U.S. v. I.D.P.

• Decision Date: 31 December 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-6743,95-6743
• Parties: 10 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 603 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. I.D.P., a male juvenile, W.L.G., a male juvenile, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 507

102 F.3d 507

10 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 603

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. I.D.P., a male juvenile, W.L.G., a male juvenile,

Defendants-Appellants.

No. 95-6743.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Dec. 31, 1996.

Carlos Williams, Asst. Federal Public Defender, Mobile, AL, for I.D.P.

Cindy W. Powell, Knizely & Powell, Mobile, AL, for W.L.G.

Maria E. Murphy, Asst. U.S. Atty., Mobile, AL, for U.S.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama.

Before TJOFLAT and BIRCH, Circuit Judges, and SMITH ^*, Senior Circuit Judge.

BIRCH, Circuit Judge:

This appeal presents two issues of first impression in this circuit pertaining to the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 ("the Act"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5042. We must resolve: (1) whether the government's certification that an offense committed by a juvenile presents a substantial federal interest giving rise to federal jurisdiction is subject to judicial review, and (2) the government's burden of proof before the district court as to whether the interests of justice militate in favor of a juvenile's transfer to adult status. In addition, we must decide whether the particular facts of this case support the district court's order that the appellants be tried as adults. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 22, 1995, the government filed a three-count information charging I.D.P. and W.L.G. with armed robbery of a motor vehicle ("carjacking"), conspiracy, and use of a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2119, 2, 5032, 371, and 924(c). It is undisputed that both I.D.P. and W.L.G. were juveniles at the time they allegedly committed these offenses. ¹ The following recitation of facts underlying the charges against I.D.P. and W.L.G. are assumed to be true solely for the limited purpose of this appeal: On April 20, 1995, I.D.P. and W.L.G. approached a parked truck in which two teenagers sat. W.L.G. pulled the individual seated in the passenger side out of the truck, while I.D.P. pointed a gun at the driver and ordered him to get out of the truck. Shortly thereafter, I.D.P. and W.L.G. drove the stolen vehicle to a grocery store accompanied by another juvenile. I.D.P. and the other juvenile went into the store, demanded money from a cashier, and shot the cashier in the abdomen when she did not immediately accede to their request. The cashier was pregnant at the time I.D.P. shot her. Another cashier gave I.D.P. and his companion the money they had demanded.

On the same date on which the information against I.D.P. and W.L.G. was filed, the government moved to proceed against each juvenile as an adult. Consistent with the requirements set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 5032, the United States Attorney filed with the district court (1) a certification stating that the offenses with which I.D.P. and W.L.G. were charged were felonies and crimes of violence and that there was a substantial federal interest to warrant the exercise of federal jurisdiction, and (2) certified copies of each defendant's state juvenile record. I.D.P. and W.L.G. each moved to dismiss the information for lack of federal jurisdiction, claiming that certification was improper due to the lack of a substantial federal interest. Following a court-ordered psychological examination of each defendant, the court conducted a closed hearing on each party's pending motion.

The court denied the motions to dismiss after finding not only that the government's certification was not subject to judicial review, but that even if the court were to review the certification, the crime of carjacking--particularly under the violent circumstances existing in this case--presented a substantial federal interest.

The court next analyzed, again pursuant to the terms set forth by federal statute, the age, social background, and psychological maturity level of each juvenile, the nature of the offenses with which they were charged, their respective juvenile delinquency records, their respective responses to past treatment, and the availability of programs designed to treat their particular behavioral problems. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032. Based on its findings, the court determined that the government had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the interests of justice weighed more heavily in favor of transfer to adult status. Accordingly, the court granted the government's motion to transfer with respect to both I.D.P. and W.L.G.

I.D.P. and W.L.G. appeal the district court's determination that they be tried as adults. Specifically, they contend that (1) there is no basis for federal jurisdiction because the government's certification erroneously characterized the carjacking offense at issue in this case as giving rise to a "substantial federal interest," (2) assuming certification was proper, the government should have been required to show by clear and convincing evidence--rather than by a preponderance of the evidence--that transfer to adult status was proper, and (3) the district court abused its discretion in concluding, based on the statutory factors and the particularized facts of this case, that these individuals should be tried as adults.

The government argues that certification is an administrative decision that rests solely within the discretion of the Attorney General and, therefore, is isolated from judicial review. The government further suggests that even if we were to review the certification, the carjacking offense that occurred in this instance implicates a substantial federal interest sufficient to warrant the exercise of federal jurisdiction. Finally, the government submits that the district court properly evaluated and balanced the applicable statutory factors in reaching its determination that transfer to adult status was justified with respect to both defendants.

II. DISCUSSION

As a preliminary matter, a brief overview of the applicable provisions of the Act is necessary to our examination of the questions presented in this appeal. To commence a juvenile prosecution in federal district court, the Act mandates that the government file with the court certified copies of the charged individual's state juvenile records. In addition, the Attorney General or her delegate ² must certify, after investigation, that (1) the juvenile court or other appropriate court of a State does not have jurisdiction or refuses to assume jurisdiction over said juvenile with respect to [the] alleged act of juvenile delinquency, (2) the State does not have available programs and services adequate for the needs of juveniles, or (3) the offense charged is a crime of violence that is a felony ... and that there is a substantial Federal interest in the case of the offense to warrant the exercise of Federal jurisdiction.

18 U.S.C. § 5032. Here, the government chose to proceed against both W.L.G. and I.D.P. under the third category provided by the statute and certified to the court that "the offenses charged against W.L.G., and I.D.P., male juveniles, are felony crimes of violence and there is a substantial federal interest in this case or the offenses to warrant the exercise of federal jurisdiction." R2-7.

Although the government's certification to the court is necessary to invoke federal jurisdiction, the decision regarding whether to transfer a juvenile to adult status ultimately rests with the court. ³ Once the government moves for such a transfer, transfer is appropriate only if the court finds, after a hearing, that a transfer would be in the interest of justice. The statute details the considerations that the court must take into account in reaching its decision:

Evidence of the following factors shall be considered, and findings with regard to each factor shall be made in the record, in assessing whether a transfer would be in the interest of justice: the age and social background of the juvenile; the nature of the alleged offense; the extent and nature of the juvenile's prior delinquency record; the juvenile's present intellectual development and psychological maturity; the nature of past treatment efforts and the juvenile's response to such efforts; the availability of programs designed to treat the juvenile's behavioral problems.

18 U.S.C. § 5032. While the court is statutorily required to make findings with respect to all enumerated factors, it remains within the court's discretion to determine what weight to give to each one. United States v. Doe, 871 F.2d 1248, 1254-55 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 917, 110 S.Ct. 276, 107 L.Ed.2d 257 (1989).

Again, it is important to emphasize that the government's certification to the court regarding the statutory classifications necessary to invoke federal jurisdiction is distinct from--and in no way dispositive of--the question of whether a juvenile should be tried as an adult. See United States v. Juvenile Male # 1, 86 F.3d 1314, 1317 n. 4 (4th Cir.1996) quoting S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 389 n. 10) (1983) ("Only if the criteria for retaining federal jurisdiction over a juvenile in the first instance ... are met, may there then be consideration of whether Federal prosecution, as opposed to a Federal juvenile delinquency proceeding, is appropriate.") Before reaching the issue of whether the district court properly concluded that the interest of justice weighed in favor of trying W.L.G. and I.D.P. as adults, therefore, we first must decide whether the government's certification that endows the federal court with jurisdiction over this case is subject to judicial review.

A. Certification

In United States v. C.G., 736 F.2d 1474 (11th Cir.1984), we examined whether the Attorney General's certification necessary to invoke federal jurisdiction under either of the first two statutorily prescribed categories--in other words, that the state either does not have or refuses to assume jurisdiction over a juvenile or, in...