State ex rel. Hord v. Board of Comm'rs of Washington County

• Decision Date: 19 March 1885
• Docket Number: 12,072
• Citation: 101 Ind. 69
• Parties: The State, ex rel. Hord, Attorney General, v. The Board of Commissioners of Washington County
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

101 Ind. 69

The State, ex rel. Hord, Attorney General, v. The Board of Commissioners of Washington County

No. 12,072

Supreme Court of Indiana

March 19, 1885

From the Washington Circuit Court.

The judgment is affirmed, with costs.

F. T Hord, Attorney General, for appellant.

S. B Voyles and L. C. Embree, for appellee.

OPINION

Howk J.

On the 5th day of June, 1884, the State of Indiana, by the Hon Francis T. Hord, its attorney general, presented to and filed with the appellee, for allowance, three separate demands, each containing "a detailed statement of the items and dates of charge," against such appellee. Of these demands, the first was for the aggregate sum of $ 1,282.96, the second was for the aggregate sum of $ 1,617.53, and the third was for the aggregate sum of $ 146. The county board refused to allow the demands or any part thereof, and adjudged that the appellant take nothing thereby, and that the relator "pay all costs herein." From this judgment of the county board, the State, by its attorney general, appealed to the circuit court of Washington county. There the appellee by its counsel appeared and answered, in four paragraphs, the appellant's cause of action. Of these paragraphs of answer, the first was a general denial and was subsequently withdrawn; to the second paragraph, the appellant's demurrer was sustained by the court, and to the third and fourth paragraphs of answer, the appellant's demurrers for the alleged insufficiency of the facts therein were overruled by the court. The appellant refused to reply to the third and fourth paragraphs of answer; and thereupon it was adjudged that the appellant take nothing by its suit, and that appellee recover of the relator its costs herein.

The overruling of its demurrers to the third and fourth paragraphs of appellee's answer are the only errors assigned here by the appellant.

In the third paragraph of its answer, the appellee alleged that Daniel P. Baldwin, Esq., was the immediate predecessor of the relator, as attorney general of the State of Indiana, and, on June 6th, 1882, the appellant upon the relation of said Baldwin, as its attorney general, presented and filed the same claims and demands, now in suit, before the board of commissioners of Washington county; that upon such demands and items an issue was made on the day last named before such board, in regular session; that, by the consideration of such board, such items and demands were then tried and refused, and judgment was then rendered by such board, that the appellant take nothing by its suit, and that the relator, Baldwin, should pay the costs therein; that from such judgment no appeal was ever successfully taken, and such judgment was still in force; and that in the determination of the matters involved in such former suit, the matters and demands now in suit were fully and finally adjudicated and settled. Wherefore, etc.

In the fourth paragraph of its answer, the appellee alleged that, on December 4th, 1883, appellant, upon the relation of Francis T. Hord, Esq., its attorney general, presented and filed the same claims, items and demands, now in suit, before the board of commissioners of Washington county, for allowance and payment; that on such claims, items and demands, an issue was formed on the day last named before such board in regular session; that, after trial and hearing, such board rendered judgment of record, which stood unappealed from and unreversed, that the appellant take nothing by its suit, and that the relator pay the costs therein; and that upon such hearing of said cause, on the day last named, the same claims, items and demands, now in suit, were fully and finally considered, adjudicated and set at rest. Wherefore, etc.

The only objections which can be urged, with any degree of plausibility, to these paragraphs of answer, are, that under the laws of this State a board of county commissioners is not a court, or that, if a court, it can not sit in judgment upon a claim against the county, because, in its corporate capacity, the board is the county. Both these objections are strenuously urged upon our consideration, in the case in hand, and have been ably and elaborately discussed by the learned attorney general, in his exhaustive brief of this cause. It seems to us too late to claim that the board of commissioners of a county is not, in this State, a court. In section 1, of article 7, of the Constitution of 1851 (section 161, R. S. 1881), it is declared that "The judicial power of the State shall be vested in a Supreme Court, in circuit courts, and in such inferior courts as the General Assembly may establish." On March 14th, 1881, this section was amended by omitting the word "inferior," where it occurs, and by substituting, in its place, the word "other." In the first session of the General Assembly, after the adoption of the Constitution of 1851, largely composed of members of the convention which framed the Constitution, provision was made by law for the organization in each county of a board of commissioners of the county, and by that and other laws, then and since passed, such boards have been clothed with original jurisdiction and judicial power over a large class of cases, materially...