School Dist. of Oakland v. School Dist. of Joplin

• Decision Date: 11 March 1937
• Docket Number: 34654
• Parties: The School District of Oakland v. The School District of Joplin, Appellant
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

102 S.W.2d 909

340 Mo. 779

The School District of Oakland v. The School District of Joplin, Appellant

No. 34654

Supreme Court of Missouri

March 11, 1937

Appeal from Jasper Circuit Court; Hon. Ray E. Watson Judge.

Reversed.

John W. Scott and Haywood Scott for appellant.

(1) Corporate nature of school districts and character of ownership of public school property to which they hold the title. (a) A school district is a state agency, an arm of the state government, a public corporation, and may be created or abolished at will by the Legislature. The school property to which the school district holds title is not its private property, but is public property, belongs to the State, and neither the people of the school district nor the school district itself has any voice in what disposition the State shall make of its property. It may, by statute, declare that the title to it shall be vested in whatsoever district it may be located and may thereby, that is, by operation of law transfer the title to school property to another district. Cochran v. Wilson, 229 S.W. 1053; City of Edina v. School District, 267 S.W. 115; State ex rel Carrollton School Dist. v. Gordon, 231 Mo. 574, 133 S.W. 44; State ex rel. Clark v. Gordon, 261 Mo. 641, 170 S.W. 892; State ex rel. O'Connell v. Board of St. L. Pub. Schools, 112 Mo. 218, 20 S.W. 484; State ex rel. Richart v. Stouffer, 197 S.W. 248; Heller v. Stremmel, 52 Mo. 312; State ex rel. Bilby v. Brooks, 249 S.W. 75; San Bernardino Co. v. Railroad Co., 70 P. 783; Ross v. Trustees of Univ. of Wyo., 228 P. 651. (b) The ownership of public school property is in the State or public. School districts or other local school organizations have no power to own public school property, nor may they acquire a vested interest in such property, but, in respect to such school property, are mere agencies of the State. Moreover, neither school officials nor individual taxpayers have a proprietary interest in public school property. Thus boards and officers of public schools are merely administrators of public school property and of the affairs of such schools, and, in holding public school property, act as trustees of the public. Such trusteeship may be changed at any time by a legislative act. However, title to school property, as distinguished from actual ownership, is, with some exceptions, placed in agencies of the State, the particular agency depending on provisions of statutes or conveyances. Thus the various statutes provide that title be placed in the school district, boards of education, school trustees, or a municipal subdivision or officers thereof. 56 C. J., sec. 408, pp. 435, 436. (c) In accordance with the general rule that ownership of school property is in the State, school land is the property of the State. Statutes sometimes provide that title to a school site shall vest in the county, county judge or school trustees. A statutory authority to borrow money for the purchase of land for school purposes does not vest legal title to property previously purchased by county commissioners for school use in the school authorities. Title to land conveyed to trustees of a school district and their successors in office is in such persons. Title to school land in the territorial limits of one school organization cannot vest in authorities of other school organizations. 56 C. J., sec 448, pp. 453, 454. (d) A school district does not own the school building in the sense of private or corporate ownership. 56 C. J., sec. 476, p. 469; Oklahoma County School Dist. No. 71 v. Overholser, 87 P. 665. (e) A State Legislature has full power, subject only to constitutional restrictions, to provide by statute for such apportionment, transfer, or other adjustment or devolution of the rights and liabilities of a school district or other local school organization, upon the alteration, dissolution or destruction of such district, as to it may seem proper. Such a statute is not unconstitutional, either as violating the due-process clause of a State or the Federal Constitution, or as destroying vested rights or diverting school funds, inasmuch as property devoted to school purposes is held in trust for the public, with full power in the Legislature to change the trustee thereof; nor is it void as impairing the obligation of contracts, especially since persons contracting with a school district must be deemed to know that it may be altered or dissolved. 