1000 Friends of Washington v. McFarland
Decision Date | 21 December 2006 |
Docket Number | No. 76581-2.,76581-2. |
Citation | 159 Wn.2d 165,149 P.3d 616 |
Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Parties | 1000 FRIENDS OF WASHINGTON, King County, and Center for Environmental Law and Policy, Respondents, v. Rodney McFARLAND, Petitioner. |
Richard M. Stephens, Diana M. Kirchheim, John Maurice Groen, Groen Stephens & Klinge, LLP, Bellevue, WA, for Petitioner.
John T. Zilavy, Futurewise, Seattle, WA, for Respondents.
Laura Beth Wishik, Thomas Aquinas Carr, Seattle City Attorneys Office, Seattle, WA, for Amicus Curiae (Association of Washington Cities).
Timothy Dunning Ford, Office of Attorney General, Olympia, WA, for Amicus Curiae (Attorney General).
Robert D. Johns, Duana Theresa Kolouskova, Johns Monroe Mitsunaga, PLLC, Bellevue, WA, for Amicus Curiae (Master Builders Association of King and Snohomish Counties).
Andrew C. Cook, Building Industry Association of Washington, Olympia WA, Russell Clayton Brooks, Pacific Legal Foundation, Bellevue, WA, for Amicus Curiae (Pacific Legal Foundation).
David Scott Mann, Gendler & Mann LLP, Lauren Rice Burgon, Seattle, WA, Ryan Vancil, Vancil Law Offices, PLLC, Bainbridge Island, WA, for Amicus Curiae (Washington Environmental Council).
Robert Kirk Costello, Alan D. Copsey, Office of Attorney General, Olympia, WA, for Amicus Curiae (Washington State Dept. of Community, Trade & Economic Development).
¶ 1 Our state constitution sets forth the blueprint for the structure of our state government. Central to that structure is the sovereignty of the people of the state of Washington because "[a]ll political power is inherent in the people, and governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, and are established to protect and maintain individual rights." CONST. art. I, § 1; see also CONST. art. II, § 1; Paget v. Logan, 78 Wash.2d 349, 352, 474 P.2d 247 (1970).
¶ 2 The people of the State are sovereign. Local subdivisions, like King County, are subject to that greater sovereignty and must act within it. But within that constraint, counties and their citizens have considerable latitude to rule and regulate themselves. See CONST. art. II, § 1; Henry v. Thorne, 92 Wash.2d 878, 881, 602 P.2d 354 (1979). This may include the power to revoke county ordinances by referendum. See, e.g., King County Charter (KCC) § 230.40.
¶ 3 When the people of the State require action from a local legislature or executive body, those actions are not subject to a veto via a referendum. Henry, 92 Wash.2d at 881, 602 P.2d 354. This follows from the blueprint, from the very structure of government established by our state constitution. It would violate the constitutional blueprint to allow a subdivision of the State to frustrate the mandates of the people of the State as a whole. Id.; see also Whatcom County v. Brisbane, 125 Wash.2d 345, 884 P.2d 1326 (1994).
¶ 4 The electorate also plays a vital role in checking the exercise of power by elected officials through the initiative and referendum process, both at a State and local level. See, e.g., CONST. art. II, § 1. But the people of the state as a whole are the proper electorate to check the legislative action at issue in these cases—by way of a statewide vote on that underlying legislation.
¶ 5 Today, we are asked to decide whether county ordinances enacted under detailed procedures established by the state Growth Management Act (GMA), chapter 36.70A RCW, to designate and protect critical areas are subject to a veto by a local vote. More than a decade ago, this court substantially answered that question. Brisbane, 125 Wash.2d 345, 884 P.2d 1326. There, we concluded that GMA ordinances, at least those relating to critical areas, are not subject to referenda.
¶ 6 We reached that decision on several grounds, including the fact that the county was required by the State to designate and protect critical areas and that the State had established elaborate procedures for public participation that were inconsistent with local up and down votes. The petitioners ask us to revisit and overrule Brisbane. We decline to do so ¶ 7 We are sympathetic to the critical importance of local government participation and public participation in land use planning. But it is for the legislature to establish any additional role county voters should play in this process or for the voters of the state to amend the GMA via a statewide process under article II, section 1 of our state constitution. If ordinances adopted pursuant to these state mandates are to be subject to local referenda, the state legislature must include the procedure in the underlying statutory schema. Accordingly we affirm the trial court.
