control, and discharge them at pleasure; that all engineers
were required to report for orders to those officers, and under their directions alone could engines go out upon the road; that deceased knew of the defective condition of the cow-catcher or pilot, and, having complained thereof to both the master-mechanic and foreman of the round-house, he was promised a number of times that the defect should be remedied, but such promises were not kept; that a new pilot was made, but, by reason of the negligence of those officers, it was not put on the engine.
The evidence in behalf of the company conduced to show that the engine was not defective; that due care had been exercised, as well in its purchase as in the selection of the officers charged with the duty of keeping it in proper condition; that the defective cow-catcher or pilot was not the cause of the engine being thrown from the track; that the whistle was securely fastened, and did not blow out, but the cab being torn away, the safety-valve was opened, whereby the deceased was scalded; that if any of the alleged defects existed, it was because of the negligence of the master-mechanic and the foreman of the round-house, for which negligence the company claims that it was not responsible.
The principal question arising upon the assignments of error requires the consideration, in some of its aspects, of the general rule exempting the common master from liability to one servant for injuries caused by the negligence of a fellow-servant in the same employment.
'The general rule,' said Chief Justice Shaw, in Farwell v. Boston & Worcester Railway Corporation (4 Metc. (Mass.) 49), 'resulting from considerations as well of justice as of policy, is, that he who engages in the employment of another for the performance of specified duties and services, for compensation, takes upon himself the natural and ordinary risks and perils incident to the performance of such services, and in legal contemplation the compensation is adjusted accordingly. And we are not aware of any principle which should except the perils arising from the carelessness and negligence of those who are in the same employment. These are perils which the servant is as likely to know, and against which he can as effectually guard, as the master. They are perils incident to the service,
and which can be as distinctly foreseen and provided for in the rate of compensation as any other.'
To prevent misapprehension as to the scope of the decision, he deemed it necessary, in a subsequent portion of his opinion, to add: 'We are far from intending to say that there are no implied warranties and undertakings arising out of the relation of master and servant. Whether, for instance, the employer would be responsible to an engineer for the loss arising from a defective or ill-constructed steam-engine; whether this would depend upon an implied warranty of its goodness and sufficiency, or upon the fact of wilful misconduct or gross negligence on the part of the employer, if a natural person, or of the superintendent or immediate representative and managing agent, in case of an incorporated company,--are questions on which we give no opinion.'
As to the general rule, very little conflict of opinion is to be found in the adjudged cases, where the court has been at liberty to consider it upon principle, uncontrolled by statutory regulations. The difficulty has been in its practical application to the special circumstances of particular cases. What are the natural and ordinary risks incident to the work in which the servant engages; what are the perils which, in legal contemplation, are presumed to be adjusted in the stipulated compensation; who, within the true sense of the rule, or upon grounds of public policy, are to be deemed fellow-servants in the same common adventure or undertaking,--are questions in reference to which much contrariety of opinion exists in the courts of the several States. Many of the cases are very wide apart in the solution of those questions.
It would far exceed the limits to be observed in this opinion to enter upon an elaborate or critical review of the authorities upon those several points. Nor shall we attempt to lay down any general rule applicable to all cases involving the liability of the common employer to one employé for the negligence of a co-employé in the same service. It is sufficient to say, that, while the general doctrine, as stated by Chief Justice Shaw, is sustained by elementary writers of high authority, and by numerous adjudications of the American and English courts, there are well-defined exceptions, which, resting as they clearly
do upon principles of justice, expediency, and public policy, have become too firmly established in our jurisprudence to be now disregarded or shaken.
One, and perhaps the most important, of those exceptions arises from the obligation of the master, whether a natural person or a corporate body, not to expose the servant, when conducting the master's business, to perils or hazards against which he may be guarded by proper diligence upon the part of the master. To that end the master is bound to observe all the care which prudence and the exigencies of the situation require, in providing the servant with machinery or other instrumentalities adequately safe for use by the latter. It is implied in the contract between the parties that the servant risks the dangers which ordinarily attend or are incident to the business in which he voluntarily engages for compensation; among which is the carelessness of those, at least in the same work or employment, with whose habits, conduct, and capacity he has, in the course of his duties, an opportunity to become acquainted, and against whose neglect or incompetency he may himself take such precautions as his inclination or judgment may suggest. But it is equally implied in the same contract that the master shall supply the physical means and agencies for the conduct of his business. It is also implied, and public policy requires, that in selecting such means he shall not be wanting in proper care. His negligence in that regard is not a hazard usually or necessarily attendant upon the business. Nor is it one which the servant, in legal contemplation, is presumed to risk, for the obvious reason that the servant who is to use the instrumentalities provided by the master has, ordinarily, no connection with their purchase in the first instance, or with their preservation or maintenance in suitable condition after they have been supplied by the master.
In considering what dangers the servant is presumed to risk, the court, in Railroad Company v. Fort (17 Wall. 553, 557), said: 'But this presumption cannot arise where the risk is not within the contract of service, and the servant had no reason to believe he would have to encounter it. If it were otherwise, principals would be released from all obligations to make reparations
to an employé in a subordinate position for any injury caused by the wrongful conduct of the persons placed over him, whether they were fellow-servants in the same common service or not. Such a doctrine would be subversive of all just ideas of the obligations arising out of the contract of service, and withdraw all protection from the subordinate employés of railroad corporations. These corporations, instead of being required to conduct their business so as not to endanger life, would, so far as this class of persons were concerned, be relieved of all pecuniary responsibility in case they failed to do it. A doctrine that leads to such results is unsupported by reason, and cannot receive our sanction.'
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