Williams v. N.L.R.B.
| Decision Date | 25 November 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 1953,D,1953 |
| Citation | 105 F.3d 787 |
| Parties | 153 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2986, 65 USLW 2439, 133 Lab.Cas. P 11,753 Clifford WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent, International Union, UAW and UAW Local 1752, Intervenor. ocket 96-4033. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
W. James Young, National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Inc., Springfield, VA, for Petitioner.
Nancy B. Hunt, Attorney, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, DC (Frederick L. Feinstein, General Counsel of National Labor Relations Board, Linda Sher, Associate General Counsel, Aileen A. Armstrong, Deputy Associate General Counsel, of counsel), for Respondent.
Before: NEWMAN, Chief Judge, LUMBARD and CALABRESI, Circuit Judges.
This case concerns the meaning of the term "membership" as it was used in an employee's dues checkoff authorization. Because
we conclude that the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or the "Board") acted reasonably in construing that term, we leave the Board's decision undisturbed.
United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers Union of America and its Local No. 1752 (collectively "the Unions") represent the employees at the Big Flats, New York, manufacturing facility of Schweizer Aircraft Corporation (the "Company"). Petitioner Clifford Williams has been employed by the Company since 1967.
Shortly after beginning his employment, Williams signed a dues checkoff authorization that stated: "I hereby assign to [the Unions] from any wages earned or to be earned by me as your employee ... such sums as the Financial Officer of said [Unions] may certify as due and owing from me as membership dues, including an initiation or reinstatement fee and monthly dues...." The dues checkoff authorization further provided that it could only be revoked during a ten-day window each year. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(4) ().
The collective-bargaining agreement between the Unions and the Company contained the following union-security clause:
The Company agrees that employees now in jobs covered by this Agreement, and employees employed after the signing of this Agreement shall on and after thirty (30) days from the date of their employment, become and remain members of the Union as a condition of continued employment, provided that nothing herein shall be interpreted to cause a violation of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 or any other applicable law.
See generally 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (permitting union-security clauses).
On December 19, 1990, Williams resigned from the Unions. This action was not inconsistent with the union-security clause; the Supreme Court has recognized an employee's right to resign union membership, even in the presence of a such a clause. See Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 106, 105 S.Ct. 3064, 3071, 87 L.Ed.2d 68 (1985). The employee who "resigns" still remains liable under the union-security clause to pay "membership" dues, Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 752-54, 108 S.Ct. 2641, 2652-53, 101 L.Ed.2d 634 (1988), but those dues do not represent the entire amount that full members of the union must pay:
Under ... § 8(a)(3), the burdens of membership upon which employment may be conditioned [in a union-security clause] are expressly limited to the payment of initiation fees and monthly dues. It is permissible to condition employment upon membership, but membership, insofar as it has significance to employment rights, may in turn be conditioned only upon payment of fees and dues. "Membership" as a condition of employment is whittled down to its financial core.
NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742, 83 S.Ct. 1453, 1459, 10 L.Ed.2d 670 (1963). Thus, a union-security clause "authorizes the exaction of only those fees and dues necessary to performing the duties of an exclusive representative of the employees in dealing with the employer on labor-management issues." Beck, 487 U.S. at 762-63, 108 S.Ct. at 2657 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). It does not oblige employees "to support union activities beyond those germane to collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment." Id. at 745, 108 S.Ct. at 2648.
Consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Beck, the Unions reduced Williams's "membership" dues to 79.64% of normal dues to reflect his decision to resign. They instructed the Company to diminish the amount of Williams's dues checkoff immediately.
In August 1991, eight months after his resignation, Williams attempted to revoke his dues checkoff authorization on the ground that he was no longer a member of the Unions. Although the window during which Williams was permitted to revoke the authorization was not yet open--it ran from September 8 through 18 each year--the Company nonetheless honored his demand. The Unions responded by filing a grievance Williams subsequently charged the Unions with violating Sections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act (the "Act"), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b), by filing their grievance against the Company. Section 8(b)(1)(A) provides that "[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in [Section 7 of the Act]." 1 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A). Section 8(b)(2) provides that "[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of [Section 8(a)(3) ]." 2 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2). The General Counsel of the NLRB issued a complaint against the Unions on August 12, 1993. On November 16, 1993, the General Counsel filed a motion for summary judgment, along with a motion to transfer the proceeding directly to the Board. The Board transferred the proceeding two days later, and the Unions soon answered with their own summary judgment motion.
against the Company, alleging that the Company should not have honored Williams's untimely request to revoke his dues checkoff authorization. The Unions and the Company settled their differences in February 1992.
On December 22, 1995, the Board, by a three to one vote, granted the Unions' summary judgment motion, concluding that their actions did not constitute an unfair labor practice. Schweizer Local No. 1752(UAW), 320 N.L.R.B. No. 39, 1995 WL 793264 (1995). Williams now petitions for review of that decision.
Our review of NLRB decisions is quite limited. "When the Board's construction of the Act is an acceptable reading of the statutory language and a reasonable interpretation of the purposes of the relevant statutory sections, its decision will not be overturned." NLRB v. National Broad. Co., Inc., 798 F.2d 75, 77 (2d Cir.1986) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). So long as the Board's "construction of the statute is reasonably defensible, it should not be rejected." Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 497, 99 S.Ct. 1842, 1849, 60 L.Ed.2d 420 (1979). And the Board's decision that a violation of the Act did not occur "must be upheld unless it has no rational basis." International Ladies' Garment Workers Union v. NLRB, 463 F.2d 907, 919 (D.C.Cir.1972). Applying that standard to the instant case, we cannot disturb the Board's decision.
It is undisputed that Williams still owes 79.64% of full membership dues pursuant to Beck. The only question before the Board and before this Court 3 is whether the Unions On this score, Williams relies heavily on IBEW Local No.2088 (Lockheed Space Operations), 302 N.L.R.B. 322, 1991 WL 67020 (1991). In Lockheed, he argues, the Board faced a similar factual situation, and held that "[i]f the employee did not agree, when he signed the authorization, to have 'regular membership dues' deducted even when he is no longer a union member, then the employee's continued financial support of the union is not clearly 'voluntary' after he has resigned." Id. at 328. According to Williams, the reasoning in Lockheed should be dispositive.
were wrongly permitted to require that this amount be deducted directly from Williams's paycheck pursuant to his dues checkoff authorization. Relying on the rule that in interpreting dues checkoff agreements, "[t]he touchstone is ... the scope of the employee's voluntary authorization," United Food & Commercial Workers Dist. Union Local One v. NLRB, 975 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir.1992), Williams contends that the Board's decision was erroneous. According to Williams, we can infer from the fact that the checkoff authorized the deduction of "membership dues" that Williams's intent at the time that he signed the checkoff form was to permit dues to be deducted from his paycheck only if he remained a full member of the Unions.
But Williams does not accurately characterize the Lockheed decision. In Lockheed the Board held that "[t]he policy [of voluntary unionism] warrants the application of a test that will assure that the extraction of moneys from an employee's wages to assist a union, if not authorized by a lawful union-security clause, is in accord with an employee's voluntary agreement." Id. (emphasis added). As such, the Board held that it would require in the dues checkoff authorization a "clear and unmistakable waiver" of the employee's Section 7 right to refuse to assist the union before it would allow the union to enforce the authorization after the employee had resigned from union membership. Id. In footnote 26 of the Lockheed decision, the Board explicitly reserved the question of whether the same analysis would apply in a case in which the employee was subject to a union-security clause:
A different situation exists when an employee is subject to a lawful union-security clause under which members and nonmembers alike have an obligation to provide dues to their...
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