State v. Castelli

Decision Date06 July 1917
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE v. CASTELLI et al.

Wheeler, J., dissenting.

Appeal from Superior Court, New Haveft County; Joel H. Reed, Judge.

Joseph Castelli and Francesco Vetere were convicted of murder, and they appeal. No error.

The defendants were convicted in the superior court for New Haven county of murder in the first degree. They were jointly indicted for the murder of Annie, the wife of Castelli, who was found in a bedroom at 260 Crown street, New Haven, on Easter Sunday, April 23, 1916, suffering from severe fractures of the skull, of which she died on the following day. The deceased and both the accused were deaf mutes. On the 26th of April both of the accused were apprehended in New York in connection with an inquiry into the disappearance from New York of Annie Castelli. While the inquiry was in progress the coroner for New Haven county arrived and the identity of the missing woman with the murdered woman was established. Each one of the accused freely made a full confession to the coroner in which each separately from the other described the killing in substantially the following way: Castelli for reasons given was tired of his wife and desired to get rid of her. He induced Vetere to plan and carry out a pretended elopement for the purpose of bringing Annie to New Haven, where Castelli was to kill her. Pursuant to this conspiracy, Vetere induced Annie to accompany him to New Haven, and took her to a lodging house at 260 Crown street, where they obtained a room, representing themselves as man and wife. They then went out to lunch, and Vetere found an opportunity of leaving Annie and informing Castelli, who had followed them on the same train, of the whereabouts of the room and how to open the front door at 260 Crown street. After lunch Vetere and Annie went back to their room, where Castelli had in the meantime concealed himself in a closet armed with a piece of iron pipe. Vetere kissed Annie, and after some love-making went to the front window. Vetere says that Annie appeared to fall asleep. Castelli then came out of the closet and struck her on the head with the' pipe, inflicting the wounds from which she afterwards died. Castelli and Vetere then took Annie's jewelry and money and returned together on the same train to New York. On the way down Vetere, at Castelli's suggestion, wrote a postal card to the effect that Annie had eloped, addressed it to Castelli, and mailed it on reaching New York. This postal card was produced and put in evidence at the trial. That evening they both went together Co a social entertainment. Each of the confessions was admitted in evidence against the party who made it, but not as against the other accused. The state also proved the death and identity of Annie Castelli the fact that she and Vetere were seen together at the boarding house; that Annie was left alone in the restaurant for a time and rejoined by Vetere; that Vetere was seen leaving the boarding house alone with a bag. Annie's jewelry was recovered from the person to whose custody Vetere had committed it.

On the trial each of the defendants went upon the witness stand and admitted all the physical facts recited in their respective confessions, but Vetere claimed that the elopement was a genuine one, and Castelli claimed that he learned of it by seeing Annie and Vetere conversing about it in the sign language, followed them to New Haven without V'etere's knowledge, ascertained by observation where their room was at 260 Crown street, and found his way there without the assistance of Vetere, concealed himself in the closet armed with a piece of iron pipe, and that he became enraged at the behavior of Annie and Vetere, and killed his wife under the influence of uncontrollable rage.

William A. Bree and John Cunliffe, Jr., both of New Haven, for appellant Castelli. Spotswood D. Bowers, of Bridgeport, and Samuel E. Hoyt, of New Haven,' for appellant Vetere. Arnon A. Ailing, State's Atty., and Walter M. Pickett, Asst. State's Atty., both of New Haven, for the State.

BEACH, J. (after stating the facts as above). At the opening of the trial Vetere moved for a separate trial on the ground that it would appear from the coroner's finding and notes that there was evidence in the case admissible against one and not admissible against the other of the accused. Castelli made no motion for a separate trial. Vetere's motion was opposed by the state's attorney on the ground that the crime was committed in carrying out a conspiracy to murder the deceased, and that as to any items of evidence which might be admissible against Castelli only Vetere could be adequately protected by a proper instruction to the jury. The court overruled the motion and directed the accused to be tried together, and this is assigned as error by both of the accused.

The rule as to granting separate trials to persons jointly indicted is stated in State v. Brauneis, 84 Conn. 222, 226, 79 Atl. 70, 72, as follows:

"Whether a separate trial shall be allowed to parties jointly indicted is within the discretion of the court. Ordinarily justice is better subserved where the parties are tried together. But cases arise where the defenses of the different parties are antagonistic, or where evidence will be introduced against one which will not be admissible against others. Where from the nature of the case it appears that a joint trial will probably be prejudicial to the rights of one qr more of the parties, a separate trial should be granted when properly requested."

The discretion of the court is necessarily exercised before the trial begins, and with reference to the situation as it then appears; and the phrase "prejudicial to the rights of the parties" means something more than that a' joint trial will probably be less advantageous to the accused than separate trials. The controlling question is whether it appears that a joint trial will probably result in substantial injustice.

It is not necessarily a ground for granting a separate trial that evidence will be admissible against one of the accused which is not admissible against another. Such evidence is received and its limited application pointed out to the jury in most cases where two or more accused persons are tried together. When the existence of such evidence is relied on as a ground for a motion for separate trials, the character of the evidence and its effect upon the defense intended to be made should be stated so that the court may be in a position to determine the probability of substantial injustice being done to the moving party from a joint trial. It does not appear from the record that the [ trial court was so advised in this case, and on that ground alone it is impossible to say that the court abused its discretion in denying Vetere's motion.

Ordinarily the fact that one of the accused has made a confession incriminating the other would be a good ground for granting a separate trial. But the peculiarity of this case was that each of the accused had made a full written confession of facts which, if legally corroborated, was sufficient to convict either one of them of murder in the first degree.

It follows that no material fact incriminating either one of the accused came to the knowledge of the jury because they were tried together which would not also have come to the knowledge of a jury if each had been separately tried and his own confession admitted against him. This being so, the claim that substantial injustice was done by a joint trial relates rather to the corroborative effect which each of these confessions may be supposed to have had upon the other; and if we assume that the trial court did know all the facts before the trial began, the question presented to it was whether it would order separate trials of two self-confessed conspirators, each of whose acts and declarations made or done in pursuance of the conspiracy was admissible against the other, because their respective confessions, being made after the event, were not so admissible. The mere statement of this proposition shows that the question was one fairly within the limits of judicial discretion, and that a denial of Vetere's motion for a separate trial was not an abuse of discretion. In view of the precautions taken in the admission of evidence and again in the charge of the court, we cannot assume that the jury were improperly influenced by any corroborative effect given to evidence not admissible against one of the accused, but admitted as against the other only. It may be observed that our attention has been called to but two cases in this country where the action of a trial court in refusing to grant separate trials to persons jointly indicted has been held to be reversible error. In one of them the right to a separate trial was granted by statute, and in the other the effect of the joint trial was to deprive the accused of the benefit of material testimony, under the common-law rule that persons jointly indicted and tried may not be called as witnesses for or against each other.

Generally speaking, the decision of a trial court upon a preliminary and collateral question of fact will not be reversed unless in a case of clear and manifest error. In State v. Willis, 71 Conn. 293, 313, 41 Atl. 820, this rule was applied to, or quoted as applicable to, the determination of the voluntary character of extrajudicial confessions as affecting their admissibility in evidence; and we see no reason why it is not equally applicable to the determination of the probability or improbability of substantial injustice flowing from a joint trial of persons jointly indicted. If it were not so, there would be grave danger of mistrials from causes which were unknown to the trial court at the time when it was required to decide the question. Moreover, joint trials of persons jointly indicted are the rule, and separate trials the exception resting in the discretion of...

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  • People v. Aranda
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (California)
    • 12 Noviembre 1965
    ...Similar rules concerning joint trial have been adopted in other jurisdictions and have been found workable. (See, e. g., State v. Castelli, 92 Conn. 58, 101 A. 476; People v. Barbaro, 395 Ill. 264, 69 N.E.2d 692; People v. Bolton, 339 Ill. 225, 171 N.E. 152; State v. Rosen, 151 Ohio St. 339......
  • State v. McLucas
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    ...on the basis of whether at the time "it appears that a joint trial will probably result in substantial injustice." State v. Castelli, 92 Conn. 58, 63, 101 A. 476, 478; State v. Holup, supra, 167 Conn. 245, 355 A.2d 478. A similar test should be applied when the prosecutor makes the motion f......
  • State v. Haskins
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    • 21 Septiembre 1982
    ...indicted or informed against are the rule, and separate trials the exception resting in the discretion of the court. State v. Castelli, 92 Conn. 58, 65, 101 A. 476 [1917].... There is no affirmative duty on the part of the court to move for separate trials. A separate trial will be ordered ......
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    ...abused its discretion in denying the [defendant's] motion."6 (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Castelli, 92 Conn. 58, 63, 101 A. 476 (1917); accord State v. Holup, 167 Conn. 240, 245, 355 A.2d 119 (1974) ("Because a preliminary motion for trials obviously must be ......
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