¶ 8 Washington State adopted the GMA in 1990. LAWS of 1990, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 17. Among other things, the GMA requires certain localities to plan their growth, protect the environment, protect the property rights of individuals, and designate and protect "critical areas." RCW 36.70A.020, .060; see also WAC 365-190-040 ( ). Critical areas include wetlands, areas that recharge aquifers used for potable water, fish and wildlife habitat conservation areas, areas that are frequently flooded, and areas that are geologically hazardous. RCW 36.70A.030(5).
¶ 9 A major component of the GMA is coordinated, countywide planning to further the statutory mandates. The responsibility for that planning falls primarily upon the individual counties that plan under the GMA's directives. RCW 36.70A.040, .070, .210. The legislature has specifically required counties to develop their comprehensive plans according to procedures that require an enormous degree of public participation. RCW 36.70A.172; WAC 365-190-040, 365-195-900 through -925.
¶ 10 Planning is not a one time thing. King County originally adopted its Growth Management Comprehensive Plan in 1994. See King County Dep't of Development & Envtl. Servs., http://www.metrokc.gov/ DDES/gmpc/index.shtm (last visited Dec. 18, 2006). King County is required to review and, if needed, revise its comprehensive plan and implementing ordinances every seven years, most recently by December 1, 2004. RCW 36.70A.130(4)(a). Since King County originally began planning under the GMA, and since it has promulgated its first comprehensive plan, the legislature has added additional substantive requirements, including the explicit direction to use the "best available science" in planning. LAWS of 1995, ch. 347, § 105, codified as RCW 36.70A.172(1).
¶ 11 King County's review process that produced the regulations at issue today took about four years and involved prepublication of proposed regulations, formal public comment, six public meetings, peer review by scientists, republication of proposed regulations with an opportunity for more formal public comment, seven more public meetings, King County Council committee review (including 11 committee meetings), and full King County Council consideration, along with some number of additional public meetings. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 13-60, 63-78, 81-87, 131-34; see also King County Ordinance (KCO) 15051(2)(a) (Statement of Facts).
¶ 12 The regulations at issue today emerged from this process. KCO 15051 explicitly designates and regulates critical areas and amends the zoning code in unincorporated King County. KCO 15052 regulates storm water and KCO 15053 regulates clearing and grading. Together, these ordinances are nearly 400 pages long. The county's statement of facts included in the enacted ordinances reflect its conclusion that KCO 15052 and 15053 are necessary to protect critical areas.1 If a challenge to the regulations has been timely filed as provided by RCW 36.70A.290, it is not reflected in the very limited record.
¶ 13 One month after these ordinances were enacted, Rodney McFarland initiated the process to hold referenda upon them. An advocacy group, 1000 Friends of Washington, later joined by King County (which has largely taken over the prosecution of this case), filed a declaratory judgment action contending that these ordinances were not subject to referenda. After a contested hearing the trial judge granted summary judgment in favor of the county.2
¶ 14 McFarland sought and we granted direct review. The attorney general and the Pacific Legal Foundation filed amici briefs in support of McFarland. The Washington Association of Cities, the Master Builders Association of King and Snohomish Counties, the Washington Environmental Council, and the Washington State Department of Community, Trade, and Economic Development (the state agency responsible for overseeing implementation of the GMA) have filed amici briefs in support of King County.3
¶ 15 Our review is de novo. Lybbert v. Grant County, 141 Wash.2d 29, 34, 1 P.3d 1124 (2000). When the text of the statute is clear, we need go no further to interpret it. Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, L.L.C., 146 Wash.2d 1, 11-12, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). However, even when the text is not ambiguous, we will consider all that the legislative body has said on the subject. Id.
¶ 16 Our task today is to determine whether the legislature intended to create broad state policy to be implemented by counties when it enacted the GMA or whether it simply intended to authorize municipalities to take some action. See generally Henry, 92 Wash.2d 878, 602 P.2d 354. How to make this sort of determination has long been a vexing problem. Clear statutory language is often absent, as legislation tends to focus on the substance of the field being legislated upon, and not on how the legislation fits within the larger constitutional structure of government. See generally Philip A. Trautman, Initiative and Referendum in Washington: A Survey, 49 WASH. L.REV. 55, 82-83 (1973). Complicating things, the GMA itself is not a model of consistent clarity. See generally Quadrant Corp. v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt....
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