Louisville & N.R. Co. v. McChord

Decision Date16 July 1900
Citation103 F. 216
CourtUnited States Circuit Court, District of Kentucky
PartiesLOUISVILLE & N. R. CO. v. McCHORD et al. LOUISVILLE, H. & ST. L. RY. CO. v. SAME. CHESAPEAKE & O. RY. CO. v. SAME. SOUTHERN RY. CO. v. SAME.

Helm Bruce & Helm and Walker D. Hines, for complainant Louisville & N. R. Co.

Helm Bruce & Helm, for complainant Louisville, H. & St. L. Ry. Co.

Humphrey Burnett & Humphrey, for complainant Southern Ry. Co.

Wadsworth & Cochran, for complainant Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co.

R. J Breckinridge, Atty. Gen., Kohn, Baird & Spindle, and Lewis McQuown, for defendants.

EVANS District Judge.

These actions have for a common object the prevention of the threatened enforcement of an act of the general assembly of this state which became a law on the 10th day of March, 1900, and, if constitutional, became effective 90 days thereafter. Including its title, the act is as follows: 'An act to prevent railroad companies or corporations owning and operating a line or lines of railroad, and its officers, agents and employes, from charging, collecting or receiving extortionate freight or passenger rates in this commonwealth, and to further increase and define the duties and powers of the railroad commission in reference thereto, and prescribing the manner of enforcing the provisions of this act and penalties for the violation of its provisions.

'Be it enacted by the general assembly of the commonwealth of Kentucky:

'Section 1. When complaint shall be made to the railroad commission, accusing any railroad company or corporation of charging, collecting or receiving extortionate freight or passenger rates over its line or lines of railroad in this commonwealth, or when said commission shall receive information or have reason to believe that such rate or rates are being charged, collected or received, it shall be the duty of said commission to hear and determine the matter as speedily as possible. They shall give the company or corporation complained of not less than ten days' notice, by letter mailed to an officer or employe of said company or corporation, stating the time and place of the hearing of same; also the nature of the complaint or matter to be investigated, and shall hear such statements, arguments or evidence offered by the parties as the commission may deem relevant; and should the commission determine that the company or corporation is, or has been, guilty of extortion, said commission shall make and fix a just and reasonable rate, toll or compensation, which said railroad company or corporation may charge, collect or receive for like services thereafter rendered. The rate, tolls or compensation so fixed by the commission shall be entered and be an order on the record book of their office, and signed by the commission, and a copy thereof mailed to an officer, agent or employe of the railroad company or corporation affected thereby, and shall be in full force and effect at the expiration of ten days' thereafter, and may be revoked or modified by an order likewise entered of record. And should said railroad company or corporation, or any officer, agent or employe thereof, charge, collect or receive a greater or higher rate, toll or compensation, for like services thereafter rendered than that made and fixed by said commission, as herein provided, said company or corporation, and said officer, agent or employe, shall each be deemed guilty of extortion, and upon conviction shall be fined for the first offense in any sum of not less than $500 nor more than $1,000, and upon a second conviction, in any sum, not less than $1,000 nor more than $2,000, and for the third and succeeding convictions, in any sum, not less than $2,000 nor more than $5,000.
'Sec. 2. The circuit court of any county into or through which the line or lines of road carrying such passenger or freight, owned or operated by said railroad, and the Franklin circuit court shall have jurisdiction of the offense against the railroad company or corporation offending, and the circuit court of county where such offense may be committed by said officer, agent or employe, shall have jurisdiction in all prosecutions against said officer, agent or employe.

'Sec. 3. Prosecutions under this act shall be by indictment.

'Sec. 4. All prosecutions under this act shall be commenced within two years after the offense shall have been committed.

'Sec. 5. In making said investigation said commission may, when deemed necessary, take the depositions of witnesses before an examiner or notary public, whose fee shall be paid by the state, and upon the certificate of the chairman of the commission, approved by the governor, the auditor shall draw his warrant upon the treasurer for its payment.'

The complainants severally seek the order of this court enjoining and restraining the defendants, who compose the railroad commission of the state, from carrying into effect any of the provisions of the act, upon the ground that it violates the constitution of the United States-- First, in authorizing the commission to fix rates in certain instances upon interstate commerce; second, in authorizing the commission to deprive them of their property without due process of law; third, in authorizing the commission to take from them the equal protection of the law; fourth, authorizing the commission to take their property for public use without just compensation; fifth, in authorizing all of these things to be done by a body of executive officers who are not a court, and who are without judicial powers; and, sixth, as to the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, by authorizing the defendants to fix rates different from those established by the unrepealable charter provisions of that company, thereby impairing the obligations of its contract with the state of Kentucky.

When the act is closely analyzed, it is found to provide: First, that either when complaint shall be made to the railroad commission accusing any railroad or corporation of charging, collecting, or receiving extortionate freight or passenger rates over its line of railroad in this state, or when that commission shall receive information or have reason to believe that such rates are being charged, collected, or received, it shall be, second, its duty to 'hear and determine' the matter as speedily as possible; third, the company complained of shall be given not less than 10 days' notice by letter, mailed to an officer or employe of such company, stating the nature of the complaint or matter to be investigated, and the time and place of hearing it; fourth, the commission shall hear such statements, arguments, or evidence offered by the parties as the commission may deem relevant, and may take the depositions of witnesses; fifth, should the commission determine that the company is or has been guilty of extortion, it shall fix a just and reasonable rate of toll or compensation which said company may charge, collect, or receive for like services thereafter rendered; sixth, the rate so fixed shall be entered in its order book, and a copy mailed to an officer, agent, or employe of the railroad company affected thereby, and after 10 days thereafter shall be in full force until changed by the commission on the record; seventh, should any such railroad, its officer, agent, or employe, thereafter charge, collect, or receive a greater rate of compensation for like services than those thus fixed for it by the commission, such railroad, its agent or employe, shall be guilty of extortion, and shall be fined as provided in the act; and, eight, of the offense of extortion as thus defined, the various circuit courts of the state shall have jurisdiction by indictment.

The supreme court of the United States in many cases has announced certain fundamental principles which have a more or less direct bearing upon the questions involved in these cases. In Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 458, 14 Sup.Ct. 467, 33 L.Ed. 981, the court used this language:

'The question of the reasonableness of a rate of charge for transportation by a railroad company, involving as it does the element of reasonableness, both as regards the company and as regards the public, is eminently a question for judicial investigation, requiring due process of law for its determination. If the company is deprived of the power of charging reasonable rates for the use of its property, and thus, in substance and effect, of the property itself, without due process of law, and in violation of the constitution of the United States, and in so far as it is thus deprived, while other persons are permitted to receive reasonable profits upon their invested capital, the company is deprived of the equal protection of the laws.'

In Reagan v. Trust Co., 154 U.S. 399, 14 Sup.Ct. 1055, 38 L.Ed. 1024, Mr. Justice Brewer, speaking for the court, said 'These cases all support the proposition that, while it is not the province of the courts to enter upon the merely administrative duty of framing a tariff of rates for carriage, it is within the scope of judicial power and a part of judicial duty to restrain anything which, in the form of regulation of rates, operates to deny to the owners of property invested in the business of transportation that equal protection which is the constitutional right of all owners of other property. There is nothing new or strange in this. It has always been a part of the judicial function to determine whether the act of one party (whether that party be a single individual, an organized body, or the public as a whole) operates to devest the other party of any rights of person or property. In every constitution is the guaranty against the taking of private property for public purposes without just compensation. The equal protection of the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
4 cases
  • Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Siler
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky
    • January 9, 1911
    ......Stone, and Wm. G. Dearing, for. complainant. . . Jas. Breathitt, Atty. Gen., Jno. Francis Lockett, Asst. Atty. Gen., and McChord, Hines & Norman, for defendants. . . Before. WARRINGTON, Circuit Judge, and SANFORD and DENISON, District. judges. . . ......
  • Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Nevada
    • March 3, 1909
    ...... another question. Smith v. Bivens (C.C.) 56 F. 352;. Butchers' & Drovers' Co. v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 67 F. 35, 40, 14 C.C.A. 290; Nashville, etc.,. Ry. Co. v. McConnell (C.C.) 82 F. ... . This. question is very elaborately discussed in Louisville &. N.R. Co. v. McChord (C.C.) 103 F. 216. The Kentucky. statute there involved, excluding the fact that the Kentucky. ......
  • Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission of Alabama
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama
    • March 21, 1908
    ...... Railway Company, the Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis. Railway Company, and the Louisville & Nashville, Railroad. Company, all foreign corporations and the Western Railway of. Alabama, the ...v. Texas Pacific. Railway Co. (C.C.) 51 F. 529; L. & St. L.R.R. Co. v. McChord (C.C.) 103 F. 216; Consolidated Gas Co. v. Mayer (C.C.) 146 F. 150; Ex parte Wood (C.C.) 155 F. ......
  • George W. Sabre v. Rutland Railroad Company And Central Vermont Railway Co.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Vermont
    • January 21, 1913
    ...... 741; People v. Mallary , 195 Ill. 582, 88. Am. St. Rep. 212, 63 N.E. 508; Louisville etc. R. Co. v. McChord , 103 F. 216; Shoultz v. McPheeters , 79 Ind. 373; In re Dumford , ......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT