LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher

• Decision Date: 06 December 1996
• Docket Number: No. 96-6149,LEBLANC-STERNBER,C,96-6149
• Parties: NOTICE: THIS SUMMARY ORDER MAY NOT BE CITED AS PRECEDENTIAL AUTHORITY, BUT MAY BE CALLED TO THE ATTENTION OF THE COURT IN A SUBSEQUENT STAGE OF THIS CASE, IN A RELATED CASE, OR IN ANY CASE FOR PURPOSES OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL OR RES JUDICATA. SEE SECOND CIRCUIT RULE 0.23. Rabbi Yitzchokhanie Leblanc-Sternberg, Fred Walfish, Lewis Kamman, Park Avenue Synagogue, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Robert FLETCHER, Nick Vertullo, Raymond Kane, Maureen Kendrick, John C. Layne, Individually and in their Capacities as Trustees of the Village of Airmont and as Officers and Board Members of the Airmont Civic Assoc., and the Village of Airmont, Defendants-Appellants, UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. The VILLAGE OF AIRMONT, Airmont Civil Association, Ralph Bracco, in his capacity as Mayor of the Village of Airmont, John C. Layne, Raymond Kane, Charles Calotta, and Ronald Sabo, in their capacities as Trustees of the Village of Airmont, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Page 355

104 F.3d 355

NOTICE: THIS SUMMARY ORDER MAY NOT BE CITED AS PRECEDENTIAL AUTHORITY, BUT MAY BE CALLED TO THE ATTENTION OF THE COURT IN A SUBSEQUENT STAGE OF THIS CASE, IN A RELATED CASE, OR IN ANY CASE FOR PURPOSES OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL OR RES JUDICATA. SEE SECOND CIRCUIT RULE 0.23.

Rabbi Yitzchok LEBLANC-STERNBERG, Chanie Leblanc-Sternberg, Fred Walfish, Lewis Kamman, Park Avenue Synagogue, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Robert FLETCHER, Nick Vertullo, Raymond Kane, Maureen

Kendrick, John C. Layne, Individually and in their

Capacities as Trustees of the Village of Airmont and as

Officers and Board Members of the Airmont Civic Assoc., and the Village of Airmont, Defendants-Appellants, UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. The VILLAGE OF AIRMONT, Airmont Civil Association, Ralph

Bracco, in his capacity as Mayor of the Village of Airmont,

John C. Layne, Raymond Kane, Charles Calotta, and Ronald

Sabo, in their capacities as Trustees of the Village of

Airmont, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 96-6149.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Dec. 6, 1996.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Goettel, J.).

FOR APPELLANTS:Dennis Lynch, Dorfman, Lynch & Knoebel, Nyack, NY.

FOR APPELLEES:Sara L. Shudofsky, Assistant United States Attorney, Southern District of New York, New York, NY; Craig L. Parshall, Fredricksburg, VA.

S.D.N.Y.

AFFIRMED.

Present: OAKES, McLAUGHLIN and CABRANES, Circuit Judges.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of record from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York and was argued.

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the judgment of the district court be and it hereby is AFFIRMED.

The Government filed an action under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. ("FHA"), in 1991, against the Village of Airmont ("Village"), alleging that the Village was formed for the purpose of excluding Orthodox Jews by, among other things, imposing restrictions on Jewish forms of residential worship. Specifically, the Airmont Civic Association ("ACA"), an organization whose purpose was the incorporation of the Village, was to enact a zoning ordinance completely preventing worship in homes--a primary method of Orthodox Jewish worship. At roughly the same time, a private group of rabbis initiated an action, which was consolidated with the government case for discovery and trial. The private action was before a jury, while the government action was tried to the court.

After an eight week trial, a jury found that the Village had violated the plaintiffs' rights under the FHA and the First Amendment. The district court (Goettel, J.) (S.D.N.Y.) then dismissed the government action, reasoning that because the Village had only passed the zoning regulations, but had not applied the regulations, there had not yet been a violation of the FHA. The district court refused to order injunctive relief because: (1) it would be enjoining acts which were already illegal; and (2) "if there is any action taken in the future which violates [the Orthodox Jews'] rights, the United States Government ... will not be timorous about suing." United States v. Village of Airmont, 839 F.Supp. 1054, 1064-65 (S.D.N.Y.1993) (Airmont I ), rev'd and remanded, 67 F.3d 412 (2d Cir.1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 2546 (1996). The district court then granted the Village's motion for judgment as a matter of law in the private action, and set aside the jury verdict.

