Lampkins v. Golden

Decision Date17 December 1996
Docket NumberNo. 95-2001,95-2001
Citation104 F.3d 361
PartiesPens. Plan Guide P 23932N NOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Sixth Circuit. Deborah LAMPKINS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert H. GOLDEN, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Before: SILER, MOORE and COLE, Circuit Judges.

COLE, Circuit Judge.

Defendant-Appellant Robert H. Golden appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment imposing a penalty against him pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1)(B) for failure to furnish requested retirement plan information to a former employee, Plaintiff-Appellee Deborah Lampkins. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court.

I.

Deborah Lampkins ("Lampkins") was employed as a secretary in the law firm of Robert H. Golden, P.C. from 1980 to 1992. During this period, the law firm sponsored both a pension plan and profit-sharing plan for employees. While employed there, Lampkins participated in the Robert H. Golden Pension Trust ("Pension Plan") 1 and the Robert H. Golden Profit Sharing Trust ("Profit Sharing Plan"). 2 Robert Golden ("Golden"), who is the sole shareholder and president of the law firm, serves as the sole administrator and trustee of both plans. He is also the only other participant in the plans.

Approximately three months after Lampkins ended her employment with the law firm, Golden furnished Lampkins a statement disclosing that her vested accrued benefit in the Pension Plan amounted to $4,455.33. 3 In addition to this statement, Golden notified Lampkins in writing that she had thirty days to submit a written request for the withdrawal of the money in the Pension Plan. Responding to Golden's letter, Lampkins advised Golden by letter dated July 1, 1992 that she was not willing to request distribution of these monies absent an opportunity to review the Pension Plan and the Profit Sharing Plan in their entirety. Believing that her vested accrued benefit in the Pension Plan amounted to more than $4,455.33, Lampkins requested copies of "the original Pension Plan documents, and any other documents, including the Adoption Agreement ..." and "... the same sort of documents for the Profit Sharing Plan."

Golden responded by providing Lampkins with three plan-related documents, including a 1987 Pension Plan Adoption Agreement ("the 1987 Adoption Agreement"). Golden, however, did not provide Lampkins with a copy of the Pension Plan Adoption Agreement in effect from January 18, 1978 through April 30, 1987 ("the 1978 Adoption Agreement"). Because the 1978 Adoption Agreement contained a different employer contribution formula from that set forth in the 1987 Adoption Agreement, Lampkins was unable to calculate accurately the amount of her vested accrued benefit in the Pension Plan without copies of both agreements. 4 Lampkins thereupon retained counsel, who made additional requests of Golden for copies of the 1978 Adoption Agreement. After a series of letters between Golden and Lampkins's counsel, Golden informed Lampkins on December 3, 1992 that the 1978 Adoption Agreement could not be found.

On March 25, 1993, Lampkins filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, seeking a judgment determining her accrued benefits in the Pension and Profit Sharing Plans and ordering Golden to distribute those benefits as she designated. 5 During discovery, Lampkins formally requested production of the 1978 Adoption Agreement. However, Golden failed to produce the document until after Lampkins filed a motion to compel its production. Lampkins then moved for summary judgment and requested, in addition to her Pension Plan and Profit Sharing Plan benefits, that the court assess a penalty against Golden for his failure to furnish the pension and profit-sharing information.

The district court granted summary judgment and ordered Golden to pay Lampkins accrued benefits in the amount of $1,371.33 from the Profit Sharing Plan and $10,817.50 from the Pension Plan. Additionally, the district court assessed a penalty against Golden for his delay in producing the 1978 Adoption Agreement. As the administrator of the Pension and Profit Sharing Plans, Golden was statutorily required to produce such a plan document within thirty days of any plan participant's written request. Because Lampkins originally requested the 1978 Adoption Agreement in a letter on July 1, 1992, Golden was obligated to provide Lampkins with the document by July 31, 1992 or pay a potential penalty of $100 per day for each day beyond the thirty-day period that he delayed producing it. In the present case, Golden delayed producing the 1978 Adoption Agreement until October 12, 1993, more than fifteen months after Lampkins had requested the document and more than fourteen months after the thirty-day statutory period for producing it had expired. Accordingly, the district court ordered Golden to pay Lampkins $32,850, a penalty of $75 per day for each of the 438 days from August 1, 1992 through October 12, 1993 that Golden failed or refused to furnish the subject document.

Golden timely appealed the decision of the district court, challenging only the district court's imposition of a fine against him.

II.

Although this case was decided on Lampkins's motion for summary judgment, and such motions are typically reviewed de novo, a district court's assessment of penalties under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c) is reviewed solely for an abuse of discretion. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1)(B); Bartling v. Fruehauf Corp., 29 F.3d 1062, 1068 (6th Cir.1994). "An abuse of discretion exists when the reviewing court is firmly convinced that a mistake has been made." Id. (citing In re Bendectin Litigation, 857 F.2d 290, 307 (6th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1006 (1989); Schrand v. Federal Pacific Elec. Co., 851 F.2d 152, 157 (6th Cir.1988)).

III.

Title 29, section 1024(b)(4), imposes specific duties upon a pension plan administrator to furnish information to a plan participant. Specifically, under § 1024(b)(4), a pension plan administrator shall

... upon written request of any participant or beneficiary, furnish a copy of the latest updated summary plan description, plan description, and the latest annual report, any terminal report, the bargaining agreement, trust agreement, contract, or other instruments under which the plan is established or operated.

Once a pension plan participant makes a request for any such documents, the plan administrator is obligated to produce the requested documents within thirty days. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1)(B). If the plan administrator fails to provide such documents within a thirty-day period, that administrator may be held personally liable to the plan participant for an amount up to $100 per day from the date of his failure or refusal to produce the documents. See id.

We cannot find that the district court abused its discretion in imposing a $75 per day penalty against Golden for failing to timely provide Lampkins with the 1978 Adoption Agreement. The 1978 Adoption Agreement is an instrument under which the Pension Plan was operated from 1978 to 1987. See 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(4). As the Pension Plan's administrator, Golden was required to produce this document within thirty days of Lampkins's written request. It is undisputed that Golden furnished the 1978 Adoption Agreement 438 days after the statute required him to do so.

Golden argues that the district court abused its discretionary authority because it assessed a penalty without finding that his delay caused Lampkins any prejudice. In support of this argument, Golden notes that some district courts have declined to impose a penalty unless the participant can show that the administrator's failure to deliver the documents within thirty days adversely affected the participant's rights in some fashion. See, e.g., Wesley v. Monsanto Co., 554 F.Supp. 93 (E.D.Mo.1982), aff'd, 710 F.2d 490 (8th Cir.1983); Pollock v. Castrovinci, 476 F.Supp. 606 (S.D.N.Y.1979), aff'd, 622 F.2d 575 (2d Cir.1980). The statute, however, does not require a finding of prejudice, and "[t]he circuits are in general accord that neither prejudice nor injury are prerequisites to recovery under the penalty provisions of the statute." Moothart v. Bell, 21 F.3d 1499, 1506 (10th Cir.1994) (citing Sage v. Automation, Inc. Pension Plan & Trust, 845 F.2d 885, 894 n. 4 (10th Cir.1988); see Faircloth v. Lundy Packing Co., 91 F.3d 648, 659 (4th Cir.1996) (noting that "prejudice to the party requesting the documents is not a prerequisite to the imposition of penalties...."); Gillis v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 4 F.3d 1137, 1148 (3d Cir.1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1369 (1994); Daughtrey v. Honeywell, Inc., 3 F.3d 1488, 1494 (11th Cir.1993); Rodriguez-Abreu v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 986 F.2d 580, 588 (1st Cir.1993)); see, e.g., Bartling v. Fruehauf Corp., 29 F.3d 1062 (6th Cir.1994). In fact, prejudice to the party requesting the documents is merely one factor that a district court may consider in imposing a penalty. See Faircloth, 91 F.3d at 659; Moothart, 21 F.3d at 1506; see, e.g., Bartling, 29 F.3d at 1068-69 (affirming a statutory penalty where, despite the lack of bad faith or prejudice, the district court had imposed the penalty "only because of the [large] number of Plaintiffs that were involved."); see also Daniel v. Eaton Corp., 839 F.2d 263, 268 (6th Cir.1988) (affirming an assessment of penalties against a plan administrator even though there was...

To continue reading

Request your trial
2 cases
  • Briggs v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • May 23, 2019
    ...Lewandowski, 986 F.2d at 1009 (recognizing that ERISA consciously limits recovery for disclosure violations); Lampkins v. Golden, 104 F.3d 361, 1996 WL 729136, *3 (6th Cir. 1996) ("The purpose of the statutory penalty is not to compensate participants, but to induce administrators to expedi......
  • Gregory v. Goodman Mfg. Co., Case No. 4:10-cv-23
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee
    • March 2, 2012
    ...a district court to take testimony or make any particular findings before assessing a penalty." Lampkins v. Golden, 104 F.3d 361 (table), 1996 WL 729136 at *4 (6th Cir. Dec. 17, 1996). To the extent that Defendant suggests that penalties may be imposed only after explicit findings of bad fa......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT