Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. v. City of Phila.
| Decision Date | 24 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 20 EAP 2013,20 EAP 2013 |
| Citation | 627 Pa. 470,101 A.3d 79 |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
| Parties | SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, Appellee v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA and Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations, Appellants. |
627 Pa. 470
101 A.3d 79
SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, Appellee
v.
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA and Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations, Appellants.
No. 20 EAP 2013
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued Sept. 11, 2013.
Decided Sept. 24, 2014.
Eleanor N. Ewing, Esq., City of Philadelphia Law Department, for City of Philadelphia and Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations.
Andrew A. Chirls, Esq., Mary Catherine Roper, Esq., David Michael Rosenblum, Esq., Philadelphia, for American Civil Liberties Union of PA and Mazzoni Center.
Ryan Allen Hancock, Esq., Kathy Weaver Morrison, Esq., PA Human Relations Commission, for Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission.
Michael Patrick Gallagher, Esq., Katharine Virginia Hartman, Esq., Patrick Michael Northen, Esq., Holly Rebecca Rogers, Esq., Dilworth Paxson LLP, Philadelphia, Gino J. Benedetti, Esq., Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, for Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority.
BEFORE: CASTILLE, C.J., SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD, McCAFFERY, STEVENS, JJ.
OPINION
Justice McCAFFERY.
We granted review in this case principally to clarify the standard for determining whether a municipal ordinance applies to an agency or instrumentality of the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth Court concluded here that the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (“SEPTA”) is a Commonwealth agency and therefore not subject to either the provisions of the Philadelphia Fair Practices Ordinance (“FPO”),1 or the jurisdiction of the Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations (“the Philadelphia Commission”). The Commonwealth Court also concluded that, because SEPTA was not
amenable to the Philadelphia Commission's jurisdiction, it had no duty to exhaust its administrative remedies before that agency. For the reasons that follow, we vacate
the order of the Commonwealth Court and remand for reconsideration under the proper standard.
This case has its origins in seven administrative proceedings against SEPTA that individuals instituted with the Philadelphia Commission from July 2007 through April 2009, alleging violations of the FPO.2 At least two of the administrative complaints included claims of types of discrimination against which the FPO offers protection, but that the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”)3 does not cover. See Stipulated Facts, ¶ 6–7; R.R. 258a–259a (listing administrative cases). SEPTA filed a motion to dismiss each of the administrative cases for lack of jurisdiction, and the Philadelphia Commission denied the motions. Id.
While all seven administrative proceedings were still pending,4 SEPTA instituted this civil action against Appellants seeking both declaratory and injunctive relief. SEPTA maintained in its complaint5 that because it is a Commonwealth
agency, and Appellants are a political subdivision and a municipal agency, respectively, the FPO does not apply to it, and the Pennsylvania Constitution barred Appellants from exercising jurisdiction over it.6
Appellants filed preliminary objections demurring to SEPTA's complaint. Appellants argued that because Philadelphia's powers under the First Class City Home Rule Act7 extend to enacting and enforcing anti-discrimination laws, the FPO applied to SEPTA and the Philadelphia Commission had jurisdiction over it. Appellants further contended that an original action for declaratory and injunctive relief was inappropriate because SEPTA had to
await final agency decisions in the individual administrative cases against it before it could seek appellate review in court. In response, SEPTA pointed out that the statute authorizing the creation of metropolitan transportation authorities, such as SEPTA, provides that such an authority “shall exercise the public powers of the Commonwealth as an agency and instrumentality thereof,”74 Pa.C.S. § 1711(a), and asserted that Philadelphia's authority as a home-rule jurisdiction extends only to the regulation of its municipal affairs. In its brief in opposition to the preliminary objections, SEPTA did not rely upon, or refer to in any manner, the section of its enabling legislation pertaining to sovereign and official immunity. 74 Pa.C.S. § 1711(c)(3). The trial court sustained the preliminary objections and dismissed SEPTA's complaint.8
SEPTA appealed to the Commonwealth Court, which reversed. SEPTA v. City of Philadelphia, 20 A.3d 558 (Pa.Cmwlth.2011) (en banc ). A majority of the court concluded that the Philadelphia Commission lacked jurisdiction because
SEPTA is an “agency and instrumentality” of the Commonwealth and therefore within the jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (the “State Commission”). The majority noted that the State Commission is responsible for the administration of the PHRA, which bans any “employer” from engaging in certain forms of discrimination. 43 P.S. §§ 955, 956(a). Because the PHRA defines “employer” as including “the Commonwealth or any political subdivision or board, department, commission or school district thereof,”9 and because neither the PHRA nor the FPO explicitly grants the Philadelphia Commission jurisdiction over SEPTA, the majority concluded the State Commission—and not the Philadelphia Commission—had jurisdiction over SEPTA. The Commonwealth Court did not base any portion of its reasoning upon the section of SEPTA's enabling legislation pertaining to sovereign and official immunity. 74 Pa.C.S. § 1711(c)(3). Because the majority considered the State Commission's jurisdiction over SEPTA to be clear, and a Commonwealth instrumentality's challenge to “the scope of a governmental body's action pursuant to statutory authority” through a declaratory judgment action to be proper, the majority also concluded that SEPTA had no duty to exhaust its administrative remedies before seeking relief in court. SEPTA v. City of Phila., supra at 563.
Now–President Judge Dante Pellegrini dissented. He concluded that SEPTA is not a Commonwealth agency, and even if it were, it would still be subject to the provisions of the FPO and the jurisdiction of the Philadelphia Commission. The dissent stated that the General Assembly had enacted the portion of SEPTA's enabling act that provides that a metropolitan transportation authority such as SEPTA is “an agency and instrumentality thereof” merely to avoid constitutional and statutory questions, such as limitations on local governments' acquisition of debt. 74 Pa.C.S. § 1711(a). The dissent opined that the cited language was not intended to render SEPTA a state agency for all purposes.
The dissent then concluded that even if SEPTA were part of the Commonwealth government, it nonetheless would be subject to the jurisdiction of the Philadelphia Commission under Commonwealth v. Ogontz Area Neighbors Association, 505 Pa. 614, 483 A.2d 448, 452 (1984). In that case, the Department of Public Welfare (“DPW”)—which we characterized as “an
agency of the Commonwealth”—applied to the City of Philadelphia for the permits needed to build a facility for the mentally handicapped. Id. at 449–50. The City denied the permits on the ground that the proposed facility did not comply with use and other restrictions under the Philadelphia Zoning Code. On review in this Court, we rejected the notion that DPW was immune from local land regulations because it had the power to condemn property to establish the facility it sought to construct. We reasoned that because the General Assembly had established both the City and DPW, and had fixed the extent of each entity's powers, we would need to examine the enabling act of each entity to determine which entity's authority the legislature had intended to prevail for purposes of the parties' controversy. Because the applicable statutes did not clearly state which entity the legislature had intended to be “preeminent,” we applied the rule of statutory construction that a court may determine legislative intent by considering “the consequences of a particular interpretation.” Id. at 455 (citing 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c)(6) ). Because Philadelphia's zoning scheme would have been frustrated if DPW were to have prevailed, while subjecting DPW to local zoning rules and restrictions would not necessarily have frustrated DPW's mandate to establish mental health facilities, we concluded that the legislature had intended the City to have priority in the circumstances at issue.
The dissent here applied the principles we set forth in Ogontz and concluded that, as in Ogontz, the relevant statutes were ambiguous as to which entity was intended to have priority. The dissent therefore considered the effect of holding each entity preeminent and determined that ruling in SEPTA's favor would...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. v. City of Phila.
...Area Neighbors Ass'n , 505 Pa. 614, 483 A.2d 448 (1984). See Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth. v. City of Philadelphia, et al. , 627 Pa. 470, 101 A.3d 79, 90–91 (2014) (SEPTA III ). On remand, the Commonwealth Court determined that, applying the Ogontz test, the language and statutory......
-
Friends of Pa. Leadership Charter Sch. v. Chester Cnty. Bd. of Assessment Appeals
...are obviously anticipated, and so long as the taxing scheme does not impose substantially unequal tax burdens, rough uniformity with a 101 A.3d 79limited amount of variation is permitted.” Id., at 1210–11 (citation omitted); see also Delaware, L. & W.R. Co.'s Tax Assessment, 224 Pa. 240, 73......
-
Del. Riverkeeper Network v. Sunoco Pipeline L.P.
...v. Fraternal Order of Police, Fort Pitt Lodge No. 1, 161 A.3d 160 (Pa. 2017), and in Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority v. City of Philadelphia, 627 Pa. 470, 101 A.3d 79 (2014) ( SEPTA ). As the Supreme Court noted in SEPTA: In a series of cases beginning with our decision i......
-
Commonwealth v. Hoover
...which is a pure question of law. Thus, our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. SEPTA v. City of Philadelphia , 627 Pa. 470, 101 A.3d 79, 87 (2014). The overriding object of all statutory interpretation "is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the Gener......