Love v. Westville Correctional Center

• Decision Date: 26 December 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-3679,95-3679
• Citation: 103 F.3d 558
• Parties: 7 A.D. Cases 436, 20 A.D.D. 182, 9 NDLR P 76 Cleo LOVE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WESTVILLE CORRECTIONAL CENTER, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 558

103 F.3d 558

7 A.D. Cases 436, 20 A.D.D. 182, 9 NDLR P 76

Cleo LOVE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WESTVILLE CORRECTIONAL CENTER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 95-3679.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued May 24, 1996.

Decided Dec. 26, 1996.

John Emry (argued), Franklin, IN, for plaintiff-appellee.

David A. Arthur (argued), Office of the Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, for defendant-appellant.

Before POSNER, Chief Judge, and ROVNER and DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judges.

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge.

The Westville Correctional Center (Westville) claims in this appeal that the district court abused its discretion by granting Cleo Love's motion for a new trial and in giving certain instructions to the second jury that resulted in a verdict for Love in the amount of $30,948. Interwoven in the case are questions about the applicability of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., to the prison setting and issues about the relation between the requirement for "intentional" discrimination under that Act and the reasonableness of accommodations offered. Because Westville conceded at oral argument that it was not challenging the general applicability of the ADA to prisons in this case, however, we assume for purposes of this opinion that it does so apply. Bearing in mind the substantial discretion that a trial judge enjoys in ruling on a motion for new trial, and finding no reversible error otherwise, we affirm.

I

Cleo Love is a quadriplegic confined to a wheelchair. In 1984, he was convicted and sentenced to twenty years in Indiana state prison for a narcotics offense. Between May 1, 1992, and June 23, 1993, the time period involved in this case, Love was housed in Westville's infirmary unit. This meant, among other things, that he was unable to use the prison's recreational facilities, its dining hall, the visitation facilities that were open to the general inmate population, and that he was unable to participate in substance abuse, education, church, work, or transition programs available to members of the general inmate population. In addition, his access to the law library, the regular library, and the commissary was limited.

In May 1994, one month before his release, Love filed a complaint against Westville alleging violations of the ADA, claiming that he was being deprived of access to programs based on his disability. See ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12132. After a two-and-a-half day trial in April 1995, the jury returned a verdict that Westville had violated Love's rights under the ADA, that the violation was not "intentional," and that Love was entitled to $1,000 in damages. The court entered judgment on that verdict on April 14, 1995. Love then properly filed a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a), in which he asked for a new trial limited to the issue of damages or, in the alternative, for a new trial on both liability and damages. He argued that the jury's verdict on damages was against the clear weight of the evidence, and the court agreed. In the district court's words, "[t]he jury found that WCC discriminated against Mr. Love, and the record is absolutely devoid of any evidence that would support a finding that discrimination was not intentional.... No evidence was presented at trial, either by WCC or Mr. Love, that would tend to show that if discrimination existed (as the jury found), it was caused by mistake, accident, negligence, or another innocent reason." Love v. McBride, 896 F.Supp. 808, 809 (N.D.Ind.1995). Later in its order, the district court explained further that "WCC may not have known that the access they were affording Mr. Love was unreasonable, but the jury was not asked to find a willful violation of the ADA. WCC voluntarily and deliberately denied Mr. Love's requests for greater access to the programs, and did so because of this known disability, not because of mistake, accident, negligence, or another innocent reason." Id. at 810. In other words, the court drew a distinction between the intentional nature of the discrimination, and Westville's awareness of the reasonableness of the accommodations it was affording Love under the ADA. For this reason, the court granted Love's motion for new trial on the issue of damages.

The retrial on damages took place on October 2 and 3, 1995. In preliminary instructions, the court instructed the new jury (over Westville's objection) that "[i]n earlier proceedings in this case, it was determined that Westville Correctional Center intentionally violated Mr. Love's rights...." At the end of that trial, the court instructed the jury that "[i]t has already been determined, and you must accept, that Westville Correctional Center violated Mr. Love's rights under the Americans [w]ith Disabilities Act, and that the discrimination was intentional." Again, Westville objected. The second jury returned its verdict for $30,948 in damages, and the court later awarded Love's counsel $39,536.75 in attorneys' fees in an order not before us today.

II

As noted earlier, Westville conceded at oral argument that the ADA applies to prisoner access to the kinds of programs at issue here. As was the case in Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 248 (7th Cir.1996), we therefore need not decide in this case to what extent the ADA applies to correctional facilities. Love's case is in any event somewhat different from the claim in Bryant, since he presents a textbook example of a traditional ADA claim based on the denial of access to services, programs, and activities, based on his physical disability. We note that the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have applied the closely analogous Rehabilitation Act to state prisons. See Lue v. Moore, 43 F.3d 1203, 1205 (8th Cir.1994); Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1446 (9th Cir.1994). The Ninth Circuit notes, however, that the requirements under the Act would be affected by the "reasonable requirements of effective prison administration." Gates, 39 F.3d at 1446. On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit has expressed doubts about the ADA's coverage of state correctional facilities. See Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340, 1343-46 (4th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1071, 116 S.Ct. 772, 133 L.Ed.2d 724 (1996). Given this difference of opinion, if not strictly of holding, we think it best to wait until the matter is fully briefed in a proper adversary setting before ruling definitively on it.

Westville acknowledges that it is difficult at best to demonstrate that a district court abused its discretion in ordering a new trial. See, e.g., Emmel v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, 95 F.3d 627, 636 (7th Cir.1996); United States v. Williams, 81 F.3d 1434, 1437 (7th Cir.1996); United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239, 242 (7th Cir.1995). In order to overcome this hurdle, it focuses on the district court's finding in its order granting the new trial on damages that Westville "may not have known that the access they were affording Mr. Love was unreasonable," and it claims that this is fundamentally inconsistent with the court's finding, as a matter of law, that the discrimination against Love was "intentional." This means, in Westville's view, that the court abused its discretion in granting a new trial limited to damages, and in instructing the second jury that it was required to accept the fact that Westville...