Bell v. Central Electric Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 20 May 1907
• Citation: 125 Mo. App. 660,103 S.W. 144
• Parties: BELL v. CENTRAL ELECTRIC RY. CO.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

103 S.W. 144

125 Mo. App. 660

BELL v. CENTRAL ELECTRIC RY. CO.

Kansas City Court of Appeals. Missouri.

May 20, 1907.

Rehearing Denied June 24, 1907.

1. CARRIERS — STREET RAILROADS — DUTY TO STOP.

A street railroad company as a common carrier is bound to employ the highest degree of care to avoid injury to passengers, and, when signaled to stop at a regular stopping place, is required to bring the car to a complete stop, and hold it stationary until the departing passengers, in the exercise of reasonable care, may accomplish their departure in safety.

2. SAME.

Where a street car is stopped for passengers to alight, it is the duty of the carrier's servants, not only to hold the car stationary a reasonable length of time for the passengers to alight, but to look to the places of exit to ascertain that no passenger is in the act of alighting before giving the signal to proceed.

3. SAME — INJURY TO PASSENGERS — RES IPSA LOQUITUR.

In an action for injuries to a street car passenger as she was endeavoring to alight, proof that the car was brought to a full stop to discharge and receive passengers, that it suddenly started while plaintiff was stepping to the street, and that she was injured in consequence of a fall caused by the starting of the car, was sufficient to raise a presumption that the starting of the car was due to negligence.

4. SAME.

Where a street car passenger was injured by the alleged premature starting of the car as she was endeavoring to alight, and the facts raised a presumption of negligence on the part of the carrier's servants, its liability for the injuries sustained was fixed, unless it could show affirmatively that, notwithstanding the existence of such facts, the starting of the car was the result of unavoidable accident or some cause beyond its control.

5. TRIAL — INSTRUCTIONS — CONSTRUCTION AS A WHOLE.

It is not necessary that any one instruction, when standing alone, should embrace all the issues, if all of those given, when construed together, embrace all the material issues involved, and are consistent.

6. DAMAGES — PERSONAL INJURIES — FUTURE CONSEQUENCES — PLEADING.

In an action for injuries, an allegation that plaintiff was reasonably certain to suffer in the future great physical pain and mental anguish was not insufficient to raise such issue, because it did not charge in terms that she "would" suffer future pain.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jackson County; John G. Park, Judge.

Action by Sarah Bell against the Central Electric Railway Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

John H. Lucas, Chas. A. Loomis, and Ben F. White, for appellant. Jamison, Elliott & Ostergard, for respondent.

JOHNSON, J.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of defendant. Plaintiff recovered judgment in the sum of $800, and defendant appealed.

The injury occurred in the afternoon of March 26, 1904. Plaintiff was a passenger on an electric car operated by defendant on one of its lines of street railway in Kansas City. The car was running eastward on Independence avenue, and, as it approached Charlotte street, a regular stopping place, plaintiff gave the signal to stop, as she desired to alight at that point. The evidence introduced by plaintiff tends to show that, in obedience to the signal, the car came to a full stop at the east line of Charlotte street, its accustomed stopping place, and plaintiff left her seat and proceeded to depart. Two other passengers preceded her, who left the car in safety, but plaintiff, while in the act of stepping from the last step to the street, was violently thrown to the pavement by the sudden starting of the car, and injured. During the time the car was stationary the conductor remained in the front part thereof, where he was engaged in collecting fares. The evidence offered by defendant is to the effect that, when the signal to stop was given, the motorman reduced speed and the car was running at the rate of two or three miles per hour when it reached the west line of Charlotte street, that plaintiff attempted to alight at that point, and that her fall was caused by the manner in which the attempt was made. The negligence alleged in the petition is that while plaintiff "was proceeding with due care and diligence to alight from said car, and while she had one foot on the step of said car and her other foot extended to step to the street from said car step, the trainmen in charge of said car, who were then and there the agents, servants, and employés of defendant, carelessly and negligently caused said car to start forward while plaintiff was in the aforesaid dangerous position in stepping from said car step, and before plaintiff had a reasonable time to alight from said car, and plaintiff was thereby thrown from said car step; * * * that said trainmen, agents, and employés of defendant then and there knew of plaintiff's dangerous position in stepping from said car step and of the lack of reasonable time given her to alight safely from said car, or by the exercise of reasonable care and diligence in their duties as such trainmen in then and there operating said car could have known of the same in time to have averted plaintiff's injury."

At the request of plaintiff, the court instructed the jury, in part, as follows:

"(1) The jury are instructed that if you believe and find from the evidence that plaintiff was a passenger on one of defendant's trolley street cars in charge of, and being operated by, defendant's trainmen, on or about March 26, 1904, that said car at that time was running east on Independence avenue from Grand avenue in Kansas City, Mo., and that, at the intersection of Charlotte street with said Independence avenue, said car was stopped by defendant's trainmen in charge thereof for the purpose of allowing passengers thereon to alight therefrom, and that, while said car was then and there stopped for said purpose, plaintiff attempted to alight from said car, and that she was using reasonable care and diligence in so doing, and that before she had had a reasonable time to safely alight from said car, and while she had one foot on the car step and her other foot extended to step to the street, and that while defendant's trainmen, in charge of said car, saw, or by the exercise of that high degree of care and vigilance...