Teter v. Teter

• Decision Date: 21 March 1885
• Docket Number: 11,619
• Citation: 101 Ind. 129
• Parties: Teter v. Teter
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

101 Ind. 129

Teter v. Teter

No. 11,619

Supreme Court of Indiana

March 21, 1885

From the Hamilton Circuit Court.

Judgment reversed.

R Graham, J. S. Frazer, W. D. Frazer, T. J. Kane and T. P Davis, for appellant.

R. R Stephenson, L. O. Clifford, G. Shirts and W. R. Fertig, for appellee.

OPINION

Elliott, J.

William H. Clayton and Mrs. Hannah A. Teter, a widow, entered into a contract of marriage, and on the 18th day of May, 1871, a license was obtained from the clerk and the marriage duly solemnized. Clayton had been previously married, but he believed, in good faith, that the former marriage had been dissolved, and there were reasonable grounds for this belief, for he had been so informed by those who were in a situation to possess full information, and the announcement that a divorce was granted was in fact made, and was noted on the record of the court of common pleas of Muskingum county, Ohio, in a suit brought by his former wife. The decree, however, was never formally entered, and the suit was dismissed because of a failure to pay the costs. Mrs. Teter believed that there was no impediment to the marriage between her and Clayton, and the evidence leads to the inference that she died in that belief. The parties lived and cohabited together as husband and wife; they were so regarded by the community; they so held themselves out; a mortgage was executed by them as husband and wife; a child, the appellee, was born to them in October, 1874, received his father's name, and was always recognized as the child of lawful wedlock. In September, 1871, Clayton's former wife, Dora, did obtain a decree of divorce in the Greene Circuit Court of this State, and he testified that neither he nor the appellee's mother had reason to believe that there was any legal impediment to their marriage; that they continued to live together as husband and wife until her death, in 1877; but he also testified that they were married but once, and that this was on the 18th of May, 1871. Mrs. Teter, at the time of her marriage to Clayton, held the land in controversy in virtue of her first marriage with George H. Teter, who died in 1863, leaving as his heirs his wife, Hannah A. Teter, and his son, John H. Teter, the appellant.

The appellee's contention is that the marriage of his mother to his father, William H. Clayton, was absolutely void; that the land which descended to her from her first husband remained in her, and that he inherits it as her illegitimate child. The appellant's contention is that there was a marriage, and that his mother was Clayton's wife at the time of her death, and that the land is his, under the rule that the children of the first husband inherit to the exclusion of the children of a second marriage, in cases where the mother dies during the second marriage the owner of land vested in her by descent from her first husband. This rule was approved when the case was in this court for the first time. Teter v. Clayton, 71 Ind. 237. At that time the appellee asserted his legitimacy, and claimed title, as a legitimate child, through a decree rendered in a partition suit, but he was defeated upon the ground that a decree in partition does not create title.

The appellee's success in this case depends upon the establishment of his own illegitimacy and his parent's shame. It will also require that we give to our statute an operation that will place the child of adulterous intercourse in a better position than one born in lawful wedlock, for, if the mother's illegitimate child be declared her heir, he takes a better position than a legitimate child, and succeeds to property vested in her in virtue of her first marriage, and partially excludes the child of the man through whom she derived her title, and he thus secures a more favored position than a child of a second lawful marriage can possibly attain. The effect of such a doctrine would be to favor children born bastards, to the exclusion of the issue of a lawful marriage. Public policy and justice seem to require that a child of adulterous intercourse should not be more highly favored than the child of lawful wedlock. The policy of our legislation is to keep the property vested in the wife by virtue of her first marriage beyond the reach of a second husband, and, surely, this policy ought to extend to the influence of a paramour, who has gained her affections. If the law with sedulous care guards the wife against the influence of a second husband, it should guard her with no less vigilance against that of a man whose relationship is as close as that of a husband, but is unsanctioned by morality or law. These considerations are important here, even though we do not undertake to follow them to their ultimate results, for they impress us, as they must every one, with the wisdom and justice of the rule, that the presumption in favor of matrimony is one of the strongest known to the law. This presumption we stated and enforced when the case was last here, and we are not now inclined to relax its force or remit its rigor in the slightest degree. Teter v. Teter, 88 Ind. 494. Where the child of the first marriage asserts the validity of his mother's second marriage, and a child born to her of an asserted marriage with another man affirms its invalidity, and that he is himself the offspring of an adulterous connection, the presumption should be extended to its utmost verge.

In the last decision made by this court in this controversy, it was held that there was no valid decree of divorce rendered by the court of common pleas of Muskingum county, in the suit instituted by Clayton's former wife, for the reason that the suit was dismissed before a final judgment had been entered, and we were bound to presume that the judgment of dismissal was right. It was also held that the decision in Light v. Lane, 41 Ind. 539, required us to decide that if the man had a living wife, his subsequent marriage was void. We held further, that the presumption in favor of the validity of marriage in cases where the parties acted in good faith and cohabited as husband and wife, believing that there was a valid marriage, was one of very great strength, and that it was not overcome by the evidence adduced on the former hearing. We did not decide what evidence would be sufficient to overcome that presumption; we did no more than decide that the evidence then before us did not do it. In affirming that evidence is not sufficient to carry down a presumption, it is neither expressly nor impliedly affirmed that a certain quantity or quality of evidence will do it. In affirming that a certain quantity of powder is not sufficient to propel a ball to a given point, there is no determination of the question of how much will be required to carry the ball to that point. In deciding that there is not sufficient evidence to establish guilt, a court does not necessarily decide what evidence will produce that result. The question now presented was not settled by the former decision.

It is important to ascertain the status of the person who asserts the validity of the marriage. In this case the person who does this is free from all taint of wrong; he is asserting his mother's innocence of evil, and maintaining his right to property acquired by his father. If any right is lost to him it results from no wrong of his, but solely from the misconduct of another. He is, therefore, in a position to insist upon a full and broad application of the rule, that "the law presumes morality, and not immorality marriage, and not concubinage; legitimacy, and not bastardy." Hynes v. McDermott, 91 N.Y. 451; S. C., 43 Am. R. 677. The son of the former marriage occupies a much more favorable position than one who had been guilty of either positive wrong or culpable negligence. It would be a wide departure from the true principles of justice to allow him to be shorn of his rights because his mother had been guilty of a moral wrong, and such a result should be avoided unless the clear words of a statute, or long settled rules of law, compel the courts to go to that length. It would be difficult to find any principle of natural justice...