Jackson v. Byrd, 95-2118

• Decision Date: 10 December 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-2118,95-2118
• Citation: 105 F.3d 145
• Parties: Christine JACKSON, Appellant, v. Mary Leftridge BYRD, Superintendent; The District Attorney for Philadelphia County; the Attorney General of the State of Pennsylvania. . Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Page 145

105 F.3d 145

Christine JACKSON, Appellant, v. Mary Leftridge BYRD, Superintendent; The District Attorney for Philadelphia County; the Attorney General of the State of Pennsylvania.

No. 95-2118.

United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.

Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

Dec. 10, 1996.

Decided Jan. 29, 1997.

Sur Petition for Rehearing March 4, 1997.

Laurence R. Feinstein, Philadelphia, PA, for Appellant.

Donna G. Zucker, Chief, Federal Litigation, Ronald Eisenberg, Deputy District Attorney, Arnold H. Gordon, First Assistant District Attorney, Lynne Abraham, District Attorney, Office of District Attorney, Philadelphia, PA, for Appellees.

Before: BECKER, MANSMANN, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.

Christine Jackson appeals from an order entered on December 15, 1995, denying her petition for a writ of habeas corpus. These habeas corpus proceedings arise in the aftermath of Jackson's conviction on July 2, 1992, at a bench trial in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania. At that trial, the court found Jackson guilty of possession of a controlled substance and possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver. It subsequently sentenced her to a term of four to eight years' imprisonment.

The state trial judge made the following findings of fact in a written opinion denying Jackson's post-trial motions:

1. On December 16, 1988, at approximately 10:00 p.m., officers from the Philadelphia Police Department executed a search warrant for Jackson's apartment. The search warrant was executed based on information from an informant who claimed to have worked for two people, John and Len, who had drugs in the apartment.

2. Jackson was the lessee of the apartment, and admitted that she had a younger brother named John who also lived in the same apartment.

3. The apartment had a living space consisting of a combination living room, dining room, and kitchen, in addition to two bedrooms.

4. Jackson and her son, who shared one bedroom, were present during the search.

5. In the rear bedroom, the police found an ice chest belonging to Jackson which contained 41 clear bags each containing approximately 40 clear plastic vials filled with crack cocaine, and 14 clear bags each containing approximately 20 plastic packets of cocaine. There were approximately 297 bags and 1,683 vials. The total weight of the crack/cocaine was in excess of 250 grams.

6. The police also found a heat sealer, scale, loaded .38 calibre handgun, and loaded .9 mm handgun in the rear bedroom.

7. In a kitchen cabinet, the police found two scales and a heat sealer. In a closet next to Jackson's bedroom, the police found a duffel bag filled with thousands of empty vials and packets, and a loaded shotgun.

8. The rear bedroom, kitchen cabinets, and closet were not locked.

9. Jackson admitted to using the kitchen cabinets and the closet.

10. Police found proof of residency for the apartment in the form of a telephone bill, an electric bill, and a lease, all of which named Jackson.

11. An expert witness, if called, would have testified that the amount of illegal drugs and drug paraphernalia found in the apartment were indicative of possession with the intent to deliver, rather than mere possession.

Commonwealth v. Jackson, No. 8901-0957 (Pa.C.P. Jan. 22, 1993). Based on these findings Jackson appealed her conviction to the Pennsylvania Superior Court which affirmed. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 433 Pa.Super. 633, 638 A.2d 268 (1993) (table). She then obtained allocatur from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court which affirmed her conviction by an equally divided court. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 540 Pa. 556, 659 A.2d 549 (1995) (table). She asked for relief on appeal on the sole ground that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction.

of fact, the trial court concluded that (1) Jackson had access to all areas of the apartment, including the rear bedroom, (2) the amount of illegal drugs and drug paraphernalia found in the apartment demonstrated that they were possessed with intent to deliver, and (3) Jackson was a willing participant in the drug dealing occurring in her apartment.

Jackson thereafter filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On November 15, 1995, a magistrate judge issued a report recommending that the district court deny the petition and find that there was no probable cause to appeal. On December 15, 1995, the district court adopted this report and recommendation and denied the petition.

Jackson appealed, and we granted her request for a certificate of probable cause. The sole issue on this appeal is whether sufficient evidence supported Jackson's conviction on charges of possession of a controlled substance and possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver. Inasmuch as the district court relied on the state court record, we exercise plenary review of the district court's order on this appeal. Zettlemoyer v. Fulcomer, 923 F.2d 284, 291 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 902, 112 S.Ct. 280, 116 L.Ed.2d 232 (1991). We do not consider the effect of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, which Congress enacted while this appeal was pending, because even under prior law, which may have been less deferential to the state court proceedings than now would be the case, (see Berryman v. Morton, 100 F.3d 1089, 1103-04 (3d Cir.1996)), Jackson is not entitled to habeas relief.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), prior to its redesignation as 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) and its amendment by section 104 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, a federal court presumes that state court findings of fact are correct if the following requirements are met: there was (1) a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, (2) with findings made by a state court of competent jurisdiction, (3) in a proceeding to which the petitioner and the state were parties, (4) and the findings are evidenced by a written finding or opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia. See also Reese v. Fulcomer, 946 F.2d 247, 254-55 (3d Cir.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 988, 112 S.Ct. 1679, 118 L.Ed.2d 396 (1992). This presumption of correctness applies unless the state court's factual determinations are not fairly supported by the record. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(8). Thus, section 2254(d) " 'reflect[ed] a clear congressional policy favoring deference to state findings of fact absent good cause for rejecting such findings.' " Reese, 946 F.2d at 256 (quoting Nelson v. Fulcomer, 911 F.2d 928, 932 (3d Cir.1990)).

Federal courts, however, do not accord deference under section 2254(d) to state court legal rulings. See McAleese v. Mazurkiewicz, 1 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1028, 114 S.Ct. 645, 126 L.Ed.2d 603 (1993). Similarly, federal courts are not bound by any ultimate legal conclusion reached by a state court in deciding a mixed question of law and fact. Deputy v. Taylor, 19 F.3d 1485, 1494 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1230, 114 S.Ct. 2730, 129 L.Ed.2d 853 (1994). Of course, the "specific historical facts found by a state court in the course of deciding [a mixed question] are subject to deference by § 2254(d) unless they are not supported by the record." Id. at 1494-95.

As we have indicated, the sole issue in this case is whether there was sufficient evidence to support Jackson's conviction of possession of a controlled substance and possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver. Fourteenth Amendment due process guarantees protect an individual from "suffer[ing] the onus of a criminal conviction except upon sufficient proof--defined as evidence necessary to convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of [T]he critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction .... does not require a court to 'ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' ... Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

every element of the offense." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2787, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). In a federal habeas corpus proceeding where sufficiency of the evidence is at issue, Jackson v. Virginia sets forth the applicable standard:

Id. at 318-19, 99 S.Ct. at 2788-89 (citations omitted) (emphasis in the original).

The parties agree that the prosecution could not prove that Jackson had actual possession of the cocaine because the drugs were found in her apartment, and not on her person. Thus, the prosecution sought to prove that Jackson had constructive possession of the cocaine. As defined by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, constructive possession of contraband is conscious dominion over the illegal substance, the power to control it, and the intent to exercise the control. Commonwealth v. Mudrick, 510 Pa. 305, 507 A.2d 1212, 1213 (1986); Commonwealth v. Carroll, 510 Pa. 299, 507 A.2d 819, 820-21 (1986); Commonwealth v. Macolino, 503 Pa. 201, 469 A.2d 132, 134 (1983). Since determining whether a defendant had constructive possession of contraband is not amenable to "bright line" tests, Carroll, 507 A.2d at 821, the finder of fact may infer an intent to maintain a conscious dominion from the totality of the circumstances. Macolino, 469 A.2d at 134.

In Macolino, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the defendant husband had equal access to, and thus constructive possession of, contraband found in the bedroom he shared with his wife. Id. 469 A.2d at 135-36. The court found constructive possession in Carroll when the police found contraband in the hotel room that the defendant husband...