Burkhard v. Travellers' Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 01 October 1883
• Citation: 102 Pa. 262
• Parties: Burkhard <I>versus</I> Travellers' Insurance Company of Hartford, Conn.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

102 Pa. 262

Burkhard versus Travellers' Insurance Company of Hartford, Conn.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

January 31, 1883.

October 1, 1883.

January 31st 1883.

Before MERCUR, C. J., GORDON, PAXSON, TRUNKEY, STERRETT, GREEN and CLARK, JJ.

ERROR to the Court of Common Pleas No. 2, of Philadelphia county: Of January Term 1883, No. 137.

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Henry D. Wireman, for the plaintiff in error.—This was an "accident" policy; the condition against voluntary exposure to unnecessary danger, as construed by the court below, is such a limitation of the principal intent of both parties to the contract, that it is void as against the policy of the law. But it is not necessary to strike down the condition, if it is construed in the manner we contend for, which is, that the act of the deceased in stepping off the train was not a voluntary exposure to unnecessary danger, within the meaning of the condition. The stepping off the train was voluntary, but the deceased had no knowledge or notice of its being dangerous. He did not know that there was a hole in the bridge, and if the hole had not been there, there would have been no danger. His intended act was to step on the bridge, not into danger; the exposure to danger, being unintentional, was not voluntary: Schneider v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 24 Wis. 28; North American Ins. Co. v. Burroughs, 19 P. F. S. 43; Trew v. Railway Passenger Ins. Co., 6 Hurl. & Nor. 839; Penfold v. Universal Life Ins. Co., 85 N. Y. 317; Theobald v. Railway Passenger Assurance Co., 26 Eng. L. & Eq. Rep. 432.

Wayne Mac Veagh, for the defendant in error.—If jumping off a train when stopped at night on a bridge, without seeing where he would alight, is not "voluntary exposure to unnecessary danger," it is difficult to imagine what would be. It is vain to say that because the deceased did not certainly know he would fall into an abyss, that he did not voluntarily encounter the danger. That he did not certainly know that there was an absence of danger is sufficient — the violent presumption under such circumstances is that such an act is dangerous. All the authorities, except Schneider v. Provident Life Ins. Co., quoted by the other side, support this view: Morel v. Mississipi Valley Ins. Co., 4 Bush 535; Lovell v. Accident Ins. Co., 3 Ins. Law Jour. 877; Hoffman v. Travellers' Ins. Co., cited 7 Am. L. Review 594; May on Insurance, §§ 530, 531, 534; Sawtelle v. Railway Passenger Assurance Co., 15 Blatch. 216. Even if the deceased had stepped on the bridge, as it is alleged he intended to do, and been injured thereon, he would have been directly within the other prohibition of the policy against "walking or being on the road-bed or bridge of any railway."

Chief Justice MERCUR delivered the opinion of the court October 1st 1883.

This case arises on a contract of insurance against injuries and death through external, violent, and accidental means. The death of the intestate was so caused. The general terms of the policy are broad enough to make the company liable. It claims exemption therefrom under certain exceptions in the policy. What rule then must be applied in the interpretation of this contract and its exceptions?

The true principle of sound ethics, says Chancellor KENT, is to give the contract the sense in which the person making the promise believes the other party to have accepted it. A just sense should be exercised in so interpreting it as to give due and fair effect to its provisions: 2 Kent's Com. 557. When a party uses an expression of his liability having two meanings, one broader and the other more narrow, and each equally probable, he cannot, after an acceptance by the other contracting party, set up the narrow construction: 2 Whar. on Con. § 670. Hence, when an insurance company tenders a policy to a party seeking to be insured, and uses in the policy ambiguous words, these words will be held to have the meaning most favorable to the insured, as the presumption is that on this construction he took the policy, and as the company could have avoided the difficulty by being more specific: Id.; Fowkes v. Ins. Co., 3 B. & S. 917. The words in such case, said Mr. Justice BLACKBURN, ought to be construed in that sense, in which, looking fairly at them, a prudent man would have understood the words to mean: Id. It is now well recognized as a general rule that when a stipulation or an exception to a policy of insurance, emanating from the insurers, is capable of two meanings, the one is to be adopted which is most favorable to the insured: May on Ins. §§ 172-179; Wood on Ins. §§ 141-6; Allen v. Ins. Co., 85 N. Y. 473; Western Ins. Co. v. Cropper, 8 Casey 351; White v. Smith, 9 Id. 186. In case of doubt as to the meaning of terms emanating from an insurance company, they are to be construed most strongly against the insurer: May on Ins., supra; Fowkes v. Ins. Co., supra; Wilson v. Ins. Co., 4 R. I. 156; Bartlett v. Ins. Co., 46 Maine 500; Bowman v. Same, 27 Mo. 152; Ins. Co. v. Slaughter, 12 Wall. 404; N. A. Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Burroughs, 19 P. F. Smith 43.

The business of this company is to insure against accidents. The purpose of this policy is to pay specific damages for bodily injuries and death caused by external violent and accidental means. The death of the intestate was so caused. The company seeks to avoid liability under two clauses in the policy. One provides the insurance shall not extend to a case of death or injury caused by "voluntary exposure to unnecessary danger;" the other that "walking or being on the road-bed or bridge of any railway are hazards not contemplated or covered by this contract, and no sum will be paid for disability or loss of life, in consequence of such exposure, or while thus exposed."

The insured was traveling by rail through Indiana on his way to Kentucky. The train stopped on the bridge across the Ohio River by reason of the draw part of the bridge being open. He went to the front platform of the coach in which he was riding, and stepped off, and through a hole in the floor of the bridge, causing his death. This hole was about three feet wide and four feet long. It was caused by the removal of some planks during the making of repairs.

1. Was this act of the insured a voluntary exposure to unnecessary danger?

To make him guilty of a "voluntary exposure to danger" he must intentionally have done some act which reasonable and ordinary prudence would pronounce dangerous. The uncontradicted evidence shows that several other passengers got out of the coach, and some of them in advance of the insured. They certainly apprehended no danger. It is customary for male passengers to...