In September, 1995, this Court reversed, see LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 67 F.3d 412, 431 (2d Cir.1995) (Airmont II ), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 2546 (1996), reasoning that the evidence supported the jury's determination that the Village had violated the FHA. This Court held that there was evidence that the events leading to the incorporation of the town and the implementation of its zoning code "amply support a finding that the impetus was not a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason but rather an animosity toward Orthodox Jews as a group." Airmont II, 67 F.3d at 431. The court also held that there was support for the jury's finding that the motivation behind the enactment of the zoning regulations was anti-Semitism, and its "implicit finding that Airmont's zoning code would be interpreted to restrict the use of home synagogues." Id. (emphasis supplied).

This Court held that the district court erred in concluding that injunctive relief was not proper, because the FHA explicitly provides that courts enter injunctive relief against parties who have violated the FHA " 'as is necessary to assure the full enjoyment of the rights granted by the [FHA].' " Airmont II, 67 F.3d at 434. This Court held that "[t]he view that such relief was premature because Airmont had not yet actually applied its zoning provision invidiously was a misapplication of the [FHA]." Id. at 434-35. The Court then directed on remand, that the district court "fashion appropriate equitable remedies." Id.

On remand, Judge Goettel ordered:

. A prohibitory injunction, enjoining the Village from: (1) promoting religious discrimination; (2) denying equal protection to religions by use, interpretation, or enforcement of the zoning code; and (3) discriminating in housing based on religion, or interfering with the exercise of religion through housing.

. A mandatory injunction, requiring the Village to revise its zoning code so that it could not be construed to prevent home worship, or to prevent persons from walking to and from places of religious worship. The court specifically called for an addition to the zoning code entitled "Residential Place of Worship." Such places were defined as "area[s] located within a residence that is used for the conducting of religious services." The order provided that such places "will be permitted by right on any day in all residential zones."

. The retention of documents and notification provisions. The Village was ordered to keep all documents related to zoning decisions, notify the government of any such decisions, or of any meetings of planning or zoning boards at which applications touching on religious worship will be presented.

LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 922 F.Supp. 959, 964-65 n. 15 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (Airmont III ).

We review a district court's award of equitable and injunctive relief for abuse of discretion or a clear error of law. See EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529, 1542 (2d Cir.1996).

The Village argues that the mandatory injunction conflicts with Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) in three respects: (1) the injunction is disproportionate because there is "no existing violation by [the Village];" rather "it was what the Village of Airmont will 'predictably' do that the Second Circuit found improper in its appellate crystal ball;" (2) the injunction is not remedial; and (3) the district court usurped the role of the local government by creating a new set of zoning regulations, thereby violating well-settled principles of federalism. The Village is wrong.

In Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280-281 (1977), the Supreme Court noted that a federal court exercising its equitable power must focus on three factors: (1) the remedy must "be determined by the nature and scope of the constitutional violation;" (2) the equitable decree must be remedial in nature, i.e. it must " 'restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct;" and (3) the federal courts must respect the role of state and local authorities in the management of their affairs.

Though by no means unlimited, the power of the federal courts to remedy constitutional violations is broad and flexible. See United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181, 1235 (2d Cir1987). In general, the power to intrude into municipal functions should be exercised only where there has been a constitutional violation. Id. The court should tailor its remedy to fit the nature and extent of the violation. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 738 (1974); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971). "The Supreme Court has not required that the 'least restrictive means of implementation' be adopted but has 'recognized that the choice of remedies to redress racial discrimination is 'a balancing process left, within appropriate constitutional or statutory limits, to the sound discretion of the trial court.' " Yonkers, 837 F.2d at 1236 (quoting United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 184 (1987) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 508 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 794 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)))). The district court has "first-hand experience with the parties and is best qualified to deal with the 'flinty, intractable realities of day-to-day implementation of constitutional commands,' " and must be given great flexibility and broad discretion in choosing a remedy best suited to curing the violation. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 184 (quoting Swann, 402 U.S. at 6). In determining whether [an] order was "narrowly tailored," the court must "acknowledge the respect owed a District Judge's judgment that specified...