People Ex Rel. John Longress v. the Bd. of Educ. of The City of Quincy.

Citation101 Ill. 308,40 Am.Rep. 196,1882 WL 5335
PartiesTHE PEOPLE ex rel. John Longressv.THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF QUINCY.
Decision Date16 January 1882
CourtSupreme Court of Illinois
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

WRIT OF ERROR to the Circuit Court of Adams county; the Hon. JOHN H. WILLIAMS, Judge, presiding.

Messrs. JOHN M. & JOHN MAYO PALMER, for the plaintiff in error, contended that under our statute an information would lie in a case like this. Prima facie the rules and regulations complained of are contrary to the policy of the State, are unreasonable, and are inconsistent with the laws. That the board of education have no power to make class distinctions on account of race or color, counsel cited Chase v. Stephenson, 71 Ill. 385. Messrs. WHEAT & MARCY, for the defendants in error:

The question presented is, whether the case will authorize a judgment in quo warranto. At common law the office of this proceeding was two-fold, viz: first, to oust the corporation from an usurped franchise; and second, to punish the corporation or its members, by fine or dissolution, for the misuse of its lawful franchise. High on Extraordinary Remedies, secs. 679, 680.

But even for this purpose the proceeding must be against the officers or corporators, and not against the corporation itself. Chicago v. People, 80 Ill. 496.

That the information does not lie against a public officer or municipal corporation for a particular illegal act, see People v. Whitcomb, 55 Ill. 172; High on Extraordinary Remedies, secs. 618 (and note 6), 636, 686, 690 (and note 1); State v. Lyons, 31 Iowa, 432; State v. Chahaba, 30 Ala. 66; Cleaver v. Commonwealth, 34 Pa. St. 283.

The statute (Hurd's Stat. 1880, p. 800,) does not extend the remedy to cases like the present, because the phrase, “powers not conferred by law,” occurring in section 1, refers to usurped franchises, not powers to do particular acts. This is the construction given to the precisely similar statute of Indiana. State v. Kilbrick T. Co. 38 Ind. 71.

The statute was never intended to apply to public corporations, the judgment authorized by section 6 being inapplicable to such corporations. Chicago v. People, 80 Ill. 511.

The information in the nature of a quo warranto, under our statute, is in effect a criminal prosecution. The judgment imposes punishment by fine or ouster, or both, and hence the present proceeding is entirely misdirected. If a penalty for misconduct is to be inflicted, it should fall upon the members of the board, and not upon the corporation. Donelly v. People, 11 Ill. 552; People v. M. and A. R. R. Co. 13 Id. 66; Wight v. People, 15 Id. 417; Lavalle v. People, 68 Id. 252; Attorney General v. Barstow, 4 Wis. 803. Again, it is settled that this proceeding does not lie to avoid the legislative action of a municipal body. High on Extraordinary Remedies, 689; State v. Lyons, 31 Iowa, 432.

Again, this remedy lies only when there is no other remedy. High on Extraordinary Remedies, 643, 645.

In this case mandamus lies. Trustees v. People, 87 Ill. 303.

Action lies for damages. Rulison v. Post, 79 Ill. 567.

Indictment lies. Rev. Stat. 1874, p. 983, secs. 100, 101.

Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE CRAIG delivered the opinion of the Court:

This was an information in the nature of a quo warranto, brought by the Attorney General, on the relation of John Longress, against the Board of Education of the City of Quincy, a corporation created by an act of the General Assembly, approved February 20, 1861. Private Laws of 1861, page 252. The board of education is entrusted by law with the exclusive management and control of the public schools in the city of Quincy.

It is alleged in the information, that the board of education did, on, to-wit, the 31st day of July, 1878, divide the city of Quincy into eight districts, suitable and convenient for the inhabitants of the city, and did establish and maintain in each of said districts an efficient and suitable public school, for the accommodation of all the bona fide residents of each of the districts between the ages of six and twenty-one years, and by proper rules providing that no pupil shall enter a school out of the district in which he or she resides, without permission of the superintendent, and that pupils, to be entitled to admission in any of the public schools, must be between the ages of six and twenty-one years, and bona fide residents of the city; and no pupil can be admitted into any public school without furnishing evidence to the principal that he or she has been vaccinated, or otherwise secured against the small-pox. It is also averred in the information, that on the 31st day of July, 1878, before that time and since, there was a large number, to-wit, five hundred persons of African descent, commonly called “colored persons,” between the ages of six and twenty-one years, who for all that time have been and are now bona fide residents of said city of Quincy, and in the several school districts thereof, and have been and are at all times, and are now, ready to furnish to the principal of the proper school satisfactory evidence that they have been vaccinated; and the said persons do now reside, and at all times heretofore have in good faith resided, in the different school districts of said city so established by the said The Board of Education of the City of Quincy, and are entitled to be admitted into the public schools of the districts in which they respectively reside, without being directly or indirectly excluded therefrom on account of their descent or color; yet the said The Board of Education of the City of Quincy, during all the time aforesaid, without warrant or authority of law, have adopted, maintained and enforced, for the management of the public schools of said city, and to exclude the said persons of African descent, commonly called “colored persons,” from the said public schools in the districts in which they reside, on account of their descent and color, the following pretended rules and regulations for the government and management of the public schools of said city, that is to say: “That the colored schools of said city shall be composed of colored pupils who shall be of the prescribed age, and bona fide residents of said city; that no pupil of African descent shall be permitted to attend any of the public schools of the city other than the colored schools, and that all the colored pupils in said city shall attend a certain public school in said city, called the Lincoln school, and no other.” All of which pretended rules and regulations for the government and management of said public schools in said city, the said The Board of Education of the said City of Quincy, without authority of law, do maintain and enforce, to the damage of the People of the State of Illinois, and against the peace and dignity of the same.

The board of education filed five pleas to the information, to which the Attorney General interposed a demurrer, which the court carried back and sustained to the information, and this decision of the court is assigned for error.

Whether a proceeding in the nature of a quo warranto, instituted by the Attorney General, will lie in a case of this character at common law, is a question which it will not be necessary to determine. The object of the proceeding was to test the legality of the rules adopted by the board of education, and if the statute is broad enough to authorize the court to inquire into the action of the board in adopting and enforcing the rules which excluded children of color from the public schools, then the information was proper, and the court erred in sustaining the demurrer.

Sec. 1, chap. 112, Rev. Stat. 1874, p. 787, provides, “that in case any person shall usurp, intrude into, or unlawfully hold or execute any office or franchise, * * * or any corporation does or omits any act which amounts to a surrender or forfeiture of its rights and privileges as a corporation, or exercises powers not conferred by law, * * * the Attorney General, or State's attorney of the proper county, either of his own accord or at the instance of any individual relator, may present a petition to any court of record of competent jurisdiction, or any judge thereof, in vacation, for leave to file an information in the nature of a quo warranto, * * * and if such court or judge shall be satisfied that there is probable ground for the proceeding, the court or judge may grant the petition,” etc.

The board of education is a corporation created by law, clothed with the exercise of certain powers in relation to the public schools of Quincy. Now, if the board, in the discharge of its duties as a corporation, exercises powers not conferred by law, it is apparent that it will fall within the obvious meaning of the statute, unless the plain reading of the statute is to be disregarded. The very gist of the complaint here is, that the board of education, a corporation, is exercising powers not conferred by law, unless it had the right to adopt and enforce the rules set out in the information. We are therefore clearly of opinion that, under the statute, the Attorney General had the right to file the information.

This brings us to a consideration of the rules adopted and enforced by the board.

The board of education of the city of Quincy can exercise such powers, and only such, as are conferred upon it by the constitution and laws of the State. The inquiry then is, whether the rules adopted and enforced by the board, which exclude children of African descent from admission to the public schools which are provided for white children, are authorized by the laws of the State. It will not be necessary to determine what rights colored children had in our public schools prior to the adoption of our present constitution, as this case must be controlled by the terms of that instrument and the legislation which has followed since its adoption and ratification by the people.

Sec. 1, of art. 8, of the constitution of 1870, declares: “The...

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