Matthews v. Evatt

Citation105 F.3d 907
Decision Date28 January 1997
Docket NumberNo. 96-5,96-5
PartiesEarl MATTHEWS, Jr., Petitioner-Appellant, v. Parker EVATT, Commissioner, South Carolina Department of Corrections; T. Travis Medlock, Attorney General, State of South Carolina, Respondents-Appellees.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)

ARGUED: John Henry Blume, III, Columbia, South Carolina; David Paul Voison, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Lauri J. Soles, Assistant Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Charles Molony Condon, Attorney General, John W. McIntosh, Deputy Attorney General, Donald J. Zelenka, Assistant Deputy Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.

Before WIDENER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge HAMILTON wrote the opinion, in which Judge WIDENER and Senior Judge PHILLIPS joined.

OPINION

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner, Earl Matthews, Jr., appeals the district court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Finding no error, we affirm.

I
A

On the evening of October 29, 1984, Lucia Aimar and her boyfriend, Eric Burn, purchased their dinner at a drive-through restaurant in Charleston, South Carolina. While the couple was parked in a nearby parking lot eating their dinner, Matthews approached the driver's side of the car where Burn was seated. Matthews pulled out a handgun, pointed it at Burn's head, and demanded money. While Burn was searching for money, Matthews struck Burn across the face, breaking his nose. After Burn found five dollars in Aimar's purse, Burn handed the purse to Matthews.

Next, Matthews walked around to the passenger's side of the car where Aimar was seated. Aimar locked the door and tried to roll up the window. Matthews prevented Aimar from rolling up the window and asked for a ride. When Burn refused, Matthews shot Aimar in the head and shot Burn in the chest. As a result of her injuries, Aimar died. Burn recovered from his chest wound and later testified at Matthews' trial.

B

Following a jury trial, Matthews was convicted of the capital murder of Aimar, armed robbery, attempted armed robbery, assault and battery with intent to kill, and unlawful possession of a handgun.

On the murder count, on the recommendation of the jury, Matthews was sentenced to death. For the remaining offenses, Matthews received consecutive sentences totaling sixty-six years.

On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed Matthews' convictions, but vacated his death sentence because of a Skipper violation, 1 and remanded the case for a new sentencing trial. See State v. Matthews, 291 S.C. 339, 353 S.E.2d 444, 450 (1986). On remand, the jury again recommended a sentence of death, and Matthews was sentenced accordingly. This sentence was affirmed by the Supreme Court of South Carolina. See State v. Matthews, 296 S.C. 379, 373 S.E.2d 587, 596 (1988). Matthews then petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court of the United States denied the petition. See Matthews v. South Carolina, 489 U.S. 1091, 109 S.Ct. 1559, 103 L.Ed.2d 861 (1989).

Matthews then filed a state application for post-conviction relief, which the state trial court denied on August 24, 1992. The Supreme Court of South Carolina denied discretionary review, and, on May 31, 1994, the Supreme Court of the United States denied Matthews' second petition for writ of certiorari. See Matthews v. South Carolina, 511 U.S. 1138, 114 S.Ct. 2155, 128 L.Ed.2d 881 (1994).

On August 30, 1994, Matthews filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. The case was assigned to a magistrate judge, who, in a 124-page report and recommendation, recommended to the district court that it deny the petition. After de novo review of the record, the district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation and denied the petition. Matthews noted a timely appeal.

II

On appeal, Matthews raises numerous assignments of error. We shall address each of these assignments of error in turn.

A

Matthews argues that the Ninth Circuit Solicitor, Charles Condon, who is now the Attorney General of South Carolina, utilized his discretion in seeking the death penalty in this case in a racially discriminatory manner. In support of his contention that Mr. Condon sought the death penalty against him in a discriminatory manner, Matthews relies on statistical evidence and numerous alleged racist acts committed by Mr. Condon, both in his personal and professional life. In response, the State argues that the claim is procedurally barred because it was never presented in state court, and, in the alternative, is without merit. We agree with the State that this claim is procedurally barred and, therefore, decline to address the merits. See Karsten v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, 36 F.3d 8, 11 (4th Cir.1994) (per curiam) (noting that alternative holdings should be avoided).

In the interest of giving state courts the first opportunity to consider alleged constitutional errors occurring in a defendant's state trial and sentencing, a § 2254 petitioner is required to "exhaust" all state court remedies before a federal district court can entertain his claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) & (c); see also Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 1203, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982) (noting that "[t]he exhaustion doctrine is principally designed to protect the state courts' role in the enforcement of federal law and prevent disruption of state court proceedings"). Thus, a federal habeas court may consider only those issues which have been "fairly presented" to the state courts. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-78, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512-14, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971); see also Townes v. Murray, 68 F.3d 840, 846 (4th Cir.1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 831, 133 L.Ed.2d 830 (1996). A claim is fairly presented when the petitioner presented to the state courts the " 'substance' of his federal habeas corpus claim." Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6, 103 S.Ct. 276, 277, 74 L.Ed.2d 3 (1982) (per curiam) (quoting Picard, 404 U.S. at 278, 92 S.Ct. at 513). " 'The ground relied upon must be presented face-up and squarely; the federal question must be plainly defined. Oblique references which hint that a theory may be lurking in the woodwork will not' " suffice. Mallory v. Smith, 27 F.3d 991, 995 (4th Cir.) (quoting Martens v. Shannon, 836 F.2d 715, 717 (1st Cir.1988)), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1047, 115 S.Ct. 644, 130 L.Ed.2d 549 (1994). In other words, fair presentation contemplates that "both the operative facts and the 'controlling legal principles' " must be presented to the state court. Verdin v. O'Leary, 972 F.2d 1467, 1474 (7th Cir.1992) (quoting Picard, 404 U.S. at 277, 92 S.Ct. at 513); see also Joubert v. Hopkins, 75 F.3d 1232, 1240 (8th Cir.) ("A claim has been fairly presented when a petitioner has properly raised the 'same factual grounds and legal theories' in the state courts which he is attempting to raise in his federal habeas petition."), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 2574, 135 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1996).

To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a habeas petitioner must fairly present his claim to the state's highest court. See Spencer v. Murray, 18 F.3d 237, 239 (4th Cir.1994) (denying certain claims on exhaustion principles where claims were not raised on direct appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court); see also Levine v. Comm'r of Correctional Serv., 44 F.3d 121, 124 (2d Cir.1995); Story v. Kindt, 26 F.3d 402, 405 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1024, 115 S.Ct. 593, 130 L.Ed.2d 506 (1994); James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 24 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 935, 115 S.Ct. 333, 130 L.Ed.2d 291 (1994); Deters v. Collins, 985 F.2d 789, 795 (5th Cir.1993); Manning v. Alexander, 912 F.2d 878, 881 (6th Cir.1990). The burden of proving that a claim has been exhausted lies with the petitioner. Mallory, 27 F.3d at 994.

The exhaustion requirement, though not jurisdictional, Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 131, 107 S.Ct. 1671, 1673-74, 95 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987), is strictly enforced, Rose, 455 U.S. at 522, 102 S.Ct. at 1205. Consequently, when a petition includes both exhausted and unexhausted claims, the district court must dismiss the entire petition. See id. ("[W]e hold that a district court must dismiss habeas petitions containing both unexhausted and exhausted claims."). However, the exhaustion requirement for claims not fairly presented to the state's highest court is technically met when exhaustion is unconditionally waived by the state, Sweezy v. Garrison, 694 F.2d 331, 331 (4th Cir.1982) (per curiam), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 908, 103 S.Ct. 1882, 76 L.Ed.2d 812 (1983), or when a state procedural rule would bar consideration if the claim was later presented to the state court, Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 1, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2557 n. 1, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-98, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1068-69, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989); see also George v. Angelone, 100 F.3d 353, 363 (4th Cir.1996) ("A claim that has not been presented to the highest state court nevertheless may be treated as exhausted if it is clear that the claim would be procedurally defaulted under state law if the petitioner attempted to raise it at this juncture."); Bassette v. Thompson, 915 F.2d 932, 937 (4th Cir.1990) (If "it is clear that the state law would bar state review, exhaustion is not required, and federal review is precluded."), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 982, 111 S.Ct. 1639, 113 L.Ed.2d 734 (1991). The state procedural bar rule barring federal review must be independent and adequate to support the state court judgment. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729, 111 S.Ct. at 2553 ("This Court will not review a question of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests on a state...

To continue reading

Request your trial
816 cases
  • Primus v. Padula, C.A. No. 4:07-cv-02652-PMD-TER.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 4th Circuit. United States District Court of South Carolina
    • May 27, 2008
    ...... Matthews v. Evatt, 105 F.3d 907 (4th Cir.1997)( citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n. 1, 111 ......
  • Warren v. Polk, 1:05-CV-260
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 4th Circuit. Middle District of North Carolina
    • January 20, 2017
    ...hint that a theory may be lurking in the woodwork." Baker v. Corcoran, 220 F.3d 276, 289 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting Matthews v. Evatt, 105 F.3d 907, 911 (4th Cir. 1997)).15 Mr. Warren contends that because his attorney conceded his guilt to second-degree murder in closing arguments, the only ......
  • Weeks v. Angelone, Action No. 2:96CV829.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 4th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Virginia)
    • April 1, 1998
    ......Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S.Ct. 887, 130 L.Ed.2d 865 (1995) ( per curiam ); Matthews v. Evatt, 105 F.3d 907, 911 (4th Cir.) (explaining that in order to preserve the right to ......
  • Mahdi v. Stirling, C/A No. 8:16-3911-TMC
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 4th Circuit. United States District Court of South Carolina
    • September 24, 2018
    ..."To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a habeas petitioner must present his claims to the state's highest court." Matthews v. Evatt, 105 F.3d 907, 911 (4th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Barnette, 644 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 2011); see also In re Exhaustion of State ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT