Woodruff v. State
Decision Date | 21 December 1904 |
Docket Number | 13,659 |
Citation | 101 N.W. 1114,72 Neb. 815 |
Parties | LOUIS F. WOODRUFF v. STATE OF NEBRASKA |
Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
ERROR to the district court for York county: BENJAMIN F. GOOD JUDGE. Affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
France & France, for plaintiff in error.
Frank N. Prout, Attorney General, Norris Brown and Meeker & Wray contra.
On a trial to the court and a jury upon an information filed by the county attorney, the defendant was by the verdict of the jury found guilty of the crime charged; and, after the overruling of a motion for a new trial, he was by the court sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for a period of four years. To secure a reversal of the judgment thus imposed, the defendant has prosecuted proceedings in error in this court. The charging part of the information is that Section 12 of the criminal code declares: "If any male person, of the age of 18 years or upwards, shall carnally know or abuse any female child under the age of 18 years, with her consent, unless such female child so known and abused is over 15 years of age and previously unchaste, every such person so offending shall be deemed guilty of a rape." The gravamen of the offense charged under the section defining the crime is the unlawful sexual intercourse by a male person over 18 years of age with a female child under the age of consent. In the case at bar, the prosecutrix being over 15 years of age, her alleged previous chastity was put in issue, and evidence was introduced for the purpose of showing she was previously unchaste, and as a complete defense to the crime charged. With these preliminary observations we proceed to a consideration of the more important of the alleged errors which are assigned and argued as grounds for a reversal of the judgment of conviction. The errors complained of are confined almost wholly to the rulings of the trial court on the admission and rejection of evidence and its instructions to the jury.
1. It is assigned as error that defendant's substantial rights were prejudiced because of the many leading questions permitted to be propounded to the prosecutrix over objections, and by that means eliciting answers favorable to the prosecution in support of the charge preferred. We find upon examining the record that many of the questions complained of as leading do not in fact suggest or lead to the answer desired. While they may be answered by yes or no, they are not necessarily for that reason to be regarded as leading. Some are preliminary in their nature and as such, even though leading, are permissible. Others, after the prosecutrix had narrated all the facts in response to questions leading up to and including the commission of the crime charged, to the form of which we see no valid objections, were for the purpose of furnishing technical proof of the alleged unlawful act. Some of these questions which were permitted to be asked and answered may have been, and probably were, in a measure, of a leading character, but regarding which we are satisfied no abuse of discretion was committed by the trial court in suffering the examination to be pursued in the manner in which it was. It is, say all the authorities, discretionary with the trial court in both civil and criminal cases to allow leading questions on the direct examination; the discretion, of course, being a legal one and subject to proper limitations. Stephen, Digest of the Law of Evidence, 445, and note; McKelvey, Evidence, sec. 237, and notes. In Edwards v. State, 69 Neb. 386, 95 N.W. 1038, it is held that the trial court has a large, though not unlimited, discretion in granting or refusing permission to ask a witness leading questions. In support of the rule there is cited in the opinion, Schmelling v. State, 57 Neb. 562, 78 N.W. 279, and Welsh v. State, 60 Neb. 101, 82 N.W. 368. We are satisfied that no serious error was committed by the trial court in respect of the matter complained of.
2. It is next contended that error prejudicial to the defendant was committed in permitting the prosecutrix to testify as she did to subsequent acts of illicit intercourse, which occurred at frequent intervals soon after the commission of the crime charged in the information. As we have noted, the essence of the offense is the unlawful sexual intercourse. The reason for the rule which should govern in respect to the admissibility of evidence to prove the charge ought not, it would seem, to be essentially different from evidence admissible to prove the crime of adultery or seduction. In the case of Way v. State, 5 Neb. 283, it is held that, on a charge of adultery, evidence of improper familiarities between the parties, both anterior and subsequent to the time the offense is charged, may be received as corroborating proof, after evidence has been offered tending to prove the offense charged. In the opinion it is said:
"There is no doubt of the conflict of authorities upon the question, but upon an examination of it, we are of the opinion that the better rule in prosecutions for adultery is, to admit testimony of improper familiarities between the parties, occurring both before and after the time the act is charged, as corroborating evidence." Citing with approval, Thayer v. Thayer, 101 Mass. 111.
This rule has been held applicable to cases such as the one under consideration, in California, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, North Carolina, Tennessee, Washington and Wisconsin.
In State v. King, 117 Iowa 484, 91 N.W. 768, it is said:
In State v. Fetterly, 33 Wash. 599, 74 P. 810, the court say:
The Wisconsin supreme court say:
Lanphere v. State, 114 Wis. 193, 89 N.W. 128. See, also, People v. Mathews, 73 P. 416; State v. Robertson, 121 N.C. 551, 28 S.E. 59; Smith v. Commonwealth, 109 Ky. 685, 60 S.W. 531; Sykes v. State, 112 Tenn. 572, 82 S.W. 185; and State v. Borchert, 68 Kan. 360, 74 P. 1108.
We are satisfied that consistency and sound reason require the extension of the rule announced in Way v. State supra, to a case like the one under consideration, and that the greater weight of authority, as well as the better reasoning, supports the rule. The fact, if it be one, that the evidence tends to prove another and independent crime does not necessarily determine its admissibility as evidence of the crime charged in the case at bar. The determinative question is, is it relevant and pertinent in establishing the offense charged, and does it throw some light on that controversy and assist in the ascertainment of the truth in respect of such charge? We feel confident in the correctness of our position in saying that it does; and, if believed, the evidence is corroborative of the ultimate fact sought to be proved; that is, the act of sexual intercourse as charged in the information. It is also in this connection contended that the court erred in permitting the prosecutrix to testify that at the time of the commission of the alleged offense, and immediately before the act of sexual intercourse, the accused said he would marry the prosecutrix if he got her into any trouble. W...
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