Cramer v. Illinois Commercial Men's Ass'n

• Citation: 103 N.E. 459,260 Ill. 516
• Parties: CRAMER v. ILLINOIS COMMERCIAL MEN'S ASS'N.
• Decision Date: 04 December 1913
• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

260 Ill. 516

103 N.E. 459

CRAMER

v.ILLINOIS COMMERCIAL MEN'S ASS'N.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 28, 1913.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 4, 1913.

Appeal from Appellate Court, First District, on Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; William B. Scholfield, Judge.

Suit by Dora Cramer against the Illinois Commercial Men's Association. A default judgment for plaintiff was set aside, and plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, where the order was reversed (176 Ill. App. 1), and defendant appeals on a certificate of importance. Affirmed.James Maher, of Chicago (John T. Murray, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

M. E. Ames, of Chicago (Quin O'Brien, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

CARTWRIGHT, J.

The appellee, Dora Cramer, brought suit in assumpsit in the circuit court of Cook county on September 14, 1910, against the appellant, the Illinois Commercial Men's Association, on a policy insuring her son against accidental death. The appearance for the defendant was filed on November 17, 1910. The declaration was filed on December 9, 1910, with an affidavit showing the nature of the demand and the amount due after allowing to the defendant all just credits, deductions, and set-offs, and on December 20, 1910, a plea of the general issue and 16 special pleas were filed without any affidavit of a good defense to the suit upon the merits to the whole or a portion of the plaintiff's demand. On January 14, 1911, on motion of the plaintiff, an order was entered striking from the files the ‘plea’ of the defendant for want of an affidavit of merits. The defendant was then defaulted, damages were assessed at $5,345.13, and judgment was entered for that amount, with costs of suit. The judgment was entered the last day of a term of the court, and at the next succeeding term, on January 30, 1911, in pursuance of notice to the plaintiff, a motion was filed by the defendant to set aside and vacate the order striking its plea from the files, and also the default, assessment of damages, and judgment. The motion specified 28 alleged errors in the action of the court, and it was accompanied by an affidavit of the attorney stating the facts upon which the motion was based. The plaintiff did not take issue on the facts stated in the affidavit, but by a pleading in the nature of a demurrer submitted to the court questions of law whether the court had jurisdiction, after the term, to enter any order affectingthe judgment, whether the motion presented any other than alleged errors of law appearing upon the record, and whether the plaintiff should be required to make any further defense to the motion. The court sustained the motion and set aside and vacated the default and judgment. The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court for the First District, and that court reversed the order sustaining the motion and setting aside the default and judgment, and granted a certificate of importance and an appeal to this court.

[1] After the expiration of the term of court at which a judgment is entered the court has no authority to set aside the judgment for any alleged error of law, and can only amend it in matter of form after notice to the opposite party. Cook v. Wood, 24 Ill. 295;Cox v. Brackett, 41 Ill. 222;Barnes v. Henshaw, 226 Ill. 605, 80 N. E. 1076;People v. Wilmot, 254 Ill. 554, 98 N. E. 973. The court, however, may correct errors of fact after the term by virtue of section 89 of the practice act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1911, c. 110), which provides that errors in fact which by the common law could be corrected by the writ of error coram nobis may be corrected, upon motion, within five years after the rendition of judgment. In the Appellate Court it was contended that the order appealed from did not constitute a final order or judgment from which an appeal could be taken, and it is insisted here that the Appellate Court erred in assuming jurisdiction of an order which was not final.

[2][3] It is true that if a court sets aside or vacates a judgment otherwise than under the motion substituted for the writ the order is interlocutory and the parties must await a final judgment, from which an appeal or writ of error will lie. Walker v. Oliver, 63 Ill. 199;City of Park Ridge v. Murphy, 258 Ill. 365, 101 N. E. 524. Aside from disputing the jurisdiction of the Appellate Court, the argument is that there was error of fact which authorized the circuit court to set aside the default and judgment, and we will not presume that the court attempted to examine, revise, or correct its action for an error of law at a subsequent term, in view of the long-established rule that it would have no power to do so. Pisa v. Rezek, 206 Ill. 344, 69 N. E. 67. The motion was intended to allege errors of fact, and unquestionably the action of the court was based on a finding that there were such errors. That being so, the law allowed an appeal from the order as in any other case of final judgment. Mitchell v. King, 187 Ill. 452, 55 N. E. 637,58 N. E. 310;Domitski v. American Linseed Co., 221 Ill. 161, 77 N. E. 428.

In Walker v. Oliver, supra, the suit was in Ford county against Oliver and two others. Oliver was a resident of Livingston county. No summons was issued to Livingston county, and no process was served on Oliver, and he did not appear. He did not know of the judgment until after the term, and on his motion the judgment was set aside. The judgment was void for want of jurisdiction apparent on the face of the record as a matter of law, and the motion to set it aside was for error of law, and not for error of fact. So, also, in City of Park Ridge v. Murphy, supra, a reason for vacating the judgment was a want of proper service of notice on Murphy or his agents, which showed a want of jurisdiction.

The material facts stated in the affidavit as matters of fact were that there were rules of the court, one of which provided that suits brought were given two numbers, and at the close of each day's business the clerk was required to distribute, in rotation, to the judges who had common-law calendars, the common-law cases commenced during the day, and to place upon the wrapper of each case the name of the judge to whom it was assigned; and the other provided that no motion would be heard or order made in any cause without notice to the opposite party when the appearance of such party had been entered, except where the party was in default, or when a cause was reached on the call of the trial calendar, that the clerk did not place on the wrapper containing the files of the cause the name of any judge, as required by the rule, and that no notice of the intended proceedings in court was given or served.

[4][5] The writ of error coram nobis at the common law would lie to correct purely ministerial errors of the officers of the court. 1 Archbold's Pr. 234. If the clerk should fail to file a plea or answer, and by such failure a party should be prevented, without fault or negligence, from making a defense, the error might be corrected by the motion substituted for the writ, but it did not appear in this case that the failure of the clerk to put the name of the judge on the wrapper had anything to do with the proceedings, or prejudiced the defendant in any way. There was no showing that the defendant was misled as to the judge who might make an order in the case, and there was another reason why the failure of the clerk would not justify setting aside the default and judgment. The fact that the clerk had not complied with the rule was known, or should have been known by the exercise of reasonable care and attention on the part of the attorney for the defendant, and the motion is not intended to relieve a party from the consequences of his own negligence.

[6][7] The court did not violate the second rule set forth in the affidavit, since the rule itself excepted from the requirement of notice any case where the party was in default. Section 55 of the practice act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1911, c. 110), provides that if the plaintiff files an affidavit of merits, and the defendant fails to file with his plea an affidavit of meritorious defense to the whole or some specified portion of the claim, the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment as in case of default. There was no affidavit, and for that reason the plaintiff was entitled to a default, and the rule did not apply. Counsel call attention to the fact that there were 17 pleas and the order was in the singular, but it was not necessary to strike the pleas from the files, although such a practice is proper and not uncommon. Filkins v. Byrne, 72 Ill. 101;New York Exchange Bank v. Reed, 232 Ill. 123, 83 N. E. 548. In Braidwood v. Weiller, 89 Ill. 606, it was said that the more usual way of taking advantage, under the practice act, of the want of an affidavit of merits accompanying the plea is by motion for a judgment as in case of a default, or by motion to strike the plea from the files for want of such affidavit. Furthermore, if there was any error in entering default and judgment with pleas remaining on file, it was error of law, and not of fact, which could not be reached by the motion. Error of law does not require evidence of facts to make it manifest, and the question whether the court erred in matter of law could only be raised by writ of error from or appeal to a higher tribunal.

[8] The attorney by his affidavit sought to excuse himself for neglecting to file an affidavit of a meritorious defense by the facts that he had a great deal of business, and had charge of many suits, and that affidavits of merits by plaintiffs in insurance suits were infrequent. He alleged that for these reasons he did not make a careful examination of the declaration. These facts were not only insufficient as an excuse, but did not constitute error of fact which would have precluded the court from entering the default and judgment if they had been known at the time.

[9] Another sufficient reason for affirming the judgment of the...