Tuigg v. Sheehan

Decision Date20 November 1882
Citation101 Pa. 363
PartiesTuigg <I>versus</I> Sheehan.
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

Before SHARSWOOD, C. J., MERCUR, GORDON, PAXSON, TRUNKEY, STERRETT and GREEN, JJ.

ERROR to the Court of Common Pleas No. 2 of Allegheny county: Of October Term 1882 No. 66.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Charles F. McKenna (with him John Barton), for plaintiff in error.—It is well settled in Pennsylvania that in matters of faith, morals and discipline, churches are free to act and legislate, without interference of the civil courts; their jurisdiction over church questions being restricted to matters relating to property. The civil courts therefore have no jurisdiction in this case: German Reformed Church v. Commonwealth, 3 Barr 282; Henderson v. Hunter, 9 Sm. 343; Cheeney v. Bishop of Ill., 58 Ill. 509. No promise to support the plaintiff below, or to pay him a salary, was found to have been made by the defendant. On the contrary, an express refusal by the bishop to do so was found by the court. The relations of bishop and clergy imply no promise of support upon which a contract can be based, which will sustain an action of assumpsit: Ross v. Vertin, 46 Mich. 457. If Father Sheehan should violate his vows of perpetual service to the diocese, or of celibacy, or his promise to refrain from secular pursuits, it would hardly be contended that assumpsit would lie against him by the bishop for his failure to fulfill his obligations to the church. It is evidence, therefore, that the element of mutuality, so essential to contracts in civil law, does not exist in this case.

Thomas M. Marshall and A. S. D. Watterson, for defendant in error.—At his ordination, a priest renounces his right to perform secular labor and promises to hold himself subject to the call of the bishop, for church duties. In return, a title to decent support is guaranteed him. This is an essential without which, by the laws of the church, ordination is impossible. America being a missionary jurisdiction, having no benefices, the priest must look to the bishop for this support; and there is an implied contract between a bishop and a priest that the bishop shall supply him with the means of existence. For the breach of this contract assumpsit will lie. A priest's title, is property which can only be taken from him by trial, conviction and sentence: Stack v. O'Hara, 2 Out. 213.

(The canon law bearing on this case was cited at great length in the paper books.)

Mr. Justice PAXSON delivered the opinion of the court, November 20th 1882.

This case has been so completely buried under a load of ecclesiastical lore that at first sight it would seem to present several points of apparent difficulty. When, however, it is examined critically, the supposed difficulties disappear, and the only real question in controversy can be disposed of by the application of a few well understood principles of law.

The case below was this: The plaintiff, Rev. Patrick M. Sheehan, is a priest connected with the catholic church, and brought an action of assumpsit against the defendant, the Rt. Rev. John Tuigg, bishop of the diocese of Pittsburgh, to recover the sum of $2400, being three years' salary as priest, at the rate of $800 per year. The suit was not based upon actual services, for it was conceded that during the period within which compensation was claimed no services had been performed, but upon the duty to support its priests which it was alleged was a part of the law of the catholic church. The statute law of the diocese as found by the learned court below fixes the salary of a priest in charge of a parish at $800 per annum, the amount claimed by the plaintiff. The court held that he could not recover this salary under the statute but awarded him the sum of $800 for the three years under "the common law of the church which guarantees him a decent support."

It appears from the facts found by the court that about the close of the year 1870, the plaintiff resigned his congregation or mission at Cameron's Bottom, Indiana county, Pa., on account of ill health. The resignation was accepted by Rev. John Hickey, who was at that time administrator of the diocese. Subsequently, Father Hickey gave the plaintiff leave of absence until his health should be restored. He was absent until 1875 and returned to Pittsburgh in October of that year. Bishop Domenec was at that time bishop of the diocese of Pittsburgh. From 1875, up to the consecration of the defendant as bishop of this diocese, some negotiations appear to have been going on with a view of assigning the plaintiff to some ecclesiastical duty. Nothing came of it however, and after the date of Bishop Tuigg's consecration the plaintiff applied to him by letter, and otherwise for an appointment to a mission or congregation. This request was refused by the bishop for the reasons: 1st. That the plaintiff was not a member of the diocese of Pittsburgh, but properly belonged to Allegheny: and 2d. That the bishop was not satisfied of plaintiff's fitness for the charge of a congregation, and required some evidence on that point, especially of his deportment during his absence from the diocese. It appears that the bishop had evidence that during plaintiff's absence "his course of life had not been regular." After this refusal of Bishop Tuigg, the plaintiff wrote to Archbishop Wood of Philadelphia, to intercede in his behalf, but without effect. He then went to Rome and made an informal complaint against the bishop. He remained in Rome until 1878. While there, Bishop Tuigg received three letters from the Prefect of the Propaganda in Rome, in which reference was made to the plaintiff's irregular habits. The plaintiff left Rome in 1878, stopped a few days in London, landed in New York, where he remained for several weeks and then went to his mother's in Virginia, where he resided until the following spring. He came to Pittsburgh in June 1879, and made another demand upon the bishop for work or a support and was refused. Whereupon he brought this suit against him, claiming three years' salary.

The learned court further found that "the plaintiff was not tried and convicted of any offence; he was not notified of any charges or complaints against him; he was not removed from any mission, congregation or post; nor was he formally suspended from the office, functions, rights or privileges of a priest. He was simply denied an appointment to any work, and refused any support by the defendant, on the ground that plaintiff was not a priest of the diocese, or if he was, he was unfit to have charge of a mission or congregation."

That the defendant acted in entire good faith and from conscientious motives is not only shown by the evidence but is found by the court below. The learned judge says in the conclusion of his findings of facts: "I take great pleasure in saying, and so find, if it be material, that there is no evidence that Bishop Tuigg, in the treatment of the plaintiff, was influenced by any personal, hostile or unkind feeling toward him. He acted from a conscientious sense...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT