Consorti v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc.

Citation103 F.3d 2
Decision Date28 August 1995
Docket NumberNo. 857,D,857
PartiesJohn CONSORTI & Frances Consorti, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. ARMSTRONG WORLD INDUSTRIES, INC., formerly known as Armstrong Cork Co.; Combustion Engineering, Inc., et al., Defendants, Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., Defendant-Appellant. ocket 94-7501.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit)

Steven J. Phillips, New York City (Moshe Maimon, Robert I. Komitor, Alani Golanski, Levy Phillips & Konigsberg, New York City, of counsel), for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

William G. Ballaine, New York City (Mark S. Landman, Joanna L. Watman, Siff Rosen, New York City, of counsel), for Defendant-Appellant.

Before: NEWMAN, Chief Judge, ALTIMARI and LEVAL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

By order dated July 1, 1996, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated our judgment, and remanded to us for reconsideration in light of Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 2211, 135 L.Ed.2d 659 (1996).

The procedural history of the Gasperini case was very similar to ours. The district judge denied the defendant's application for remittitur and entered judgment based on the amount of the jury's verdict. On the defendant's appeal from that ruling, a panel of this court, relying in part on our previous holding in Consorti, found the verdict to be excessive under New York law and ordered a new trial unless the plaintiff would acquiesce to a reduced award.

The reasoning that led to this disposition (in both the Gasperini and Consorti appeals) was as follows:

1. Under Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), state law rather than federal law controls the question whether a verdict was excessive in a case tried in the diversity jurisdiction of the federal court.

2. For review of a remittitur decision on appeal, a New York statute, CPLR § 5501(c), commands the "appellate division" to decide excessiveness based on whether the jury's verdict "deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation," a test which accords less deference to the jury's award than the traditional common law standard of "shocks the conscience," which is applied in federal cases.

3. As the federal counterpart of New York's appellate division, we are obligated to use the standard that New York law prescribes for it.

4. Applying that standard, the jury's verdict far exceeded what would be reasonable compensation and must therefore be remitted (unless the plaintiff prefers to opt for a new trial).

Review of Gasperini in the Supreme Court focussed primarily on two questions: First, whether state or federal law governs the issue of the excessiveness of a jury award in a diversity case; and second, whether remittitur is beyond the power of a federal appellate court sitting in diversity because the Seventh Amendment commands that "no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law" (a question which had not been raised below).

As to the first question, the Supreme Court affirmed our ruling that state law governs. On the second question, the Court ruled that "[N]othing in the Seventh Amendment ... precludes appellate review of the trial judge's denial of a motion to set aside [a jury verdict] as excessive." --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2224 (quoting Grunenthal v. Long Island R. Co., 393 U.S. 156, 164, 89 S.Ct. 331, 336, 21 L.Ed.2d 309 (1968) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (alterations in original)). The Court emphasized, however, that even in a diversity case the proper distribution of functions between the trial court and the court of appeals is a matter of federal law. In the federal system, "the district court is to determine whether the jury's verdict is within the confines set by state law" and the "court of appeals should then review the district court's determination under an...

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  • Tanzini v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York
    • August 4, 1997
    ...v. Center for Humanities, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, ___ - ___, 116 S.Ct. 2211, 2224-25, 135 L.Ed.2d 659 (1996); Consorti v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 103 F.3d 2, 4 (2d Cir.1996); Bunt v. Altec Indus., Inc., 962 F.Supp. 313, 320 (N.D.N.Y.1997) (Hurd, M.J.); Kukla v. Syfus Leasing Corp., 928 F.......
  • Funk v. F & K Supply, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York
    • March 9, 1999
    ...court must apply New York state law in determining whether damage awards on diversity claims are excessive); Consorti v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 103 F.3d 2, 4 (2d Cir.1995); Anderson, 1997 WL 190283, at *6-7. The relevant law is set forth in C.P.L.R. S 5501(c) (McKinney 1995). That se......
  • Foradori v. Harris
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • April 1, 2008
    ...carry with it generation of rules of substantive law." Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 426, 116 S.Ct. 2211. 18. See Consorti v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 103 F.3d 2, 4 (2nd Cir.1996): Review of Gasperini in the Supreme Court focused primarily on two questions: First, whether state or federal law......
  • Cross v. New York City Transit Authority
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
    • August 2, 2005
    ...in ADEA actions"). Thus, the district court was obliged to review the award under New York law. See Consorti v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 103 F.3d 2, 4 (2d Cir.1995) (per curiam) (observing that "we are obligated to use the standard that New York law prescribes"); see also Gasperini v. ......
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