Ross v. Comm'rs of Palisades Interstate Park

• Decision Date: 06 June 1917
• Citation: 90 N.J.Law 461,101 A. 60
• Parties: ROSS et ux. v. COMMISSIONERS OF PALISADES INTERSTATE PARK.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

101 A. 60

90 N.J.Law 461

ROSS et ux.

v. COMMISSIONERS OF PALISADES INTERSTATE PARK.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

June 6, 1917.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Appeal from Circuit Court, Bergen County.

Action by P. Sanford Ross and wife against the Commissioners of the Palisades Interstate Park. From a verdict of a jury in a condemnation proceeding, plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

Argued before TRENCHARD and BLACK, JJ.

Bedle & Kellogg, of Jersey City, and Alonzo Church, of Newark, for appellants. Josiah Stryker, of Trenton, and John W. Wescott, Atty. Gen., for respondent.

BLACK, J. This case is an appeal from the verdict of a jury rendered in a condemnation proceeding tried at the Bergen circuit. The verdict of the jury was $8,000. The award of the commissioners was, $6,600. The amount of land sought to be taken was. 3.6 acres.

The land under condemnation is situate in the extreme northerly part of the borough of Ft. Lee, Bergen county, and lies between a line drawn parallel with the Hudson river 150 feet west of the high-water line of the Hudson river and the steep cliffs of the Palisades. The tract extends about 980 feet along this line, while the distance from the line to the cliffs is 170 feet at the northerly end and 155 feet at the southerly end. Access to the land on the west is shut off by the steep cliffs. The surface of the laud is a steep slope from the base of the cliffs to the easterly boundary. The land is bounded on the east by other lands of the appellant, which extend easterly 150 feet to the high-water line of the Hudson river and from there to the exterior line for solid filling.

The land in question and the remainder of the same tract is wild, unoccupied land, the upland being covered with small trees, underbrush, and stones, the whole tract being underlaid with slate and sandstone, and at the westerly end, at an elevation of 123 feet, with trap rock. There is no communication with the land by railroad, trolley, or wagon road, none of the land under the Palisades north of the tract has ever been used for industrial purposes, and the nearest land under industrial development is 2.6 miles southerly in the adjoining borough of Edgewater.

The grounds of appeal are 38 In number. They are argued, however, under eight heads in the appellants' brief. They all challenge the rulings of the trial court and allege trial errors as grounds for a reversal of the judgment. The principal ones, however, relate to the court's exclusion of the opinion of appellants' experts as to the value of the land taken. The witnesses offered by the appellants for this purpose were Mr. Frederick Dunham, civil engineer, Mr. Floyd S. Corbin, a real estate broker of water front and dock properties in the harbor of New York, Mr. John H. Ehrehardt, a consulting engineer, Mr. Edlow W. Harrison, a distinguished civil and consulting engineer (Mr. Harrison has had long and varied experience in valuing railroad lands in New Jersey for taxation since 1884, particularly as to the value of the railroad terminal lands in Hudson county; he has been called as an expert on many features of the litigation involving the taxation of railroad property since the passage of the railroad tax act of 1884), Mr. Joseph E. Snell, a civil engineer of Newark, and Mr. P. Sanford Ross, the appellant and owner of the property under condemnation, who is an engineer and contractor. Mr. Dunham testified that he had no familiarity with sales of property under the Palisades in the vicinity of the Ross property; that he had made no effort to keep in touch with sales of land under the Palisades in the borough of Ft. Lee. Mr. Corbin had no familiarity with the sale of any water front property in the borough of Ft. Lee or with the sale of any property anywhere which had the same physical characteristics and the same lack of any means of communication as the property under condemnation or the tract of land of which it formed a part. Mr. Ehrehardt had not bought or sold property in Bergen county; he had no knowledge of any sale of any land lying along the Hudson river anywhere in Bergen county. Mr. Harrison testified, that the nearest property to the Ross tract of which he had any knowledge was the Koch property, which was located one mile south of the Ross property, his familiarity with this property being acquired by appraising it. He had no familiarity with values of land in the borough of Ft. Lee, except this one appraisal of the Koch property. He knew of no sales of any property similar or like the Ross property. Furthermore the record does not show any question overruled by the trial court put to him as to the value, but it does show that the trial judge said he would sustain the objection. Mr. Snell testified that he had never purchased or sold any land in the vicinity of the tract under condemnation; that he had no familiarity with the sale price of any land in that vicinity. Mr. Ross testified that he had no knowledge of sales of water front property under the Palisades north of the land under condemnation; that he had made no effort to learn the sale prices of such property; he had no knowledge of either values or purchase prices of any property in the borough of Ft Lee, except the piece under condemnation and the tract of which it was a part, which he purchased in 1882.

The primary question in this case for solution then is whether, under our cases, it was error to reject the opinion of these witnesses on the value of the land under condemnation. Who is an expert under our decisions must be left very much to the discretion of the trial judge. His decision is conclusive, unless clearly shown to be erroneous in the matter of law. Manda v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. R. Co., 89 N. J. Law, 327, 98 Atl. 467; New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Lehigh Zinc Co., 59 N. J. Law, 194, 35 Atl. 915; Elvins v. Delaware, etc., Tel. Co., 63 N. J. Law, 247, 43 Atl. 903, 76 Am. St. Rep. 217; State v. Arthur, 70 N. J. Law, 427, 57 Atl. 156.

Our Court of Errors and Appeals, speaking on this precise point, said:

"Evidently, in the view of these authorities, the most material circumstance forming this qualification of expert witnesses as to land values consists of the fact either that they have themselves made sales or purchases of other similar lands in the neighborhood of the land in question within recent periods, or that they have knowledge of such sales by others. How recent the occurrence of such sales, in point of time, and how near in location, and how nearly similar in comparison must, of course, vary with the circumstances of each case, and it is theretore impossible to define a general rule applicable to all cases." Brown v. New Jersey Short Line R. R. Co., 76 N. J. Law, 797, 71 Atl. 271.

So the court in speaking of a former owner of land for six or seven years said:

"Hence, to say nothing of personal capacity or of study or practice, there was shown on his part no opportunity to observe, and no actual observation, in the locality of the land which fitted him to speak of its value. The witness had no special knowledge of values which, being imparted to the jurors, could aid them in the discharge of their duty." Walsh v. Board of Education of Newark, 73 N. J. Law, 647, 64 Atl. 1088.

The witness must have some special knowledge of the subject about which he is called upon to express an opinion. Crosby v. City of East Orange, 84 N. J. Law, 708, 710, 87 Atl. 341; Elvins v. Delaware, etc., Tel. Co., 63 N. J. Law, 247, 43 Atl. 903, 76 Am. St. Rep. 217.

A witness to be an expert must have more than a general knowledge of the subject under investigation. Authorities from other jurisdictions applying a different rule are not binding on this court. It is sufficient to say, in the language of Mr. Justice Dixon:

That, if in other states a more liberal rule is applied respecting the opinion of witnesses, as to the value of real estate, "the worthlessness of such testimony is hardly a stronger reason for its rejection than the practically limitless amount of it that might be produced." Laing v. United New Jersey R. R., etc., Co., 54 N. J. Law, 578. 25 Atl. 409, 33 Am. St. Rep. 682.

In our reports the rule has been applied in the following illustrative instances to the opinion of witnesses on the valuation and damage to land: A witness has qualified as an expert who has a knowledge of sales of lots and portions of lands similar to and in the immediate neighborhood of the condemned land. The land so sold was within a radius of two miles from the land in question and within a period of three years from the date of the giving of the testimony. Brown v. New Jersey Short Line R. R. Co., 76 N. J. Law, 797, 71 Atl. 271.

A farmer is not an expert as to the damage done to a farm by the building of a railroad other than for farming purposes. Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Root, 53 N. J. Law, 253, 21 Atl. 285. Real estate agents residing six miles distant from the property who had nothing to do with property in the vicinity or anywhere near it are not on the question of rents. Haulenbeek v. Cronkright, 23 N. J. Eq. 413, affirmed 25 N. J. Eq. 513. Ordinary real estate agent is not, as to the value of the private title in a strip of land lying on a public highway, separated by the street from private property, nor as to damages done to the owner of the abutting property, by appropriating that strip to railroad purposes. Laing v. United N. J. R. R., etc., Co.,...