56 C. J., sec. 114, p. 272. (2) Transfer of the title to public school property by operation of law. (a) In Missouri the State has, by statute, enacted that "The title of all schoolhouse sites and other school property shall be vested in the district in which the same may be located. . . ." Sec. 9269, R. S. 1929. (b) The Legislature has, by various statutes, shown its intention to transfer the title to school property by operation of law. In Article II of Chapter 57, Revised Statutes 1929, in the laws applicable to all classes of schools, it is provided that upon condemnation of lots or land and schoolhouse sites and schoolhouses, libraries, offices and public parks and playgrounds or additional grounds to schoolhouse site or sites and the payment therefor of the appraisement as provided by the condemnation statutes, the title to such lots or land shall vest in the board of directors or board of education for use in trust for the district and the purposes for which the same were condemned. Sec. 9215, R. S. 1929. (c) In Article IV, Chapter 57, Revised Statutes 1929, in the laws applicable to city, town and consolidated schools, it is provided that the board of education is authorized to lease or purchase grounds additional to the schoolhouse site either adjacent to or elsewhere in such school district and to condemn grounds to be used for such purposes and to pay for such grounds so leased, purchased or condemned and to hold parks and playgrounds in trust for the use of the school district. Sec. 9333, R. S. 1929. (d) In Article XVII, Chapter 57, Revised Statutes 1929, relating to school districts in cities of 500,000 inhabitants or over, it is provided that "the title to all school lands and other property of every kind, shall be vested in the board of education established by this article." Sec. 9569, R. S. 1929. (e) In the same article it is provided that upon condemnation of land for school purposes and payment for the same, the title to the land shall vest in the board of education. Sec. 9571, R. S. 1929. (f) In Article IX, Chapter 57, Revised Statutes 1929, it is provided that whenever a city school district having a population of more than 100,000 inhabitants and less than 300,000 inhabitants shall adjoin a city school district having a population of less than 100,000 inhabitants, and the school district containing the larger population shall desire to extend its boundary lines so as to embrace the territory of the district having the lesser population, together with the territory which may be attached thereto for school purposes, such extension may be accomplished in the manner set forth in Sections 9424 to 9429, Revised Statutes 1929. Sec. 9424, R. S. 1929. (3) The meaning of the word "vest" or "vested." The word "vest" or "vested" is used in numerous statutes relating to public schools and public school property with reference to the title thereto. The word "vest" or "vested" is a technical word of substantial import, said to be of well-established and well-recognized meaning. To "vest" has been defined to give an immediate, fixed right of present or future enjoyment; to give a legal or equitable seizin. The normal sense of the word "vest" is to indicate a present and immediate interest as distinguished from one that is contingent. Whatever may have been the original meaning of the word as denoting the investiture of the fee, "vest" is now applied to estates in personalty, as well as to estates in land. Intransitively, "vest" has been defined as to come or descend, to devolve, to take effect as a title or right. Whether found in a constitution, a statute, or a document, "vest" may be construed with reference to the subject matter to carry out the intention of the provision wherein it is found, as in the case of any other word or phrase. To "vest" has been defined as to confer ownership of property upon a person, to invest a person with the full title to property; but it has been said that the word does not necessarily mean a vesting of the fee, or absolute ownership. On the one hand, to vest has been defined as to put in possession, to put more or less formally in occupation, to place or put in possession or at the disposal of, and has been construed as meaning to "take effect in possession;" but on the other hand, the word has been defined as meaning to pass or devolve as a matter of right or title, irrespective of any immediate right of possession. 67 C. J., sec. 1, pp. 238, 239; Ross v. Trustees of Uni. of Wyoming, 228 P. 642.

Ray Bond and McReynolds & Flanigan for respondent.

(1) Laches and estoppel are affirmative defenses and, to be relied upon, must be affirmatively pleaded. Ambruster v Ambruster, 326 Mo. 51, 31 S.W.2d 38, 88 A. L. R. 782. Even if laches or "estoppel in pais" had been pleaded in this case, there is nothing in the record to warrant the application of either doctrine. There is nothing in the record showing that appellant has suffered any injury or been prejudiced, or has suffered any disadvantage, or that there has been any change in the conditions or relations of the property or the parties, as a result of the short delay in bringing the suit, or of any conduct on the part of respondent. Davies v. Keiser, 297 Mo. 1, 246 S.W. 897; Kellogg v. Moore, 271 Mo. 189; Rollestone v. Natl. Bank of Commerce, 299 Mo. 57, 252 S.W. 394; Matthews v. Van Cleve, 282...